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Abstract 
 
The influential theorist, David Bordwell, talks about various modes of watching film: the 
intellectual, the casual, or the obsessive interaction with cinema practiced by the film-buff. 
This thesis is an attempt to come to terms with film and film culture in a number of ways. It 
is first an attempt at reinscribing a notion of aesthetics into film studies. This is not an easy 
task. I argue that film theory is not adequately equipped to discuss film in affective terms, and 
that instead, it emphasises ways of thinking about film and culture quite removed from the act 
of film ‘spectating’ – individually, or perhaps even more crucially, collectively. To my mind, 
film theory increasingly needs to ask: are theorists and the various subjectivities about whom 
they theorise watching the same films, and in the same way? 
My experience of film is, as Tara Brabazon writes about her own experience of 
film, a profoundly emotional one. Film is a stream of quotation in my own life. It is 
inextricably wrapped up inside memory (and what Hutcheon calls postmodern nostalgia). 
Film is experience. I would not know how to communicate what Sergio Leone ‘means’ or 
The Godfather ‘represents’ without engaging what Barbara Kennedy calls the ‘aesthetic 
impulse.’ In this thesis, I extrapolate from what film means to me to what it might mean to an 
abstract notion of culture. For this reason, Chapters Three and Four are necessarily abstract 
and tentatively bring together an analysis of The Matrix franchise and Quentin Tarantino’s 
brand of metacinema. I focus on an aesthetics of cinema rather than its politics or ideological 
fabric. This is not to marginalise such studies (which, in any case, this thesis could not do) 
but to make space for another perspective, another way of considering film, a new way of 
recuperating affect.
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1. A Notion of Film Aesthetics 
 8 
1.1 Engaging the Aesthetic Impulse 
 
Contemporary cultural formations have been theorised through postmodern ideas of 
fragmentation, distillation, and a ‘politics of difference’ which has questioned fixed notions 
of identity and subjectivity. How do we begin to understand and account for the popularity, 
the desires and pleasures of contemporary cinema outside of these notions?1 
 
It is important to acknowledge that a shift has occurred – at least within an important 
swathe of contemporary visual culture – towards an aesthetic that foregrounds the 
dimension of appearance, form and sensation. And we must take this shift seriously at the 
aesthetic level… A rush into interpretation before the aesthetic has been more clearly 
apprehended may follow an all too easy dismissal of such a spectacle aesthetic on grounds 
that it is facile, already transparent or really about something else.2 
 
Post-media aesthetics needs categories that can describe how a cultural object organizes 
data and structures users’ experiences of this data.3 
 
The notion of an ‘aesthetics of sensation,’ which seems to have fallen out of favour with 
literary and cultural theorists, is necessary to make sense of the myriad of ways in which a 
contemporary popular culture interacts with cinema. According to Barbara Kennedy, one of 
the shortcomings of film theory is a failure to engage with what might be called an ‘aesthetic 
impulse.’ And while such an impulse celebrates affectivity, or what Andrew Darley calls 
“questions of a sensual and perceptual character,”4 it does not compromise the analysis of 
film as ideological or cultural artefact. I do not wish to disengage with the seemingly 
inexhaustible body of critical theory that privileges the structural or psychoanalytic approach 
to cinema, or the broadly Marxist project that charts in painstaking detail the formation of 
selves and others in a discursive system of studios, cultures, subcultures and artistic 
commodities. Yet this body of work cannot account for what I perceive to be the 
contemporary obsession with film as an affective medium, nor the cinematic text as an 
aesthetically engaged product operating within a Western, or as some theorists have argued, 
global marketplace.5 The nearest critical theory comes to this phenomenon is the relatively 
                                                
1 Barbara Kennedy, Deleuze and Cinema: The Aesthetics of Sensation (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2000), 4.  
2 Andrew Darley, Visual Digital Culture: Surface Play and Spectacle in New Media Genres (London: 
Routledge, 2000), 6. 
3 Lev Manovich, “Post-media Aesthetics.” In (dis)locations (DVD ROM) (Karlsruhe: ZKM Centre for Art and 
Media, 2001), 2. 
4 Darley, 6.  
5 For an analysis of the interconnectedness of various national cinemas, see Tom O’ Reagan, “A National 
Cinema.” In The Film Cultures Reader, ed. Graeme Turner (London: Routledge, 2002), 141.  
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recent interest in fandom,6 and even this field seems unfortunately to privilege the ‘cult’ text 
or ‘alternative’ voice, and is thus destined to repeat the exclusion of a text based on its 
popularity, or rather, the absence of a requisite degree of alterity. It is unfortunate precisely 
because film franchises such as The Matrix and Star Wars draw the crowds at the box office 
that an engagement with this art is so necessary. Film writing (scholarly and other modes) has 
always been suspicious of the blockbuster, distinguishing between an art cinema that 
functions as an autonomous creative work, and the pop culture entertainment spectacle that 
services a capitalist market ethos and the wish-fulfilment fantasies of a majority of the film-
going populace. In this way, the film theorist is able to differentiate between, for example, 
Antonioni’s Blow-Up and L’Avventura (The Adventure), and Spielberg’s Jaws and Raiders of 
the Lost Ark. Antonioni requires a spectator actively engaged in making meaning of the 
narrative, and indeed, the visual contours of the shot (L’Avventura’s striking use of deep 
focus in almost every shot is an example of the unconventional visuality of the art film 
aesthetic). Both L’Avventura and Blow-Up present metaphysical conundrums that challenge 
the conventional separation of truth and deception, or orthodox narrative continuity and a 
jarring discontinuity. Spielberg’s output in the late 1970s and early to mid 1980s is a self-
acknowledged sequence of ‘high concepts’ structured into cinematic spectacles: a twenty-five 
words or less pitch of the kind satirised in Robert Altman’s The Player.7 The high concept 
entertainment spectacle is a business enterprise; the art film is an artistic endeavour founded 
upon a singularly creative impulse. 
 In spite of the token disclaimer that high and low culture distinctions have been 
effaced in the postmodern milieu (apparently opening popular cinema to a veritable 
smorgasbord of analytic processes), film theory has in the main recuperated the distinction. 
While undertaking analyses of contemporary popular cinema (The Matrix, Star Wars, Back to 
the Future, Jaws, The Lord of the Rings, The Silence of the Lambs, Forrest Gump and Scream 
have each received a significant amount of attention from film and cultural theorists), theory 
relegates an examination of popular cinema as far from a conventional aesthetic approach to 
art as it possibly can. The Silence of the Lambs is less an aesthetic work than a system of 
                                                
6 For an analysis of fandom and its complex textual and cultural strategies, see Will Brooker, “Internet Fandom 
and the Continuing Narratives of Star Wars, Blade Runner and Alien.” In Alien Zone II: The Spaces of Science 
Fiction Cinema, ed. Annette Kuhn (London: Verso, 1999), 50-72. 
7 For an example of an influential exponent of this form of criticism, see David Thomson, The Whole Equation 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), 339-343. 
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ideological significations charting late capitalist, feminist or queer subjectivity.8 The Matrix 
services an examination of race and/or gender issues in contemporary America.9 Jaws enacts 
a liminal space in which deviant female sexuality is imagined as an unrelenting predator.10 
The Star Wars franchise instantiates a return to the Manichean opposition of good and evil 
and allegorises a neo-imperialistic ideological bent in late capitalist Western societies.11 
This kind of analysis, which has provided film theory with its remarkable 
advancements into the academy between the 1970s and the late 1990s, is not confined to the 
blockbuster or popular film. Work on film noir undertakes a similar task, with often striking 
and provocative conclusions. Examinations of the horror and slasher genre that burgeoned 
with the low budget independents of the 1970s (The Texas Chainsaw Massacre (1974), 
Halloween, The Howling) service a similar analytical bent. Laura Mulvey’s landmark turn to 
film theory with “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” is, as she states at the opening of 
the piece, to appropriate “Psychoanalytic theory…as a political weapon, demonstrating the 
way the unconscious of patriarchal society has structured film form.”12 Equally, the aesthetic 
of the film (Mulvey’s analysis implies that visual narrative is founded in its entirety on the 
patriarchal prejudices of society) is appropriated and reconfigured as structural or 
instrumental analysis of subjectivity and social conditioning. The image of Woman in 
Hitchcock’s Rear Window and Vertigo is “as (passive) raw material for the (active) gaze of 
man [which] takes the argument a step further into the structure of representation, adding a 
further layer demanded by the ideology of the patriarchal order as it is worked out in its 
favourite cinematic form – illusionistic narrative form.”13 Illusion masks only patriarchal 
hegemonic practices and chained female subjectivities. I do not wish to take issue with 
Mulvey’s seminal analysis except to suggest that illusion in cinematic spectacle (and 
                                                
8 See, for example, Annalee Newitz, “Serial Killers, True Crime, and Economic Performance Anxiety.” In 
Mythologies of Violence in Postmodern Media, ed. Christopher Sharrett (Michigan: Wayne State University 
Press, 1999), 66. 
9 See C. Richard King and David J. Leonard, “Is Neo White? Reading Race, Watching the Trilogy.” In Jacking 
in to The Matrix Franchise: Cultural Reception and Interpretation, ed. Matthew Kapell and William G. Doty 
(New York: Continuum, 2004), 32-47. 
10 Robert Jewett and John Shelton Lawrence, The American Monomyth (New York: Anchor Press/Double Day, 
1977), 148-164. 
11 For the most lucid account of this widely held view, see Dan Rubey, “Not So Long Ago, Not So Far Away.” 
Jump Cut 41 (1997). See also Koenraad Kuiper, “Star Wars: An Imperial Myth.” Journal of Popular Culture 21, 
no. 4 (1988), 77-86. 
12 Laura Mulvey, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema.” In The Sexual Subject: A Screen Reader in Sexuality, 
ed. Screen (London: Routledge, 1992), 22. 
13 Mulvey, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” 32. 
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certainly in the work of Hitchcock) is a purveyor of far more than patriarchy and it is this 
kind of failure to engage with an alternative aesthetic practice in film that has marginalised 
film aesthetics altogether. 
What I perceive as a very real shortcoming in film theory is the lack of an analysis of 
film as aesthetically charged, or functioning affectively on the spectator. Manovich describes 
this ‘waning of affect’ in relation to the demand for new modes of affectivity in computer 
culture and digital media:  
 
Affect has been neglected in cultural theory since the late 1950s when, influenced by the 
mathematic theory of communication, Roman Jakobson, Claude Levi-Strauss, Roland 
Barthes and others began treating cultural communication solely as a matter of encoding 
and decoding messages… By approaching any cultural object/situation/process as ‘text’ that 
is ‘read’ by audiences and/or critics, cultural criticism privileges the informational and 
cognitive dimensions of culture over affective, emotional, performative and experiential 
aspects. Other influential approaches of recent decades similarly neglect these dimensions.14 
 
The orthodox treatment of the affective in film writing relies on the assumption of spectator 
passivity in the popular film, but the nature of the cinematic spectacle is rarely conceptualised 
in more conventional analyses that emphasise the study of film ‘cultures,’ or more 
fashionably, ‘film subjectivities.’ At the risk of sounding parochial, spectators are interested 
in the look and sound of film as a profoundly aesthetic engagement with the senses. Spectacle 
is rarely (and certainly not entirely) a matter of image absorption or spectator inculcation into 
an ideologised medium. Visual cinema (which I will distinguish from narrative cinema – of 
course, most cinema relies on narrative structure, but a visual cinema responds to the 
affective engagement with the visual impact of the image, shot or sequence on screen) is a 
complex dynamic of camera movement, angles, positions, mise en scene, innovations in 
sound and image technologies. In this film aesthetic, I contend that the spectator rises above 
the passivity conceptualised by Adorno, Jameson and others.  
Distinctions between passive and active viewing in contemporary, or more 
specifically, postmodern cinema, are incompatible with ways of seeing, or spectating, that 
contemporary culture employs. On one level, the activity of intellectually or emotively 
responding to L’Avventura is vastly removed from a response to a multi-million dollar film 
franchise in which a complex engagement with the film text requires immersion in its 
                                                
14 Manovich, “Post-media Aesthetics,” 5-6. 
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performance as product in the market: soundtracks, computer games, action figures, clothing 
and various other marketing strategies employed by most sections of the marketplace. Film 
theory must re-engage with the complexities of how a film is read, or viewed, and this 
analysis (if it is to be a qualitative analysis of popular culture) must begin with an analysis of 
its film aesthetics. In relation to what I will freely acknowledge is a consumerist popular 
culture, I reject Adorno’s notion of a kind of industrialisation that spawns only passivity, 
conformity and the blandness of cinematic entertainment. In this formulation, mass culture 
(though distinctions between mass and other cultural bodies are vague) is a culture which 
“proclaims: you shall conform, without instruction as to what; conform to that which exists 
anyway, and to that which everyone thinks anyway as a reflex of its power and 
omnipresence.” “The power of the culture industry’s ideology is such that conformity has 
replaced consciousness.”15 Although I will explore this in some detail, I will say here that 
Adorno’s piece was historically and culturally specific, and could not have foreseen the rise 
of a kind of mass culture (I distinguish between Noël Carroll’s notion of mass art as occurring 
with the printing press16 and the phenomenon of Titanic as a billion dollar-plus cultural and 
artistic industry) as a complex and diversely articulated movement.17 
 
In his monologue at the 2005 Academy Awards, American comedian Chris Rock satirised the 
Academy of Motion Pictures by interviewing audiences at a South Central Los Angeles 
multiplex. Rock’s claim was that relatively few Americans had seen the films nominated for 
best picture that year. While the Academy and Hollywood celebrated its filmic ascendance 
with Eastwood’s social realist fable, Million Dollar Baby, Scorsese’s lavish biopic, The 
Aviator, and the nostalgic Americana, Sideways, Rock’s contention was that these films were 
establishment honorific symbols. What signified the Hollywood product in 2005, among 
other things, was the Wayans’ Brothers screwball comedy, White Chicks, in which two black 
men disguise themselves as white women to bring a white-collar criminal to justice. The 
reference to Billy Wilder’s Some Like it Hot (albeit a reference that was vague amidst a 
                                                
15 Theodor Adorno, “Culture Industry Reconsidered.” In The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass 
Culture, ed. J. M. Bernstein (London: Routledge, 1991), 90. 
16 Noël Carroll, A Philosophy of Mass Art (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 172. 
17 For a discussion of the influence of the Frankfurt School, and particularly Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
‘pessimism,’ see Joanne Hollows, “Mass Culture Theory and Political Economy.” In Approaches to Popular 
Film, ed. Joanne Hollows and Mark Jancovich (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), 18-20. 
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plethora of derivative scenes) was lost on this multiplex audience, but the Wayans did not 
need Wilder to stamp their film with an establishment honour. 
 Rock’s monologue was perceived as the Hollywood establishment ‘not taking itself 
too seriously.’ Yet while his investigation of mainstream American film interests 
demonstrates less than a scholarly approach, the implicit distinction Rock makes between a 
‘serious’ cinema and a cinema of the multiplex is provocative. Consider the following 
selection of films: 
  
Citizen Kane (1941), The Third Man (1949), Sunset Boulevard (1950), L’Avventura (1960), 
Peeping Tom (1960), A Clockwork Orange (1971), Don’t Look Now (1973), Eraserhead 
(1977), Apocalypse Now (1979), Raging Bull (1980), The King of Comedy (1983), Paris, 
Texas (1984), Akira (1988), Sex, Lies and Videotape (1989), Clerks (1994), Chong Qing 
Sen Lin (Chungking Express, 1994), Strange Days (1995), Boogie Nights (1997), Todo 
Sobre Mi Madre (All About my Mother, 1999), Adaptation (2002). 
 
It must be significant that the majority of the film going populace has not seen these films. I 
selected these in particular because many of them have been central to the formation of a 
corpus of film (and associated cultural, aesthetic and philosophical) theory; others are 
exemplary of the contemporary scholarship of postmodernism, feminism and the gaze, 
psychoanalysis, structuralism, cultural theory and subcultures, and art-house/alternative 
cinema. Each one of these films merits serious analytical attention, but accepted analytical 
strategies have rendered a great deal of writing on film insular, self-reflective, obtuse, and in 
its worst incarnation, elitist. Theoretical abstraction in film studies marginalizes the voice of 
the casual filmgoer, reviewer and fan, who, in Graham McCann’s analysis, watch ‘movies,’ 
while theorists view ‘films.’ In a caustic piece reflecting on recent trends in psychoanalytic 
theory, McCann writes: 
 
For all their demotic pretensions, film theorists continue to handle popular culture with ill-
disguised distaste. The popular has to be transformed into the unpopular before it can be 
discussed without embarrassment…The transformation may occur through 
repackaging…accompanied by reassuring Guardian encomia and precious labels like 
‘Connoisseur Video’ and ‘The Elite Collection’…In this new form, the movie can be 
thought of as a film.18 
 
He proceeds to discuss Žižek’s use of Lacan in his writing on Hitchcock, implying that the 
abstraction of the film into theory fails to address its status as a popular culture artefact, 
                                                
18 Graham McCann, “The Movie Killers.” Modern Review 1, no. 9 (1993), 33. 
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‘movie’ more than ‘film.’ Robin Wood explores similar territory in his influential analysis of 
Hitchcock as a filmmaker:  
 
The cinema – especially the Hollywood cinema – is a commercial medium. Hitchcock’s 
films are – usually – popular: indeed, some of his best films (Rear Window, Psycho) are 
among his most popular. From this arises a widespread assumption that, however “clever,” 
“technically brilliant,” “amusing,” “gripping,” etc., they may be, they can’t be taken 
seriously as we take, say, the films of Bergman and Antonioni seriously. They must be, if 
not absolutely bad, at least fatally flawed from a serious standpoint.19 
 
In response to François Truffaut’s suggestion that Psycho is an experimental film, Hitchcock 
replies: 
 
Possibly. My main satisfaction is that the film had an effect on the audiences, and I consider 
that very important. I don’t care about the subject matter; I don’t care about the acting; but I 
do care about the pieces of film and the photography and the sound-track and all the 
technical ingredients that made the audience scream. I feel it’s tremendously satisfying for 
us to be able to use the cinematic art to achieve something of a mass emotion. It wasn’t a 
message that stirred the audiences, nor was it a great performance or their enjoyment of the 
novel. They were aroused by pure film.20 
 
Both McCann and Wood allude to the need for a film aesthetic that takes account of the 
affective parameters of the cinematic text. Implicit in this is an acknowledgement that the 
affective response is fundamentally attached to the way film is viewed in mainstream society, 
or the way in which popular cinema engages with a wider audience. Of course, we cannot 
dismiss the material conditions in which the product enters the marketplace, subject to what 
Wood calls the “dominant ideology.” But neither is popular cinema a blank slate upon which 
to work nefarious ideological conspiracies upon the passive consumer. The oeuvres of Lucas 
and Spielberg have little in common with either Bergman’s or Antonioni’s. But in what sense 
should this result in the evaluation of Lucas or Spielberg as lesser filmmakers, or as the 
detritus of a once aesthetically engaged medium? If movies and MTV have taught us 
anything, it is that theorists must employ the age-old Leavisite/Arnold distinction of the 
classical aesthetic and culture with caution. 
Film studies must concurrently engage with the material reality of the film industry 
and the qualitative features of what Adorno considered the industrialisation of culture. Carroll 
                                                
19 Robin Wood, Hitchcock’s Films Revisited (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 57. Original 
emphasis. 
20 François Truffaut, Hitchcock (London: Granada, 1969), 349. 
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suggests that mass or popular forms of culture and art are ultimately attached to notions of 
commonality and community: “A taste for easily accessible art will not evaporate soon, nor 
will the pleasure to be had from sharing artworks with large numbers of our fellow citizens. 
For people like to have commerce with the same artworks that their neighbours – far and 
wide – do… It is an important element of possessing a common culture.”21 Adorno’s 
industrialisation of culture is also, in a literal sense, a process in which culture is made 
available to a wider audience. Such processes operate within what writers (predominantly 
Marxist) have analysed as a ubiquitous capitalistic marketplace. Rather than taking issue with 
the existence (or ubiquity) of this market, I attempt to reorganise the relation of the mass 
culture subject to the market.  
It is indisputable that film is not only the dominant form of entertainment and art in 
contemporary Western cultures, but for many of these cultures, the only one. This is a 
simplification only insofar as film is hardly singularly mass or popular. And yet the majority 
of filmgoers are surely oblivious to Antonioni or Tarkovsky. For a sense of cultural and 
aesthetic identity, I argue that cultures revert to a popular form of cinema, its ways of making 
meaning, and its affective impact on the self. This centrality of an art form to personal 
experience and subjectivity requires returning to an aesthetic inquiry, if only to forge a 
critical space for the Matrix-like franchises that dominate the box-office and the individual 
and collective fantasies of a mass culture. 
 
1.2 Realism: Foundations 
A new cinematic aesthetic must necessarily describe and engage a body of films and critical 
theory that traces a diversion from cinematic realism. Realism, in this context, has a two-fold 
definition. Traditional pictorial realism refers to the degree of verisimilitude of the 
reproduction of the real object. A photograph of a building façade is, in one sense, the perfect 
image reproduction of that façade. The advance in image making technologies (traditional art 
forms (painting, sculpture, wood block print, etc.), photography, moving images, digital 
cinema, virtual imaging) allows a more perfect reproduction, an image more faithful to the 
object than that permitted by an earlier technology. More generally, I use the term realism to 
refer to a broader ‘realist’ aesthetic that has informed artistic traditions and analysis. This 
aesthetic refers to a degree of verisimilitude in the attitude of the text to the object it 
                                                
21 Carroll, A Philosophy of Mass Art, 13.  
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represents, but it also indicates a sense of the reproduction as striving for a realistic 
representation of the tangible object. Of course, it must be said here that the two definitions, 
or contexts, are interconnected. The verisimilitude of the reproduction functions as a template 
for the verisimilitude of a more general ‘truth’ – for example, a truth manifested in the 
universal nature, or the Platonic ideal. Ultimately, discussions about nature or essentialisms 
in literary or cinematic characters stress the fidelity to the way that nature exists in a ‘real’ 
world, or a world that antecedes the representation, the aesthetic object. 
A new film aesthetic must simultaneously acknowledge the centrality of the realist 
aesthetic to contemporary film and film theory, and recognise the innovation toward 
spectacle cinema, virtual realism, genericity, and the transformation in the ontology of the 
spectator/theorist. Theorising beyond the Real requires an appreciation of the ontology of the 
realist image. A theory of hyperrealism (in which Baudrillard’s Real consists of a “generation 
by models of a real without origin or reality”22) or Neorealism (consider, for example, the 
influential Italian Neo-realist cinema of the 1940s23) must acknowledge the residue of a 
classical realist aesthetics in its performance on the screen, or on the isolated subjectivity of 
the cinematic spectator. The realist aesthetic insinuates itself into critical theses on cinematic 
style as well as the dominant modes of qualitative cultural analyses.  
I argue that critical theory esteems an essentialist notion of realism in which realism is 
a mimetic art, or a ‘reality myth,’ to paraphrase André Bazin. Cinema promises the 
possibility of the perfection of representative art: the revelation of truth and a profoundly 
humanist capacity for the illumination of nature and an essential reality. Kracauer offers a 
seminal formulation of this approach to cinema:  
 
All these creative efforts [of the filmmaker] are in keeping with the cinematic approach as 
long as they benefit, in some way or other, the medium’s substantive concern with our 
visible world. As in photography, everything depends on the “right” balance between the 
realistic tendency and the formative tendency; and the two tendencies are well balanced if 
the latter does not try to overwhelm the former but eventually follows its lead.24  
 
                                                
22 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation. Trans. Sheila Faria Glaser (Detroit: University of Michigan 
Press, 1994), 1. 
23 Roberto Rossellini’s Roma, Città Aperta [Open City, 1945], Paisà [Paisan, 1946] and Vittorio de Sica’s 
Ladri Di Biciclette [The Bicycle Thief, 1948] are generally considered exemplary of this tradition. For a 
discussion of the legacy of Neo-realism, see Jay McRoy, “Italian Neo-Realist Influences.” In New Punk Cinema, 
ed. Nicholas Rombes. (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2005), 40.  
24 Siegfried Kracauer, Theory of Film: The Redemption of Physical Reality (London and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1960), 39. 
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Andrew summarises the pursuit of realism as a founding principle of cinema: “The history of 
cinema is usually measured as the progressive ad-equation of the rules of cinematic 
organisation to the habitual ways by which we organize our life in our culture.”25 Cinema 
thus presents the capacity to reveal the Real in its fullest sense, in its image and process, 
which I would argue is the culmination of a humanist pursuit of the ideal in representative 
form. While this chapter focuses on Bazin’s ‘ontology of the Real’ (particularly as he 
formulates it in relation to Orson Welles), I hope to foreground the necessity for discussing 
the various cultures that receive cinematic texts, and that continue to view, collect, reflect 
upon and indelibly re-conform them. In Chapter Two, I consider the major aesthetic models 
brought to bear on our accepted analyses of cinema, including Frederic Jameson’s ‘waning of 
affect,’ and to a lesser extent, the Marxist frame of critical and cultural analysis. In the 
following discussion, I touch briefly on these legacies, but more for their descriptive and 
applicative value in the criticism of cinematic style than in a meaningful discussion of their 
cultural (for my purposes, specifically popular cultural) impact. 
 This chapter will also comprise an extended introduction to the second part of this 
thesis, in which I attempt to conceptualise a contemporary filmic subjectivity (the performer 
of the ‘hypermyth,’ Neo) necessary for comprehending the ontological space carved out by 
contemporary cinematic practices. Christian Metz distinguishes between the ‘filmic’ and the 
‘cinematic,’26 in which ‘filmic’ connotes elements external to the film and ‘cinematic’ 
elements internal to it: narrative structure, characterisation, theme, as well as mise en scene 
and mis en shot. This is a distinction I will uphold. The filmic, in a Metzian sense, 
incorporates the processes of production and the act of consumption of the cinematic. Metz’s 
distinction is useful because it allows a critical trajectory aimed equally at a stylistics of film 
and the instruments of its production and reception, producers and consumers, an approach 
that incorporates an analysis of the filmic and the cinematic. In my usage, consumers are 
partakers communally in the proffering of a product; filmmaking and film viewing are 
essentially consumptive practices.  
*** 
                                                
25 Dudley Andrew, Concepts in Film Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 47. 
26 Christian Metz, Language and Cinema. Trans. Donna Jean Umiker-Sebeok (The Hague: Mouton, 1974),  
55-61.  
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Foregrounding the reality aspect of film is often perceived as a necessary component of 
criticism, particularly in popular media. The greater part of film reviews (to distinguish this 
from the scholarly, and academically published, analysis of film) consider film’s relation to a 
pre-existing and eminently discoverable reality for a sense of its aesthetic or cinematic worth. 
Thus, Mike Leigh or John Sayles are praised for their unique brand of social realism. Leigh’s 
cinematic philosophy esteems realism over spectacle, the Real over the generic artifice. 
Discussing Vera Drake, Leigh asserts that his characters are “specific and idiosyncratic.”27 Of 
his artistic philosophy, Leigh suggests that “primarily, my films are a response to the way 
people are, the way things are as I experience them.”28 The implication here is that a notion 
of the indissoluble Real pours forth the artistic representation as near to verisimilitude as the 
medium will allow.  
Moreover, the triumph of the Real finds form (or at least credibility) in the departure 
from the non-Real. Secrets and Lies employs naturalistic acting styles (that veer perilously 
close to melodrama, particularly in the early exchanges between Cynthia (Brenda Blethyn) 
and Hortense (Marianne Jean-Baptiste), and camera angles to ground the image in the 
parameters of an external social reality. The naturalistic cinematography of Matewan or 
Lonestar compliments Sayles’s political project that engages with material working 
conditions and a contemporary class-consciousness.  
Even more significantly, genre animation such as The Incredibles is valued for what it 
might say about the ‘real world,’ and by extension, real lived experiences and even a sense of 
the communal self. Lisa Schwarzbaum, writing in Entertainment Weekly, suggests that  
 
the family’s escapades in the field are indeed stupendous, an homage to the exploits of 
classic comic-book masters of the universe. But the true heroism in this spectacular movie – 
as worthy of a best picture nomination as any made with fleshly stars – shines brightest in 
that suburban house, where Bob, with his midlife bulge and his thinning hair, pines 
nostalgically for the old days, and Helen marches anxiously forward, bending to her 
family’s needs.29  
 
The value of the digitally animated image is discovered by Schwarzbaum in character, theme 
and narrative rather than image, shot, sequence, or a broader notion of spectacle. The 
                                                
27 Quoted in Sean O’Hagan, “’I’m allowed to do what I want – that amazes me!’” Interview. The Observer, Dec. 
5, 2004. 
28 Quoted in Michael Coveney, The World According to Mike Leigh (London: HarperCollins, 1996), 5. 
[Originally International Herald Tribune, Feb. 2, 1994.] 
29 Lisa Schwarzbaum, “The Incredibles.” Entertainment Weekly, 15 Sep. 2005.  
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Incredibles is spectacular, but for the most unspectacular reasons. The genre film is subjected 
to critical scrutiny based on a conventional realist approach to cinema. Genre must ascribe its 
own ‘reality apparatus,’ to which the generic product must adhere or yet again stretch the 
sacrosanct bounds of filmed reality. Steve Neale uses the term ‘verisimilitude’ to describe the 
way genre cinema conforms to particular types and cinematic styles. Neale suggests that a 
genre film must have a degree of verisimilitude to the generic form, whether western, musical 
or gangster film.30 We could equally extend this verisimilitude to the realist aesthetic, in 
which the Real is engaged less obviously with a ‘real world’ than with its reproduced and 
ultimately generic aestheticisation; Jim Collins refers to this mode as ‘genericity’, which I 
will explore in some detail in chapter four.  
Genre cinema is less than ‘reality,’ but it functions for mainstream film reviewers in 
much the same way, evidenced by Schwarzbaum’s approach to The Incredibles. The 
orthodox response to David Fincher’s Se7en must address the film as conforming to the 
precepts of the thriller or film noir before it can embark on a project of generic commentary 
to embody a “spirit of innovation.”31 Classical genre cinema of the 1930s and 40s did a very 
similar thing, transposing an essentially classical realism for its contemporary audience. 
Consider, for example, the invisible editing of the Hollywood studio film of the 1930s and 
1940s. Finding its business in the genre film (in which even the most naturalistic depiction 
(The Grapes of Wrath, The Lost Weekend) was a generic form and eminently reproducible), 
the studio aesthetic employed an editing process that diminished the degree of artifice in plot 
and characterisation. The perfection of the film noir in Double Indemnity offers a depiction of 
a harsher reality of post-Depression America (servicing the traditional realist aesthetic) amid 
the stylised dialogue and acting. 
The pervasiveness of the mode of classical realism infects even the casual filmgoer, 
such that she feels beholden to address the cinematic image in relation to an ideal measure of 
reality. The image on screen must be, a priori, a thing of itself, and what it was always 
intended to be: irreducible, a perfect reproduction of the external reality from which it is 
drawn, yet simultaneously reproduced only once. In this sense, it is posited as an ‘authentic’ 
reproduction, something to which Walter Benjamin moves in his essay, The Work of Art in 
                                                
30 Steve Neale, Genre and Hollywood (London: Routledge, 2000), 31. 
31 Jim Hillier, “Introduction.” In American Independent Cinema: A Sight and Sound Reader, ed. Jim Hillier 
(London: British Film Institute, 2001), 16. 
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the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.32 The literal transposition of the Real into the 
reproduced image recalls Adorno in a similar context: “For no authentic work of art and no 
true philosophy, according to their very meaning, has ever exhausted itself in itself alone, in 
its being-in-itself.”33 In his essay, Adorno argues for a dialectic in which the artwork is 
autonomous yet simultaneously engaged with the external conditions into which it is placed 
for exhibition or consumption. The necessity for an ‘autonomously engaged’ art can be 
applied to the autonomy of the image on a cinematic screen as an organising factor in the 
viewing criteria of classical Hollywood cinema. The screen image was posited as distinct 
from reality (it was, in a very literal sense, a form of escapism from an external world), but it 
prompted the spectator to address the screen image as a faithful reproduction of the real 
world. The image was autonomous, yet engaged with the reality it sought to reproduce. 
Cinema as an art form was thus founded on a realist aesthetic even as Hollywood prospered 
through its stories of heroes, villains, and damsels in distress. Ironically, Hollywood’s 
enduring ‘classicism’ of the studio era was always simultaneously an enduring form of 
realism.34 
 
The contemplation of film as reality invites a consideration of the limits to which realism can 
be stretched as a meaningful aesthetic measure. In positioning the spectator in a relation to 
the Real, film is able to foreground this inherent limitation. Viewing a trailer of Michel 
Gondry’s Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, a two minute montage, I was transfixed only 
by a single sequence, a three second shot of Joel Barish (Jim Carey), dishevelled with 
unrequited love, as the clip played the major theme over his shuddering (from the 
expurgation of grief) image. The chaotic complexities of the film dissolved into something 
vague and formless, yet its essentiality remained. It cohered beautifully and elegantly (to my 
mind, uncorrupted) as a three second sequence, and would no doubt have done as well in a 
single image, in the way that the lines of streaming data on a computer screen can recall the 
experience of engaging with a film franchise, The Matrix. What struck me as significant in 
Joel Barish’s image was the ease – and remarkable acuity - with which I substituted it for an 
                                                
32 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” In The Norton Anthology of 
Theory and Criticism, ed. Peter Simon (New York: W. W. Norton: 2001), 1166-1186. 
33 Theodor Adorno, “Cultural Criticism and Society.” In Prisms, trans. Samuel and Sherry Weber (London: 
Neville Spearman, 1967), 23. 
34 See E. Ann Kaplan, “Classical Hollywood Film and Melodrama.” In American Cinema and Hollywood: 
Critical Approaches, ed. John Hill and Pamela Church Gibson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 46-48. 
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entire film experience. I rented the film, watched it again, and lived the experience of the first 
viewing a year before, and the profundity of that second viewing, the three second sequence. 
What I am getting at here is the spectator’s ability to substitute the signifier for the signified 
in the cinematic image, the reproduced segment for the original whole, and yet to maintain 
the veracity and incorruptibility of its authenticity. A contemporary film ontology is in this 
sense founded upon an artifice. In reducing the whole to a montage, the spectator substitutes 
the component part for the full composition. The substitution of the once irreducible whole 
into an infinitely variable composition of images, shots, montage sequences, etc., shares 
something with Nicholas Rombes’s analysis of the component structure of the DVD: 
 
What if we think of the supplementary features on DVDs not as just simply bonus material, 
but as new forms of cinema? Experimental cinema? For instance, the Blue Velvet DVD 
includes a bizarre feature that’s sort of a “deleted scenes,” but not quite. Supposedly, the 
footage that didn’t make it into David Lynch’s Blue Velvet was lost, but 
production/publicity stills survived, and the deleted scenes are composed of these still 
images, set to music, and edited together to suggest movement.35  
 
I would only add that the division of the cinematic whole into chapters and various 
alternatives to the ‘original’ text (alternate endings are an obvious example) inscribes the 
DVD as a kind of cinema ontologically removed from a classical cinema and its viewing 
practices. The fact that DVD enables chapter viewing, still shots without the stretching of 
videotape, a capacity to reduce the image to slow-motion controlled by the spectator – must 
fundamentally reorganise the relationship between the spectator (particularly the 
spectator/fan or spectator/theorist, distinctions I will further explore) and the unalterable 
‘classic’. It is now fascinating to read Robin Wood’s analysis of Rear Window in the first 
edition of Hitchcock’s Films Revisited. Wood confesses that his analysis is based on a “three 
year old memory and a few scribbled notes in the cinema.”36 Contrast this with Žižek’s 
analysis of a single (panning) shot on Vertigo’s DVD: 
 
After seeing the entrance to Ernie’s from the outside, there is a cut to Scottie sitting at the 
bar counter in the front of the restaurant and looking through a partition into the large room 
with tables and guests. A long panning shot (without a cut) then takes us back and to the 
left, giving an overview of the entire crowded room, the soundtrack reproducing the chatter 
                                                
35 Nicholas Rombes, “A New Film Genre?” Digital Poetics. Blog. 15 Apr. 2005. 
<http://professordvd.typepad.com/my_weblog/2005/04/index.html>. Accessed 16 Jul. 2005. 
36 Wood, Hitchcock’s Films Revisited, 100. 
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and clatter of a busy restaurant. We should bear in mind that this, clearly, is not Scottie’s 
point of view.37 
  
The DVD is, if not revolutionary in its reproductive capacity, certainly an alteration in the 
way ‘cinema’ (which is of course now vaguely anachronistic) is viewed, reviewed, analysed, 
and in the advent of the innovation of digital cinema, made. 
The spectator’s response to contemporary cinema (and to classical cinema made 
contemporary upon DVD release) is also anchored in a cinematicality, an awareness of the 
text as partaking of a filmic history, context and aesthetic register. The image of the love-lorn 
Carey is inserted into what Eco calls the encyclopaedia of the “collective imagination.”38 The 
montage imbues the sequence extracted from the whole with what Collins calls a “cultural 
charge,”39 an affective stimulus based on a complex cinematic and cultural awareness. 
Attending an opening-weekend screening of Star Wars, Episode III: Revenge of the Sith, I 
was astonished to hear a collective round of applause at the presentation of the gigantic 
STAR WARS title screen. The still image was imbued with the fullness of a filmic franchise, 
as Joel Barish’s face had been imbued with the fullness of Eternal Sunshine. An exchange 
between image and spectator had taken place in the opening shot, rendering the image 
attentive to its own status as metonym, as signification of an entire mythic, cultural and 
aesthetic reality. What is significant here is the transition of the cinematic shot/image, the 
indivisible component (in lieu of the fullness of the text) into a continuum of subjective 
aesthetic values. This formulation shares something with Deleuze, if in a slightly different 
context. Deleuze suggests that the cinematic image after the Second World War is a 
conflation of “floating images, these anonymous clichés which circulate in the external 
world, but which also penetrate each one of us and constitute his internal world so that 
everyone possesses only psychic clichés by which he thinks and feels, is thought and is felt, 
being himself a cliché among the others in the world which surrounds him.”40 While I am not 
drawing concretely on Deleuze’s formulation of an alternative to the action-image, I share his 
scepticism of the cinematic image to engage with the fullness of a traditional (Real) textual 
activity. 
                                                
37 Slavoj Žižek, “Vertigo: The Drama of a Deceived Platonist.” Hitchcock Annual (2003-2004), 68-69. 
38 Umberto Eco, “Innovation and Repetition.” Daedalus 114, no. 4 (1985), 170.  
39 Jim Collins, “Genericity in the Nineties: Eclectic Irony and the New Sincerity.” In Film Theory Goes to the 
Movies, ed. Jim Collins, Hillary Radner, and Ava Preacher Collins (New York: Routledge, 1993), 256. 
40 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement Image. Trans Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London: 
Athlone Press, 1986), 208-209.  
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 Engaging with the Real in a classical realist sense requires engaging with an 
idealisation of the Real. Beneath my aesthetic engagement with Eternal Sunshine is the 
notion of an ideal text. Any post-structuralist cautionary word in light of the recuperation of 
the Real meets only images and sound bites that stand in for perfected texts, and wholly 
cohesive, contained film experiences. The Real need not be a tangible point of ‘reality’ (as, 
say, the socio-economic plight of youths in Brooklyn is in Spike Lee’s Do the Right Thing). I 
recalled the basic narrative structure of Eternal Sunshine, but it was not narrative to which I 
turned for its aesthetic impact. In fact, it occurred to me, the less reality involved, the more 
Real the cinematic mind makes of the image. In this way authenticity can be a subjective 
experience, that is, if reality is substituted by an idealised vision that informs the subjective 
point of view, albeit only a three second clip.  
 What I hope to illustrate is the tenuousness of the relationship of the cinematic image 
to the Real; in Eternal Sunshine’s case, this applies to the notion of an essential and holistic 
film experience. We simply do not experience films this way in contemporary Western film-
going societies, if indeed we ever have. Films are no more texts on a screen for passive 
consumption than they are traditional interpretive phenomena in the service of a better 
cultural appreciation. I hope to reconstruct an aesthetic mode of looking at film (I use ‘mode’ 
insofar as it connotes a less than comprehensive or uniform approach), an aesthetic not 
divorced from an appreciation of art as ideology, or art as social reflection (or even cultural 
engineer), but certainly one that returns critical theory to its rightful place, equally 
commentary and complimentarity rather than a thing in and of itself. 
 
1.3 Bazin and the Myth of Total Cinema  
André Bazin’s writings on cinema might appear an odd choice with which to level an attack 
on realism. Among other things, Bazin’s work has been critiqued and developed in several 
forums and in several inventive ways. One influential analysis of Bazin’s realism myth can 
be found in Deleuze’s Cinema 2 in which he considers depth of field in relation to Bazin’s 
theory of the reality of the depth of field image. However, in my discussion, I am interested 
more in the legacy of realism in cinema than a detailed structural analysis of the shot and 
sequence, which Deleuze undertakes.41  
                                                
41 For example, see Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time Image. Trans Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam 
(London: Athlone Press, 1989), 105-109.  
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Bazin offers a vital point of origin of cinema as a predominantly realist medium. But 
rather than value his functional ‘ontology of the Real,’ I contend that his notion of reality is 
anchored in a historical privilege accorded to the representative or mimetic art form. Robert 
Ray suggests that “the American Cinema’s apparently natural subjection of style to narrative 
in fact depended on a historical accident: the movies’ origins lay in the late nineteenth 
century whose predominant popular arts were the novel or the theatre…it adopted the basic 
tactic and goal of the realistic novel.”42 Classical Hollywood cinema was thus connected to a 
realist aesthetic that achieved its zenith in the nineteenth century realist novel and drama. 
Griffith’s Birth of a Nation and Intolerance are essentially social historical dramas that find 
an ancestor in American realism and naturalism of the late nineteenth century. I am not 
arguing here that all cinema was indebted to a realist aesthetic. Murnau’s Nosferatu or Lang’s 
Metropolis are striking for their unique departures from a classical realism and their 
deliberate incorporation of Expressionist and Surrealist art traditions. But the cinema that was 
taken up by the Hollywood studios was indelibly inscribed with the mark of the Real, 
whether this was Wilder’s uncompromisingly realistic portrayal of alcoholism in Lost 
Weekend, or the genre cinema of Hawks’s Scarface: The Shame of a Nation and The Big 
Sleep.43  
Classical cinema adopted the classical realist aesthetic in its attempt to perfect the 
reproduction of the image. The High Renaissance is deemed ‘high,’ among other things, for 
devising the complexity of perspective in painting and sculpture, and achieving a heightened 
realism in its depiction of the life form (Michelangelo’s David is often mentioned in this 
context).44 Film was very early considered an image medium (thus the formative and 
influential work of Sergei Eisenstein on the montage) rather than a field of free movement; it 
is this distinction that foregrounds Deleuze’s influential books on film. Early cinema 
foregrounds the image and the cut rather than the sequence. This emphasis on the still 
representation (in photography, the perfect realisation of the physical form) can be traced to 
                                                
42 Robert Ray, A Certain Tendency of the Hollywood Cinema, 1930-1980 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1985), 34.  
43 For an influential analysis of Hawks’s contribution to studio cinema, and particularly for his brand of ‘noble 
realism,’ see Jacques Rivette, “The Genius of Howard Hawks.” In Cahiers Du Cinéma: The 1950s, ed. Jim 
Hillier (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1985), 130. 
44 See André Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image.” In What is Cinema, Volume 1, trans. Hugh 
Gray (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), 12-13. For an assessment of Bazin’s 
theory, see David Bordwell, On the History of Film Style (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1977), 
70-71. 
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classical realist aesthetics, distinguishable from modernist successors. Modern art movements 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries found their modernity in the departure 
from the representative image, whether a figure or a field of flowers. It is precisely for this 
reason that Adorno esteems Picasso’s Guernica in its being “wholly incompatible with 
criteria of realism, gaining expression through inhuman construction.” For Adorno, Guernica 
achieves a critical distance from realist aesthetics, which paradoxically allows it to engineer a 
frame of “social protest.”45  
Art that foregrounds its politics or ideological bent is impotent because, in Adorno’s 
estimation, it prevents a heightened aesthetic and social interaction with the artwork. On the 
contrary, Bazin recuperates the ethos of classical realism as the aspiration of a new kind of 
image in the cinema: “Painting was forced, as it turned out, to offer us illusion and this 
illusion was reckoned sufficient unto art. Photography and the cinema on the other hand are 
discoveries that satisfy, once and for all, and in its very essence, our obsession with 
realism.”46 He is correct to begin with the assumption of realism as an obsession, a necessity 
to contort what is fundamentally artificial (in this case, the cinematic image) into the shape of 
what it is said to indelibly represent. The criteria of contemporary film viewing conditions is 
based on the importance of the realist aesthetic. A mass audience views films in a darkened 
room, insulated from an external reality, as audiences once did in the presentation of silent 
cinema or at the advent of sound, to sustain disbelief that it is viewing a world fundamentally 
divorced from its own, a world based upon a technological and textual construct. But rather 
than address the ontology of realism as a representative standard (that is, the Real as 
aestheticised reality), Bazin addresses the technological evolution toward the perfect 
realisation of the Real. In his work on the photograph, he explores the ‘ontology of the 
photographic image,’ in which he suggests a profound ontological shift from the earlier, and 
inherently flawed, realism of the master painter. “No matter how skilful the painter, his work 
was always in fee to an inescapable subjectivity. The fact that a human hand intervened cast a 
shadow of doubt over the image.”47 However, in the ascendance of the photograph over the 
representative painting, “for the first time, between the originating object and its reproduction 
                                                
45 Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory. Trans. C Lenhardt, ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), 337.  
46 Bazin, “Ontology of the Photographic Image,” 12. 
47 Bazin, “Ontology of the Photographic Image,” 12. 
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there intervenes only the instrumentality of a non-living agent” [the camera lens].48 For 
Bazin, the photographic image is empowered with the greatest ontology yet to “lay bare the 
realities.”49 
 In fact, the driving ‘myth’ of cinema is toward the Real. Thus, even before the 
technological components of image-making had been realised, the mythic foundation of 
representative art was to reproduce the Real without the impingement of the subjectivity of 
the artist or the shortcomings of a primitive technology: the crudity of an artist’s tools, the 
unreliability of the human faculties to reproduce perfectly what they perceived. Bazin 
summarises this in the following passage: “Any account of the cinema that was drawn merely 
from the technical inventions that made it possible would be a poor one indeed. On the 
contrary, an approximate and complicated visualisation of an idea invariably precedes the 
industrial discovery which alone can open the way for its practical use.”50 In realising this 
myth, cinema achieves what it had been destined for, an art laying bare the world in “all its 
cruelty and ugliness.”51 This was an image that was pure in relation to its object, an art of the 
Real and a new artistic realism. 
 In his much discussed essay, “The Evolution of the Language of Cinema,” Bazin 
imbues the cinematic image with the power he attributes to photographic realism. In so doing, 
he realises a benchmark in film theory in which realism achieved its perfection in the 
cinematic image. Crucially, Bazin was a co-founder of the influential French journal, Cahiers 
du Cinema, which proved a fermenting ground for the philosophical aesthetics of the French 
New Wave auteurs, particularly Jean Luc Godard and François Truffaut; it proved a 
fermenting ground also for Bazin’s realist aesthetics. According to Bazin, the inherent 
realism of the cinema is revealed in the stripping back of the complex (though ‘invisible’) 
editing techniques of classical Hollywood cinema and the montage of Russian cinema 
explored in the films and writing of Sergei Eisenstein. In the 1940s and 1950s, Bazin looks to 
Welles, William Wyler, early Renoir, and traces residues of the perfection of realism in the 
silent films of Murnau (Nosferatu [1922], Sunrise [1927]) and Eric Von Stroheim (Greed 
[1924]). 
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It is interesting to note here that Godard and Truffaut shared very little cinematically with 
Bazin’s theories, particularly in his reification of realism. Both foreground cinematic style 
and the inherent artifice of the cinematic image. Godard’s A Bout De Souffle (Breathless) is 
exemplary of what I will refer to as the metacinematic aesthetic. Michel (Jean Paul 
Belmonde) plays a protagonist on the lam who embodies a Humphrey Bogart persona while 
addressing the camera, and finds his narrative continuity hampered by Godard’s incessant use 
of the jump cut. Truffaut’s concluding shot in Les Quatre Cents Coups (The 400 Blows) (in 
which the loss of innocence of the protagonist is conveyed in a camera rush on his striking 
features, followed by an unorthodox use of freeze-frame), merges the realist aesthetic with 
the cinematic flamboyance of the first of the New Wave auteurs. Truffaut’s next film was the 
overtly ‘artificial’ Tires Sur Le Pianiste (Shoot the Piano Player). And indeed the French 
New Wave quickly came to embody the cool artifice of the cinematic medium, confronting 
and then succeeding the demands of a cinema that had exhausted, in Deleuzian terms, the 
possibilities of the action image.  
 
1.4 Depth of Field and Focus 
In Bazin’s work, cinema is essentially a narrative art form. He discusses Robert Flaherty’s 
documentary Nanook of the North in the same critical vein in which he discusses Orson 
Welles’s use of deep focus in Citizen Kane; in both films, the structure of the cinematic text 
is based on the telling of a story. The measure of the cinematic image is its capacity to 
convey the reality of life stories, characters and ideals. For Bazin, the origins of an 
‘intellectual cinema,’ postulated in the montage of Sergei Eisenstein, are less an exposition 
than a perversion of the Real. The intellectualism of the cinema, for Eisenstein, could be 
traced to the quality of the montage, “an essential method and device in any cinematographic 
exposition. And, in a condensed and purified form, it is the starting-point for ‘intellectual 
cinema,’ a cinema that seeks the maximum laconicism in the visual exposition of abstract 
concepts.”52 The intellectualism of cinema is thus initially a matter of form that organises the 
nature of the content; the montage functioned as a comprehensive philosophical and aesthetic 
language.  
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Eisenstein’s intellectual montage is particularly relevant to this discussion of Bazin, 
for while Bazin does not use the term ‘intellectual cinema,’ he more readily discusses the 
work of a Murnau or Dreyer than Hollywood’s Cecil B. DeMille. Interestingly, Welles, 
Wyler and Ford emerged in the U.S. from within a studio aesthetic and an industrialised film 
production. Hitchcock is perhaps the most interesting case insofar as his auteuristic impulse 
was attuned equally to the artistic as the commercial.53 The notion of an intellectual cinema 
that developed separately from a commercial cinema is increasingly problematic after the 
1930s, but it is a distinction that Bazin at least implicitly upholds. 
Bazin locates the realisation of the myth of total cinema after 1940, particularly in 
Welles’s Citizen Kane (1941) and The Magnificent Ambersons (1942). It is his contention 
that Welles’s use of ‘deep focus’ and ‘depth of field’ challenges the ontology of the montage 
as the cinematic purveyor of reality. Deep focus is a cinematographic device in which the 
focus of a single shot is broadened to encompass more than a central figure or a single point 
of reference. The dominant style of classical Hollywood cinema (1930s and 40s) was a ‘shot-
reverse shot’ sequence in which the spectator is presented with a shot and a subsequent 
reverse shot contextualising the arrangement. A shot would therefore have a focal point 
(commonly centre-screen), a high contrast with a background that remained out of focus, and 
a subsequent cut to a reverse shot to give the focal arrangement a point of reference. Robert 
Ray suggests that the shot-reverse shot was integral to the maintenance of the ‘invisibility of 
style’ in classical Hollywood: “The shot-reverse shot figure, therefore, played a crucial role 
in a formal paradigm whose basic tactic was the concealment of the necessity of choice.”54 In 
contriving the invisibility of style editing process in its major, primarily genre films, the 
Hollywood studio system presented the cinematic image as unadorned, servicing only the 
structural requirements of the narrative. The shot-reverse shot drew the spectator into the 
action, collapsing the screen that ordinarily functioned as a point of demarcation between 
cinematic text and spectator. The screen was dissolved, arriving almost paradoxically at the 
perfection of the realist aesthetic through the immersion of the spectator in the story, 
characterisation, thematic, and by extension, the Hollywood studio system. The spectator, 
relinquished of the necessity to choose (or forge her subjective interpretation on the sequence 
of images), assumes that the reality on screen is identical to the one it represents. 
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 In response to various strategies of montage, Bazin celebrates the cinematic image’s 
potential to reproduce the Real, and thus to reject the inherent artificiality of ‘visible’ editing, 
exemplified in the work of Eisenstein. If montage is a “collision of two factors which gives 
rise to an idea,”55 Bazin considers the process of arrangement, or the ordering of single shots, 
an intrusion into the visual reality: “It is simply a question of respect for the spatial unity of 
an event at the moment when to split it up would change it from something real into 
something imaginary.”56 The montage is essentially a putting together of two or more 
otherwise unrelated shots into an ordered system, forming a narrative component. This 
ordered system does not permit the spectator to partake in the realisation of the image on the 
screen because the order of the image sequence is determined wholly by the filmmaker.  
The crucial distinction between Eisenstein’s and Bazin’s philosophy of the cinematic 
image can be found in the notion of ‘spatial unity.’ Whereas Eisenstein attempts to trace a 
genealogy of the montage through Japanese symbols and hieroglyphs: 
 
For example: the representation of water and of an eye signifies “to weep”, 
the representation of an ear next to a drawing of a door means “to listen”, 
a dog and a mouth mean “to bark”… 
But – this is montage!!57, 
 
Bazin conceptualises a transcendental Real, an a priori  ‘spatial unity’ that pre-exists the 
cinematic representation, the reproduced image. Bazin’s ‘language of cinema’ is essentially a 
language with which to reproduce the inherent “continuum of reality.”58 For Eisenstein, 
cinema is a system of production: “Cinema is: so many firms, so much working capital, such 
and such a ‘star’, so many dramas./ Cinema is, first and foremost, montage.”59 For Bazin, it is 
a system of reproduction. Eisenstein creates something out of montage; Bazin perceives a 
revealing of the Real “in which the image is evaluated not according to what it adds to reality 
but what it reveals of it.”60 
 This revelation occurs in the ontology of the deep focus and depth of field shot (in 
which the ‘field’ of the shot is longer than a façade or a standard set-up). While deep focus 
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holds more of the shot in focus simultaneously, depth of field is able to visually contrive the 
‘centrality’ of an out of focus object. The two cinematographic strategies are complementary. 
David Bordwell offers an excellent discussion of the use of depth of field in contemporary 
cinema in which he claims that what was once unique in Welles has been taken on board by 
the majority of mainstream filmmakers after the 1980s:  
 
Most postwar directors, modernist or mainstream, cannot be distinguished by their 
commitment to a distinctive aesthetic of depth…Neither [can] most of the younger 
generation, including the various New Waves in Europe and the Third World. Virtually all 
of the Cahiers’ canonised ‘modern’ directors shot with deep focus in the 1940s and 1950s 
and shifted to telephoto lenses and zooms during the 1960s and 1970s. They quickly 
adapted the new techniques to their aims of more self-consciously realistic, reflexive and 
ambiguous storytelling.61 
 
Contemporary filmmakers employ conventional focus for the majority of shots, though 
frequently revert to deep focus for a single shot, and even occasionally an extended sequence. 
The scene in which Delilah (Anna Levine) offers William Munny (Clint Eastwood) a “free 
one” in Unforgiven is shot almost entirely in deep focus, achieving a naturalism in the 
relationship between the isolated figures ostracised from their respective societies, and the 
desolate beauty of the American West. Antonioni’s L’Avventura is shot almost exclusively in 
deep focus; the composition of the shots on the ocean and particularly on the island on which 
Anna (Lea Massari) disappears is striking.  
 While the majority of shots in contemporary cinema use shallow or medium focus, deep 
focus is still utilised, and often to striking and provocative effect. Bazin’s notion of the deep 
focus as rendering the cinematic image ‘ambiguous,’ or at least subject to multiple 
interpretations, is illustrated, for example, in Scorsese’s Casino. Ginger (Sharon Stone) 
speaks to Sam (Robert De Niro) on a payphone while Lester Diamond (James Woods) 
‘chastises’ their daughter in the background. The spectator’s gaze is divided between the 
separate shot segments (and thus separate dramas) that merge in a medium focus shot. In a 
classical montage, the separate dramas would be rendered through a series of cuts that direct 
the spectators gaze and, according to Bazin, code the meaning of the scene. 
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1.5 Citizen Kane: A Cinematographic Revolution? 
Citizen Kane remains the most influential film produced in the Hollywood studio system, and 
perhaps the most influential film ever produced in the United States. After more than fifty 
years, it is still regarded as the greatest film ever made by the influential Sight and Sound 
poll.62 Of course, measuring degrees of influence is largely subjective and the reader ought to 
bear in mind Chris Rock’s visit to a multiplex in South Central L.A. In any case, film theory 
attests to Kane’s centrality in its stylistic innovation rather than in the originality of the story. 
Reviewers, critics and theorists return to Kane’s unique cinematography to find its 
distinction. Bazin discusses in particular the function of depth of field and focus, which 
allows the camera to maintain the spatial unity of the shot, or to reproduce it in its ‘true’ 
form. Welles certainly did experiment with the conventions of editing in Citizen Kane and 
The Magnificent Ambersons, primarily in lengthening the takes and deepening the focus of 
the shot to include characters and objects on the periphery. The famous four minute opening 
sequence of Touch of Evil was captured in a single take (and remains perhaps the most 
distinguished single take on film). However, I would argue that the ontology of the long take 
had altered significantly since 1941, or, for that matter, 1947, the year Hitchcock shot Rope in 
a ‘single’ take.63  
 The use of the long take in Kane permits the action to unfold according to a natural 
spatial and temporal dimension. The extended take is favoured over the cut, approximating 
the movement of the actor to real life, and offering the spectator the depiction of movement 
as it would appear off-screen. Bordwell and Thompson offer a detailed reading of a sequence 
early in Kane in which the camera unobtrusively moves from a long exterior shot to an 
interior conversation involving characters positioned in various depths of shot.64 The scene is 
imbued with a sense of intimacy, and yet there is a fluidity of movement from exterior to 
interior shot. The depth of focus emphasises the inherent continuity of the shot – background 
to foreground becomes a space that remains in focus. The immersion of the image in focus 
functions literally as a resistance to the cut. While the camera holds on Charles’s aunt and 
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uncle inside the house, Charles is never ‘out of focus’ in the exterior, but merely off-screen. 
This is precisely the revolutionary component of deep focus that several critics have failed to 
appreciate. Deep focus and the long take equates to an inherent continuity of the image in 
which action and movement are in a sense always occurring. For Bazin, this offers the nearest 
approximation of an external reality in which, if a person turns her head from one direction to 
another, what lies behind her back continues its own progression into the future while she 
remains oblivious. Space and time are in a state of perpetual movement in relation to the 
spectator gaze. 
 In contrast, the cut is for Bazin connected to an earlier fascination with the still-life 
image captured by an earlier form of reproductive technology:  
 
Orson Welles restored to cinematographic illusion a fundamental quality of reality – its 
continuity. Classical editing, deriving from Griffith, separated reality into successive shots 
which were just a series of either logical or subjective points of view of an event…The 
construction thus introduces an obviously abstract element into reality. Because we are so 
used to such abstractions, we no longer sense them.65  
 
 
One could contrast Welles’s ‘continuous’ shot with Kubrick’s use of the cut as an organising 
principle of space and time in the last chapter of 2001: A Space Odyssey. For Welles, deep 
focus maintains continuity in the represented image. For Kubrick, the cut literally erases a 
figure from the shot. After exiting the wormhole, the first shot depicts Bowman (Keir Dullea) 
from outside the spaceship. The first cut fractures the causality of the conventional shot 
reverse-shot. Now the spectator sees Bowman positioned outside the spaceship, but the point 
of view shot positions the spectator inside the spaceship. The prior incarnation of Bowman 
(who materialised in the spaceship after exiting the wormhole) is now occupied subjectively 
by the spectator. The cut installs the spectator into Bowman’s subjectivity that has 
simultaneously been displaced to the exterior of the ship. This occurs three more times as a 
hard cut erases Bowman’s presence from the scene. The cut is used throughout this 
extraordinary sequence to dissociate the new Bowman (the precursor to the Star Child) from 
a natural cause-effect determinism. In this case, the erasure is literally achieved through the 
cut, which alters the point of view of the sequence, transforming the (subjective) reality of the 
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shot. This is Kubrick’s remarkable visualisation of a quantum space and time through 
cinematographic principles. 
 While Bazin in a sense acknowledges and even celebrates the aestheticisation of reality, 
deep focus in Kane transcends this, exacting an affinity with the Real which maintains “an 
awareness of the reality itself”66 apart from the abstraction into artifice.  
 
1.6 A Note on the Mechanics of Style 
For the discussion that follows on Citizen Kane, I am indebted to Roger Ebert’s astonishingly 
detailed commentary on the film.67 Ebert’s ‘insider knowledge’ in this respect is very useful, 
and indicates yet again that film-buffs and historians have access to source material beyond 
the reach or interests of the traditional film scholar. Only Bordwell to my mind has offered an 
analysis of film style that approaches the professionalism of the language of a filmmaker.68 
One need only contrast Scorsese’s description of a shot in Taxi Driver or Raging Bull69 with 
my own rudimentary terminology of shots and sequences in Citizen Kane. Ultimately, I 
would argue that film scholarship does not have an adequate knowledge of the filmmaking 
process. The advantage of such knowledge is two-fold. The recuperation of any measure of 
auteurism (which I would argue is necessary in a study of contemporary cinema) requires a 
knowledge of the way the film is put together. Wood offers a reading of a sequence in 
Marnie, first as a literal exegesis of the action as it would appear in the script and then as a 
series of shots.70 For Wood, the essential innovation of cinema (and particularly Hitchcockian 
cinema) is the uniqueness of the visual technique to the individual filmmaker, as well as a 
heightened affectivity of the visual image over the written word: “A novelist could give us 
some kind of equivalent for this, could make us react along the same general lines; but he 
couldn’t make us react in this direct, immediate way, as image succeeds image – he couldn’t 
control our actions so precisely in time.”71 An analysis of the cinematic stylistics of 
individual filmmakers is not misplaced in a study of film, nor easily negated by investigations 
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of spectator subjectivities in psychoanalytic theory or analyses of hegemonies, cultures, or by 
extension, selves. 
 Secondly, a knowledge of the filmmaking process is required to establish a measure of 
intent in the cinematic image, and this is equally necessary to an analysis of cinema. To take 
a very simple example, it is crucial in the narrative structure of Psycho that Hitchcock 
maintains the deception of the Norman/Mother duality until the final scene in which Norman 
is literally unveiled. According to screenwriter, Joseph Stefano, the most complex deception 
took place in the scene in which Norman carries Mother (against her will) into the fruit 
cellar.72 According to the shooting script, Norman would have a brief argument with Mother, 
which would take place inside the bedroom, off camera. The camera would be positioned at 
the top of the staircase. As Norman leaves the bedroom, coming into shot in the original set-
up of the camera, Hitchcock would cut the scene and show Norman and Mother from the 
doorway of the bedroom as they descend the stairs. Stefano’s objection was that the spectator 
would sense something amiss and the deception would be compromised, perhaps even 
revealed. The cut from medium front shot on the staircase to a medium back shot from the 
bedroom doorway would be too conspicuous, and too obviously deceptive. Stefano suggested 
building a mechanism with which to capture an overhead shot, thus filming the exit of 
Norman and Mother from the bedroom, the passage through the landing, and the descent on 
the staircase, in a single take. Hitchcock objected on the morning of the shooting due to the 
cost of the set-up but changed his mind when it became clear that Stefano was right. 
 The point here is that the deception is maintained through the composition of the shot 
based on a visual strategy employed by the filmmaker (in this case, Stefano/Hitchcock). I 
would contend that the theorist who seeks to conceptualise the impact of the shot on the 
spectator must have a knowledge of the way the shot is composed. The composition is 
ultimately co-ordinated by a mechanistic process involving the camera and various 
contraptions that allow the camera to move. The innovation of digital cinematography is to 
transcend the physicality of the mechanised process, but I will have more to say about this in 
Chapter Three. 
 Conventional film theory has devoted little space to analysing what David Sterritt has 
called the “physicality” of cinematic narrative, that is, the way in which the physical objects 
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and bodies are arranged to give a sequence a systematic composition. Of Hitchcock, Sterritt 
suggests that “even close analyses of Hitchcock’s films tend to race past the visceral impact 
of physical events that pass across the screen.”73 It is not only the physicality of the cinematic 
shot but the mechanised processes involved in its composition that must surely be returned to 
any meaningful analysis of film. Without such an analysis, film theory is limited in its scope 
to spectator response, which accounts for its emphasis on subjectivity and the relationship of 
the subject to the cinematic screen.74 While such analyses are central to an understanding of 
the way film functions on the spectator, I would argue also that a study of film as a uniquely 
visual text (incorporating the moving image) is just as crucial. 
 
1.7 Auteurism and the Artifice of the Cinematic Image 
I have thus far engaged with Bazin’s theory of cinematic realism. Central as Bazin was to the 
Cahiers group, and central as auteur theory remains to film audiences (who invariably refer 
to a film as the singular possession of its director), I have also argued that Bazin’s realism is a 
component of a broader realist aesthetics that pervades contemporary theories of cinema. 
Bazin was there first, so to speak, and his tenacious engagement with an ontology of the Real 
remains impressive in light of subsequent film theories and movements. 
 A critique of Bazin is necessarily formulated around two divergent arguments: the 
overemphasis on the auteur aspect of Welles after 1940 (particularly in the focus on Kane and 
The Magnificent Ambersons) and the challenge to the ontology of the image in post-
structuralist semiotics – I draw on Barthes’s work in this respect.  
 The notion of the auteur (or creative genius) was in its conception a retrospective 
theorising and engagement with the presentation of content, that is, the auteur’s unique way 
of formalising the content of the story. In spite of an attack levelled by post-structuralist and 
materialist critics in the decades subsequent to the French New Wave, Andrew Sarris, the 
influential American film writer, reverts to the notion of the auteur as a meaningful criteria 
with which to measure the value of a film.75 Sarris’s “The Auteur Theory Revisited” is 
particularly interesting insofar as it offers a response to the attack levelled by Gore Vidal and 
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others. I am somewhat sympathetic to theories of the auteur, in spite of Thomas Schatz’s 
dismissive analysis of the theory as “adolescent romanticism.”76 While one ought to be 
suspicious of auteur theory in its mid-1950s incarnation, especially in relation to 
contemporary cinema produced within the Hollywood system, it seems facile to reject the 
possibility of a discernible ‘vision,’ albeit a vision constructed within a highly complex and 
fluid dynamic. Lynch’s Blue Velvet, Lost Highway and Mulholland Drive seem to me 
quintessential Lynch as much as Taxi Driver, Raging Bull and Goodfellas are quintessential 
Scorsese. A large portion of the work of Lynch and Scorsese is focused on a similar thematic 
and stylistic project. One could argue, as Roger Ebert does pejoratively, that Lynch has been 
trying to make the same film his entire career and finally succeeds with Mulholland Drive.77 
Scorsese’s ‘New York’ films (Mean Streets, Taxi Driver, Raging Bull, The King of Comedy, 
Goodfellas, Gangs of New York, the forthcoming The Departed) examine similar characters, 
stories and themes while exploring a stylistics of cinema that can be traced throughout his 
work. The slow-motion entry of the protagonist as flaneur (who is more often than not also 
one of the film’s narrators) is a shot that occurs in Mean Streets, Taxi Driver (in which the 
enclosed urban space of the city substitutes for the social setting of a bar or restaurant), 
Goodfellas and Casino.  
 The retroactive declaration of Welles as an auteur in the tradition of Hitchcock or Ford 
seems premature in light of his career after Kane and The Magnificent Ambersons. Auteur 
theory credited a uniformity or continuity of style, including a continuity of the visual aspect 
attributed to certain directors. There is a near uncanny uniformity in the way Hitchcock 
approaches his subject matter as a director. While he never looked through a viewing lens 
(leaving that to the cinematographer, whom he at times called a ‘cameraman’), the use of 
camera angles, movement, staging of the scene, etc., has a degree of congruence in each of 
his films. Rebello discusses Hitchcock’s obsession with subjective (or point of view) shots in 
Psycho that became almost synonymous with the director’s work – Rear Window, Vertigo 
and Psycho are obvious cases in point.78  
 Bazin’s conception of Welles as auteur focuses instead on a unique cinematographic 
strategy as an auteuristic impulse and thus as a purveyor of a perfect cinematic realism. What 
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Bazin seems to argue for is the notion of the auteur as philosopher as well as creative genius; 
Welles’s career is notable for what it says about ‘Film’ rather than the films themselves. 
Bazin has relatively little to say about the narrative or thematic continuity of Welles’s films 
from Citizen Kane onward. While the freedom offered by depth of field cinematography was 
considered a remarkable and controversial aesthetic innovation in Hollywood cinema in the 
1940s, 79 it surely does not constitute the essence of Welles’s filmmaking. Most film 
audiences (those niche audiences privileged enough to have seen Citizen Kane) remain 
oblivious to the concept of deep focus cinematography. 
 Welles’s turbulent years in the Hollywood studio system inevitably fashioned 
something auteuristic in his work, and perhaps even more significantly, in his persona as a 
Hollywood rebel. He is particularly interesting for his involvement with and ultimate 
exclusion from the studio system. Citizen Kane had been made through RKO Pictures, one of 
the major studios in 1940. He made only The Magnificent Ambersons two years later with 
RKO, which the studio considered such a disappointment that it altered the film’s downbeat 
ending. Following Ambersons, Welles existed on the fringe of the studios. He made The 
Stranger, a less than noteworthy genre film which was marginally successful. The Lady From 
Shanghai appeared in 1948, though next to Kane and Ambersons, this is mediocre film noir, 
remarkable only for a tense, well-conceived first act and a wildly surreal concluding scene in 
a hall of mirrors.80 He appeared briefly in The Third Man (1949), though his creative input is 
questionable. Touch of Evil (1955), now regarded as a classic and the progenitor of the neo-
noir, was received poorly by American critics and audiences: “While the New York critics 
were honoring Stanley Kramer’s The Defiant Ones, the Cahiers critics were cheering Orson 
Welles’s Touch of Evil. Obviously their eyes were quicker than our ears.”81 Thus, it is only 
Kane (that did not win a Best Picture or Best Director Oscar) and Ambersons that supports 
Bazin’s thesis, and in relation to the peripheral nature of Welles’s career after Ambersons, I 
would suggest this is presumptuous. Bogdanovich describes this general response to Welles 
as a filmmaker toward the end of his career: “If Welles did have fears, he came by them 
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honestly: since Orson’s earliest theatre and radio successes, after Citizen Kane, his U.S. 
notices were mixed to negative. “What else has he done since Citizen Kane?” was a popular 
refrain long before Welles died.”82  
 Perhaps this criticism is not entirely fair to Bazin, who does not purport to describe his 
brand of realism as central to the Hollywood studio system. Along with Truffaut, he 
championed Welles as one of the great auteurs in the midst of an industry practising a 
classical aesthetics: shot-reverse shot, theatrical sets, naturalistic focus, quick edits, etc. But 
the legacy of Welles as an intellectual filmmaker, to recall Eisenstein’s term, attributable as it 
is to Bazin and others, is questionable in this regard. And this must subsequently bring into 
question the significance of deep focus and depth of field cinematography to subsequent 
filmic traditions. Welles’s legacy will always revolve around the legacy of Citizen Kane to 
classic and contemporary Hollywood cinema, but one wonders how much that legacy has to 
do with cinematographic strategies or realist principles. An abiding legacy of Kane must also 
be located in the Academy, most notably, among the theorists who turned to classical 
Hollywood in support of their theses. One such writer is Laura Mulvey, whose volume on 
Citizen Kane appropriates the film for an extended analysis of various theoretical legacies.83 
Mulvey concedes that her contribution to the legacy of Kane  
 
is an experiment in method. I am applying the film theory and criticism of my generation to 
a film that has been taken through the mill by each generation since it appeared fifty years 
ago. As the main influences on my thought have been psychoanalytic theory and feminism, 
both have strongly inflected my analysis of Citizen Kane, not just in terms of content – how 
the film depicts women and uses Freud – but as a film that challenges conventional 
relations between screen and spectator and constructs a language of cinema that meshes 
with the language of the psyche.84 
 
In this sense, Kane’s legacy will always manage to be reconstituted as the textual fabric of a 
new visual (or cinematic) consciousness. 
  
A meaningful critique of Bazin’s realism must also engage with his theory of the ontology of 
the cinematic image. We must begin with his notion of a possible cinematic realism that is 
realised in opposition to the montage. If the montage is a strategic connecting of unrelated 
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images to form a narrative segment (the montage itself), deep focus allows the shot to 
maintain an inherent spatial unity by erasing the edit, the join, and by allowing a free flow of 
the temporal and spatial reproduction of the Real. Deep focus and depth of field allow the 
camera to photograph reality as it is. To address this, let us return to a scene in Kane. Charles 
Foster Kane sits in an office signing away his great fortune. Welles characteristically places 
this scene a third of the way through the narrative and returns to Kane’s youth in the scene 
that immediately follows. The sequence in which Kane stands from the desk and walks to a 
rectangular window, pauses and then returns to sign the document is striking for a number of 
reasons.85 The single take is held in deep focus. The spectator perceives the contours of the 
desk, Mr Thatcher, Mr Leland at the right of shot, as well as the rectangular windows in the 
background. Kane stands and moves towards the windows while the shot holds in deep focus. 
As Kane approaches the window, the spectator realises that the depth of field of this shot is 
also a trick of perspective. The windows on the set are six feet above the ground. The critic, 
Roger Ebert, describes this as an ‘optical illusion,’86 which of course it is. The spectator is 
deceived into thinking the windows are conventionally proportioned for an office building. 
Instead, the spatial dimensions of the shot are incongruent with an external reality while 
emphasising the ‘reality’ of the scene through long takes, deep focus, and depth of field. 
Thus, while the scene is exemplary of deep focus as a cinematographic device, it is also an 
example of Welles’s ingenious use of deep focus to deliberately encode the Real with an 
inherent artificiality.  
 This illusion of realism is employed several times in Kane. The famous opening on 
Xanadu, Kane’s pleasure palace, is a seamless blend of a constructed set and a matte drawing 
of Xanadu’s façade; both set and drawing are held in the shot in deep focus. Rather than 
revealing the reality of the shot, deep focus positions a cinematic gaze that is subject to an 
inherent illusion: Xanadu, constructed in the spatial reality of the shot, does not exist. The 
trick of perspective is used a number of times in Kane to symbolise the rise and fall of a 
‘great man.’ As Ebert suggests, it works as a “visual pun,”87 but it works also as a 
cinematographic technique that signifies meaning in more than one way. 
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  Welles employs a similar visual pun in the shot in which Kane walks toward a gigantic 
fireplace in Xanadu’s great hall, exemplifying what Wood has called “the most artificial kind 
of cinema.”88 According to Ebert, Kane is “filled with special effects. When you look at the 
movie for the first time, you just see a political rally [Ebert is referring to a shot of Boss Jim 
Getty and Kane exiting a civic hall]. You don’t think of it as a special effects shot, but it’s as 
contrived as anything in Star Wars…it’s made out of thin air.”89 Deep focus and depth of 
field are striking innovations in the technical aspect of Kane, yet they are essentially 
cinematographic strategies employed to aestheticise a narrative in a visual medium. Welles 
employed depth of field precisely to foreground the contrivance of the cinematic shot (as 
Godard and Truffaut would do two decades later, inspiring a wave of innovative auteurs). 
 Cinema fractured as a mimetic form in the years after Welles, and Kane must surely be 
credited as a landmark film in this aesthetic revolution. Consider the famous opening of Billy 
Wilder’s Sunset Boulevard in which a body lies floating in a pool. The shot was captured by 
placing a mirror on the pool floor and shooting from above the water. We thus see a corpse of 
a traditional noir protagonist floating from beneath the surface, who promptly begins to 
narrate the film. The set-up is obviously not a conventional mise en scene or point of view 
shot.  
 The Hollywood auteurs (Wilder among them) explored the cinematic frontiers of the 
image. Hitchcock’s oeuvre is a testament to film as a visual medium distinct from traditional 
textual practices, and to the shot as a site of innovation and variation on traditional realist 
aesthetics. How else can one account for the centrality of an ostensibly genre filmmaker to 
film theory after the 1950s? Broadly speaking, Hitchcock was never a ‘serious’ filmmaker in 
the sense of a Spielberg, who started with the high concept film in the 1970s (Duel, Jaws, 
Close Encounters of the Third Kind) but has attempted to transform himself into a director 
with artistic credibility with films such as The Color Purple, Schindler’s List, Saving Private 
Ryan and Munich. Hitchcock appealed equally to mainstream audiences and film theorists. I 
can only hypothesise that his centrality to film since the 1950s lies in his fascination with 
cinema as a unique form of spectacle divorced from prior art forms. 
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 Mimesis was ultimately subsumed by the cinematic possibilities to contrive variations 
on the Real. In the work of Welles, Hitchcock, Godard and others, the cinematic and the Real 
were absorbed into each other. The classic shower scene in Psycho is constructed out of forty 
separate shots in a sequence lasting less than a minute.90 The cinematicality is foregrounded 
in the very deliberate arrangement of the sequence. In this scene, Hitchcock reveals only that 
the Real was extinguished when the cameras started to roll. It was already cinematic. 
 Bazin is relevant to any study of film aesthetics (and certainly any consideration of 
cinematic realism) simply because his concept of the film image is well defined and holds 
itself up to scrutiny. But why should depth of focus have anything at all to do with a more 
faithful reproduction of an external reality? He formulated his myth of cinema in response to 
what he saw as a transformation in signification practices, though he might have conceived of 
this transformation quite apart from the structuralist apparatus of Christian Metz and others.91 
But exactly what is transformed in Welles’s Citizen Kane and The Magnificent Ambersons? 
Kane’s cinematography does not allow a richer interpretation of the character. If anything, 
what I’ve argued is the essential artifice of depth of field and focus that mirrors the 
inconclusiveness of the narrative. Kane’s story is subject to perpetual revision; a quasi-
fictional account illuminates the ephemeral nature of identity and the discontinuities inherent 
in a narrative history. Formally, the film plays out as an expressionistic portrayal of a 
narrative conceit – the figure of Kane – visible intermittently through looming shadows, 
fractured accounts and knowing subversions of narrative truth. Kane is equally a construct of 
news reports, personal anecdotes and fragmented memories, and an overarching narrative 
trajectory that frames this collage. The narrative structure of Kane is perhaps most interesting 
in the context of the later European art films (Hiroshima Mon Amour, L’Année Dernière À 
Marienbad (Last Year at Marienbad)) that employed non-linear narrative structures to 
foreground the notion of artifice in narrative composition. 
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1.8 Focus and Signification 
The ontology of depth of focus and field realism fares poorly in the light of post-structuralist 
theories of the image and the perpetual displacement of signification. Roland Barthes 
addresses the ontology of the photograph in a way that challenges Bazin’s model. He concurs 
initially with Bazin’s ontology in his essay, The Photographic Message:  
 
The photograph professing to be a mechanical analogue of reality, its first-order message in 
some sort completely fills its substance and leaves no place for the development of a 
second-order message. Of all the structures of information, the photograph appears as the 
only one that is exclusively constituted and occupied by a ‘denoted’ message, a message 
which totally exhausts its mode of existence.92 
 
Here the denoted comprises a first order signification, the unmediated relation of the signifier 
to the signified, the photographic image to its representation, an external reality. As does 
Bazin, Barthes contrasts the fullness of photographic reality with the mediation of the Real in 
traditional representative arts: “In short, all these ‘imitative’ arts comprise two messages: a 
denoted message, which is the analogon itself, and a connoted message, which is the manner 
in which the society to a certain extent communicates what it thinks of it.”93 Yet Barthes very 
quickly re-organises the ontology of the photographic image according to a characteristically 
Barthesian scepticism of the ‘unmediatedness’ of the Real: “The photographic paradox can 
then be seen as the co-existence of two messages, the one without a code (the photographic 
analogue), the other with a code (the ‘art’ of the treatment, or the ‘writing’, or the rhetoric, of 
the photograph).”94  
 Barthes’s system of denotation and connotation can be applied to Welles’s use of deep 
focus. On the level of denotation, the depth of focus in the sequence in Kane in which the 
young Charles Foster Kane is removed from his home opens up the temporal and spatial 
dimensions of the shot: young Charles playing in the snow, the intrusion of his mother’s head 
into the right of shot, the long track back through the window to rest on a high angle shot of a 
table in which Charles will be signed over to Mr Thatcher (this scene has a remarkable 
congruence, stylistically and thematically, to the scene in which Charles signs away his 
beloved paper in Mr Thatcher’s office). The cinematic reality is denotationally faithful to the 
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dimensions of the scene external to the shot. But the second-order meanings, the connoted 
‘treatment’ (to use Barthes’s term) only proliferate with the use of deep focus. Deep focus 
results in an explosion of connotative meanings. This is precisely what Barthes has in mind 
with the paradox of the photographic message: “It is that here the connoted (or coded) 
message develops on the basis of a message without a code.”95 Deep focus lays bare the lack 
of a coding (or compositional arrangement): a scene literally without a code with which to 
view it. 
 The unconventionality (and invisibility) of the cinematography foregrounds the camera 
as a significatory mechanism. This invisibility is perfectly contrasted with the ‘invisibility of 
style’ of Classical Hollywood cinema. Hollywood achieved a classical realism through, 
paradoxically, a complex and highly structured editing style. In Kane, rather than ‘laying bare 
the realities,’ the gaze of the deep focus camera, untethered from the edited cell and the 
montage, reorganises the spatial and temporal sense of the shot. The depth of focus lays bare 
only the visibility of the contrivance in which the deep focus shot is an intrusion into an 
assumed invisibility of style. The focal depth (in Bazin’s notion of the continuity of the 
image, it is an infinite focal depth) provides the perfect canvas with which to explore the 
artifice of shot composition (as Welles did throughout his career, most deliberately in Touch 
of Evil). Kane’s visual sensibility is based on this duality: a freeing of the conventions of 
classical Hollywood editing to explore the boundaries of what Hitchcock called ‘pure 
cinema.’ The purity of the image achieves its resonance as a photographed (and thus 
reproduced) reality; deep focus allows the photograph to draw the entirety of the Real into its 
construction. 
 Consider the obverse to the deep focus shot in a striking sequence in Wong Kar Wai’s 
Chungking Express. After a short sequence in which a man and woman converse across a 
food counter for the first time (the spectator is informed that she will fall in love with him in 
six hours), the man leans forward and summons the woman to him with a gesture. The scene 
cuts to a close-up profile of the two faces that now fill the shot.96 The man’s face, nearest the 
camera, is in macro zoom and perfectly in focus; the woman’s face, according to the spatial 
unity of the scene, should be positioned slightly behind his and marginally out of focus, if at 
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all. However, her image is luridly out of focus. She has been positioned some distance behind 
the man to capture the extreme shallow focus of the shot.  
 If Welles’s deep focus is striking for its unconventionality, Wai’s shallow focus is 
equally provocative. Yet neither arrests a sense of an external reality. Both techniques 
foreground the artifice of the shot. In terms of Barthes’s connotative reading, Wai 
complements the jarring shallow focus with the anachronistic music accompaniment, 
California Dreaming (The Mamas and The Papas) and a cool existentialism that recalls 
Godard’s Breathless. Chungking Express (and Wong Kar Wai’s impressive oeuvre) 
foregrounds its cinematic precocity. Shortly after this first meeting, a medium shot holds the 
man at left screen and the woman at right. The depth of field of the shot is visually striking 
and noticeably unconventional. Wai has the actors move in super-slow motion and speeds up 
the film. Thus, the passers-by move at twice the normal speed while the man and woman 
appear to inhabit a spatial and temporal frame in isolation.  
 Deep focus and depth of field are cinematographic performance spaces that express 
only an ontology of the constructed image. Cinema is and always has been about contorting a 
crude reality to the aesthetic elegance of the cinematic image. How can the spectator respond 
affectively to cinematic physicality (to use Sterritt’s terminology) without an awareness of its 
status as constructed artifice? Welles and Wai explore a film aesthetics in contrast to what 
had preceded it. Welles’s deep focus stands out only in an era in which the Hollywood studio 
had encoded in its major pictures an invisibility of style. Welles, always a precocious talent, 
celebrated his pioneering of a technical innovation that has since become legendary to 
theorists and historians of film, if not mainstream film audiences. Rather than revealing a 
reality beneath the artifice of Hollywood, Welles exploded the connotative possibilities of the 
cinematic image, and Hitchcock, Godard, Scorsese, Tarantino and Wai only followed suit. 
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1.9 A Brief Defence of Bazin 
It would be remiss to overlook a genuinely revolutionary philosophy of the cinematic image, 
attributable to Bazin’s “The Evolution of the Language of Cinema.” As well as suggesting 
that deep focus “brings the spectator into a relation with the image close to that which he 
enjoys with reality,”97 he also alludes to a “more active mental attitude on the part of the 
spectator and a more positive contribution on his part to the action in progress.”98 Thus, in the 
deep focus shot, the ‘reality’ or ‘spatial unity’ provides an avenue for the spectator to 
critically engage with the content of the image:  
 
While analytical montage only calls for him [the spectator] to follow his guide, to let his 
attention follow along smoothly with that of the director who will choose what he should 
see, here he will be called upon to exercise at least a minimum of personal choice. It is from 
his attention and his will that the meaning of the image in part derives.99  
 
While I have critiqued the notion of an inherent congruence of the Real and a deep focus 
reproduction, I agree with Bazin that the spectator’s subjectivity enters the frame of meaning 
of the image. Indeed, my argument departs from Bazin only insofar as deep focus performs a 
veritable explosion of significatory mechanisms within the composition of the shot. Within 
the frame of the deep focus shot, the image seems less attuned to what is externally Real than 
internally presented (or photographed). But beyond this, I share Bazin’s fascination with the 
complexity of the relationship between the cinematic image and spectator subjectivity. In 
critiquing Adorno’s dialectic of the artwork and the culture industry commodity, as well as 
Jameson’s ‘waning of affect’ and passivity of the postmodern spectator, I return to Bazin and 
this critical juncture in the formulation of the cinematic subject. 
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1.10 The Transcendence of the Image 
 
Reality, as it was visually experienced, became a staged, social production. Real, everyday 
experiences, soon came to be judged against their staged cinematic, video-counterpart.100 
 
You’re even better than the Real Thing.101 
 
In spite of the critique of Bazin, his theories of cinema have a special place in the corpus of 
film studies. The majority of attacks of Bazin subvert his attempt to inscribe a realism myth 
into the cinematic apparatus. Comolli and Narboni introduce the ‘ideological’ argument of 
the cinematic image: “Clearly, the cinema ‘reproduces’ reality: this is what a camera and film 
stock are for – so says the ideology. But the tools and techniques of filmmaking are a part of 
‘reality’ themselves, and furthermore ‘reality’ is nothing but an expression of the prevailing 
ideology.”102 I have spent the greater part of my discussion in a conceptual engagement with 
his ontology of the Real and reproduced, the external reality and a cinematically reproduced 
image. This discussion has been specific to Bazin’s model and may appear less than 
provocative in light of theories of cinema that have since prevailed. However, I have 
maintained that realism masks the essential artificiality of the cinematic image, and that 
without a confrontation between cinema’s inherent artifice and the spectator, an engagement 
with the aesthetics of contemporary film will be lacking. The greater part of recent film 
studies is a catalogue of ways in which to use cinema. Consider, for example, Teshoma 
Gabriel’s cinema of resistance, a politics and poetics of a cinema of the Third World.103 The 
epistemological status of such a cinema is equated with a means to an end; the nature of that 
end is something I address in Chapter Two. 
 The legacy of cinematic realism is such that the spectator assumes a degree of passivity. 
Realism, essentialised as it has been in the work of Bazin and others, or the adoption of the 
studio’s ‘invisibility of style’ of the 1930s and 40s, the spectator is encouraged to insert 
herself into the image or, paradoxically, remove herself from it. A knowing engagement with 
the dimensions of the spatial and temporal disunity – what I have referred to as the inherent 
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artifice of the cinematic image – is forbidden. Consider, for example, Graeme Turner’s 
conception of the point of view shot.104 Turner’s book is a detailed work on cinema as a 
‘social practice,’ and to this end he attempts to establish the potency of the camera as a tool 
of signification. In discussing the sequence in Citizen Kane in which Kane stands over Susan 
Alexander (the sequence shot in Xanadu’s great hall, discussed above), Turner writes: “In 
this sequence, the manipulation of camera angles is the major means by which the audience is 
informed about the changing relationship between the two characters.”105 That is, Kane 
looming over Susan Alexander conveys Kane’s largeness and Susan Alexander’s smallness. 
In this schematic, a high-angled shot connotes a relationship of superiority/inferiority (or 
dominant/submissive), the low-angled shot the reverse. However, Turner fails to address the 
inadequacy of the shot as a (mimetic) significatory unit. The cinematic shot exists in a system 
of relations of various modes of signification: music, lighting, props, mise en scene, the 
physical presence of the actors, etc. Kane’s point of view is challenged by subsequent shots 
of his diminishment in front of the gigantic fireplace or the wildly disproportionate interiors 
of the film. The point of view is less a physical space or the interior of a character’s 
subjectivity than a cinematic reconfiguration of these physical (and psychical) dimensions. 
There is no point at which the shot – long, zoom, high angle, low angle, point of view – is a 
purely mimetic mechanism.   
 Turner goes on to address a sequence in Spielberg’s Jaws in which the spectator 
apparently inheres in the shark’s point of view:  
 
In Jaws, we are given numerous shots of the victims from the underwater point of view of 
the shark. The confusion caused by our discomfort with this alignment, and our privileged 
knowledge of the shark’s proximity to the victim, exacerbates the tension and the 
impression of impotence felt by the audience and enhances our sense of the vulnerability of 
the victims.106 
 
Jaws has two striking sequences in which the camera constructs a relationship between the 
shark and the spectator through the camera’s point of view. The justly famous opening shows 
a young woman swim from shore, leaving her friend on the beach. After a long shot in which 
the woman is seen back-stroking through the calm sea, the camera cuts to a close-up of the 
still water, ruptured from beneath by the woman. The idyllic quality of the scene is 
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maintained as the woman turns from camera towards the last sunlight and the shore, 
heightening the stillness and her isolation from the party. The scene then cuts to the first 
underwater shot. At this point, the spectator cannot inhere in the shark’s point of view simply 
because the denotative message, to return to Barthes, has provided only the enchantment of 
the still water, a socially transgressive skinny-dip and the body of a naked woman treading 
water. The camera begins a slow movement toward the woman from beneath the water, and 
only then is the accompanying John Williams theme heard. The spectator is transported into a 
cinematic ‘space’ through the rising theme and the slow zoom.  
 It is not only the intrusion of the shark into the idyllic setting that sustains the suspense. 
Prior to the zoom, the underwater shot positions the spectator in a realm of cinematic 
otherness, a voyeuristic distance. She does not vicariously share in the power and brutality of 
the shark, or the weakness and defilement of the young woman. The spectator enters the 
cinematic image and fractures the mimetic, and conventional, functionality of shot 
signification. The fracture occurs only at the commencement of the slow zoom and theme, 
anticipated with silence and a long pause. I agree with Turner about the “confusion caused by 
our discomfort.”107 I cannot agree however that Spielberg’s camera is subject to the 
conventional parameters of mimesis. The point of view shot in this case (and several times in 
Jaws) is less than reliable as an indication, or initiation, of the spectator’s subjectivity into the 
fictional subjectivity (of the shark) on screen.  
 Žižek offers a similar reading of a much discussed sequence in Vertigo in which 
Hitchcock corrupts the conventional shot-reverse shot as a signification of point of view. 
Scotty (James Stewart) enters Ernie’s restaurant for the first time. The sequence in which the 
two ‘interact’108 has been subject to several analyses, which Žižek accuses of overlooking the 
central panning shot in which the spectator is removed from Scotty’s subjectivity. Žižek 
draws on a notion of the Lacanian Real that intrudes, or extrudes, from the alignment of 
spectator and conventional point of view. This Lacanian otherness (at least in terms of the 
spectator) shares something with the depth of the underwater shot in the opening sequence of 
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Jaws, which is broken at the commencement of the slow zoom.109 Raymond Durgnat 
suggests something similar for several so-called point of view shots in Psycho. It is Durgnat’s 
contention that too much has been made of the point of view (or subjective) shot in 
Hitchcock’s work to identify either the filmmaker or the spectator with his films’ deviant 
psychologies: L.B. Jeffries (Rear Window), Scotty Ferguson (Vertigo), Norman Bates 
(Psycho), Mark Rutland (Marnie). Durgnat has two objections to this analysis:  
 
one, that in fictions like Psycho, camera and diegesis are logically incompatible, so that 
diegetic space and camera space read as a non-continuum, and, two, that most spectators 
overlook camera POV, much as they disregard cuts, which, if taken literally, would jump 
them about in space, like performing fleas. The reasons are well known in visual art theory 
and in scientific psychology.110 
 
While Durgnat does not take up the issue of the content of the camera space, as opposed to 
the diegetic space, it is significant that he recognises a distinction between the two. 
 This abstract, though vital point can be illustrated more simply in another sequence in 
Jaws in which the spectator is positioned in the shark’s point of view. My contention is 
simply that the spectator’s subjectivity is at best imperfectly related to the cinematic image. I 
reject the notion of a perfect congruence between the spectator and Charles Foster Kane in 
the point of view shot. The spectator embodies the temporal and spatial unity of Kane’s 
presence in the great hall, in which Turner perceives a “controlling [aspect] of the audience’s 
identification with the characters,”111 but there is not the sense of a literal transferral of the 
spectator’s subjectivity into Kane. The spectator unconsciously appreciates and aestheticises 
the inherent, cinematic distance – the construction of the shot. In the sequence in Jaws in 
which Brody (Roy Scheider) sits on the beach keeping a lookout during the 4th of July 
weekend, the gradual intrusion of the shark into an idyllic setting is played out in much the 
same way as in the opening sequence. The attack occurs suddenly and the viewer is inserted 
into Brody’s point of view. However, rather than a conventional point of view shot from 
Brody’s perspective, Spielberg uses what is referred to as the ‘push-pull.’ The camera fast 
zooms on Brody’s face while the focal length of the shot decreases dramatically. The effect is 
wholly unconventional and disorienting for the spectator because there is no recourse to the 
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focal conventions of human vision. The shot is essentially a cinematic contrivance, a 
manipulation of the spatial and temporal reality (focal length and speed) into the artifice of 
the shot. The spectator, rather than being aligned with either of the primary characters – 
Brody, his wife, the boy who is attacked, or the shark – inhabits a contained, and contrived, 
cinematic space in which her subjectivity actively engages with the image. The quality of this 
engagement cannot be a literal and seamless transference of spectator/character subjectivity.  
 It is interesting to compare Spielberg’s use of the push-pull in Jaws to Hitchcock’s 
similar use of tracking and focus to achieve the famous ‘vertigo’ shot. Hitchcock employs the 
push-pull (or at least a variation of the device Spielberg uses) precisely to identify the 
spectator with Scotty; the disorientation of the shot perspective conveys what Scotty feels 
when he looks over an abyss. In Hitchcock’s usage, the push-pull inserts the spectator (to 
some degree) into Stewart’s character. In Spielberg’s usage, a similar cinematographic trick 
inserts a space between spectator and character subjectivity. The use of the push-pull in Jaws 
disrupts the neat transference of the cinematic message. In fact, in light of the cinematic-ness 
(or the hyper-cinematic aesthetic) of the contemporary film, the relation between the 
image/shot/sequence and the reality it purports to represent is increasingly ephemeral, even as 
it attempts to correlate spectator and character subjectivity. 
 While it is necessary to appreciate the tangible relations between the Real and the 
cinematic reproduction (the subjective transference in the literal point of view shot, for 
example, which occurs frequently in Hitchcock, particularly Rear Window, Vertigo and 
Psycho), it is equally necessary to appreciate the shortcomings of such a conceptual 
framework. Point of view shots are rarely an insular, wholly contained point of view. The 
notion of the ‘voyeuristic distance’ of the cinematic image (which I’ve used above) 
compromises a perfect transference of the spectator/character subjectivity. However, this 
distance has little to do with Denzin’s gendered gaze: “Always a gendered production, 
usually male, but not necessarily, the voyeur exposes the erotic, political sides of everyday 
life. In doing so, this figure shows how the gaze is inevitably gendered and structured by the 
laws of patriarchy.”112 In Denzin’s analysis, the voyeur is an ideologised, and indeed, 
politicised position. Without rejecting the ideological voyeur, central as it is to contemporary 
theories of gender and power in film, the place from which the spectator views the cinematic 
image on a screen is dissociated from the space that appears on that screen, or the space that 
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comprises the reality external to the movie theatre. In regard to Denzin’s notion of a 
cinematic distance as ideologised, I remain sceptical. In my opinion, cinematic voyeurism is 
ontologically connected to the cinema. Hitchcock’s Rear Window is still the best example of 
the ‘romanticisation’ of the cinematic voyeur. Consider an early shot in which Grace Kelly is 
‘presented’ to the spectator. The camera offers a close-up of her features (she is 
simultaneously Lisa Freemont and Grace Kelly, a film icon, and the camera’s adoration is 
directed toward both) as she advances toward the spectator. The spectator does not inhere in 
Jeff’s (James Stewart) point of view. Rather, the interaction is with a cinematic image and a 
film icon. The shot cuts to their ‘first kiss,’ a languorous slow motion sequence, and a rarity 
for Hitchcock. While I concur with writers like Laura Mulvey113 and Tania Modleski114 that 
the cinematic voyeur and the average Peeping Tom have something in common, I would also 
argue that too much has been made of the sameness of these two (very different) ways of 
seeing. 
  
Theories of the ‘society of the spectacle,’ a phrase I take from Guy Debord’s famous work,115 
vacillate between a grudging acceptance of the centrality of the image to contemporary 
culture to an extreme, almost religious embracing of the image as ontologically transcendent 
over the object. One need look no further than Jean Baudrillard’s fashionable simulacrum of 
images, signs and mediated ephemera for the location of this phenomenon: “Today 
abstraction is no longer that of the map, the double, the mirror, or the concept. Simulation is 
no longer that of a territory, a referential being, or a substance. It is the generation by models 
of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal.”116 Baudrillard has since found his way into 
the conceptual framework of The Matrix franchise (Morpheus’s “desert of the Real” echoes 
Baudrillard; indeed, in the shooting script of the first film, he explicitly references 
Baudrillard in explaining the relationship of the Matrix to the Real) and Fight Club, in which 
the disenfranchised narrator experiences postmodern America as “a copy of a copy of a 
copy.”117 Mass culture of the 21st century, it seems, has been taught to think in terms of the 
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language of the simulacrum. Theorists like Baudrillard and writers like Don DeLillo (who 
seems to practice a ‘poetics’ of the simulacra: consider DeLillo’s notion of the Zapruder film 
of the JFK assassination as the simulacral expression of the Real (Underworld]), a theme 
central to his earlier Libra) reflect on an apparent loss of the Real, a disgruntled sense of the 
fickleness of personal and social relations. Perhaps Bono, interviewed on the tele-visual set of 
U2’s 1991 Zoo-TV tour, presents a way forward: “we saw all this information, all this 
bullshit… and wanted to surf it.” Metaphors of surface and depth have proliferated since the 
announcement of the dominance of the Postmodern Condition by Lyotard,118 yet depth 
unfortunately connotes the diverse, nuanced, subtle, complex, contextualised, historicised, 
reactionary Real, and surface the contemporarily transparent, superficial, sophomoric, 
simplistic, and ultimately valueless reproduction. Thus I reject such metaphors of cultural and 
aesthetic phenomena as inadequate to describe my own interaction with – and within – 
popular culture and its myriad of signs, texts and experiences. What does it mean to suggest 
that a cultural production – art, work, commodity - is depthless? 
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1.11  
 
It used to be that only movies were on film; now the whole world is. More than ever, visual 
technologies seem intent on striving for what Kracauer called “the status of total record.” 
And not only does it seem at the start of the new century that everything is on film or 
video…but thanks first to video and then the Internet, scenes that were never shown before 
– from natural disasters and human atrocities to sexual intimacies and ecstasies – are now 
public spectacles that are instantly shown everywhere.119  
 
Can the world be cinematic? And what would be implied in the dawning of a meta-cinematic 
aesthetic in which the external reality itself must submit to the ontology of the 
image/shot/sequence? Does the fact that the world (in whatever sense Black intends this) is 
captured on film alter the relationship of an external reality to its reproduced image? Of 
course it does. This chapter has attempted to theorise just such an alteration in the ontology of 
the Real. A classical realist aesthetics is incompatible with the cinematic medium; an 
engagement with a meaningful film aesthetics must confront a new ontology of the cinematic 
Real.  
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2.1  Culture as Functionality 
 
If we are asked to believe that all literature is ‘ideology,’ in the crude sense that its 
dominant intention (and then our only response) is the communication or imposition of 
‘social’ or ‘political’ meanings and values, we can only, in the end, turn away. If we are 
asked to believe that all literature is ‘aesthetic,’ in the crude sense that its dominant 
intention (and then our only response) is the beauty of language or form, we may stay a 
little longer but will still in the end turn away.1 
 
In titling this chapter ‘Towards a Theory of Popular Culture,’ I aim at something less grand 
than a unified theory of popular culture (or any culture, for that matter) in the way that 
physicists have aimed at a single theory of the physical world. If investigations into the nature 
of cultural institutions, narratives and, broadly speaking, ideologies have told us anything, it 
is that culture is complex, always heterogenous, and elusive. Culture cannot be explained 
holistically precisely because of its heterogeneity. It is a network of sources, texts, signs, 
symbols and the paraphernalia of meaning that is always, in a sense, beyond the grasp of the 
theorist. In this respect, I take Frederic Jameson’s point: “The dilemma of the student of mass 
culture therefore lies in the structural absence, or the repetitive volatilisation, of the ‘primary 
texts.’”2 I would only add that the problem lies equally with the texts (primary and secondary 
insofar as theory is implicated in these structures of meaning) and the individual 
subjectivities that receive them. In investigating culture through its texts, in this case 
primarily cinematic, I begin with the assumption that it is transmitted through a variety of 
significatory mechanisms that incorporate values, ideologies and politics, and that these 
systems of meaning are rarely conveyed unproblematically.  
 This second chapter functions as a correlative to the first. To conceptualise an 
alternative cinematic aesthetic, it is necessary to investigate the ‘content’ of the form (the 
stylistics of the image), which I have done under the mantle of ‘cinematic realism.’ But it is 
equally important to consider historically the formation of the culture in which various texts 
are received. I have stated in Chapter One that I am interested in the style of cinema not 
merely for its controlled aestheticism, but for its impact, or what I have called affectivity, on 
the spectator. I share the view of NoëI Carroll that mass or popular culture is a historical 
phenomenon.3 I also agree with Jameson that there is at least the perception of a distinction 
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between high and low culture, which is subject to an effacement: “The second feature of this 
list of postmodernisms is the effacement of some key boundaries or separations, most notably 
the erosion of the older distinction between high and so-called mass or popular culture.”4 I 
use the term ‘perception’ simply because the distinction has more veracity and currency as an 
imaginary standard or status symbol than an actual aesthetic tool. In relation to this 
effacement, which Jameson suggests is tantamount to an aesthetic revolution, an analysis of 
film must concurrently be an analysis of a culture that has made film its dominant textual 
form. Contemporary cinema demands a new kind of aesthetic system. Contemporary popular 
culture, it seems to me, requires a notion of culture that reflects what Anne Friedberg calls 
“media fusion’ or ‘convergence’ or the pluralist inclusiveness of ‘multimedia’”5 For Patricia 
Pisters, this is a new “mobile self [that] is individual but related, traversed by multiplicities, 
changing in time and informed by a camera consciousness.”6 
 The collapse of a distinction between high and low culture, or popular and elite art 
forms (that comprise the art work itself, but also its site of reception) is perhaps nowhere 
more apparent than in contemporary cinema. How can one distinguish between, for example, 
Pedro Almodóvar’s La Mala Educación (Bad Education) and Christopher Nolan’s Batman 
Begins in terms of high and low art? Both, I would argue, are commentaries on prior 
cinematic and textual traditions. Bad Education, rather than settling for the neo-noir, self-
consciously reworks Wilder’s Double Indemnity; the spectator might classify it as a 
‘homosexualised’ film noir. Nolan’s adaptation draws on a pulp/mass culture tradition, yet is 
imbued with a cinematic realism that is unconventional in comic book adaptations; it seems a 
deliberate recuperation of the Real after Tim Burton’s hyper-stylisation in Batman and 
Batman Returns. Both films are a commentary on cinematic traditions, and equally on the 
distinction between high and low culture. Both perform a hybridity or genericity in which 
forms of the genre film “represent contradictory perspectives on ‘media culture,’ an ironic 
eclecticism” and “articulate a profound ambivalence that reflects the lack of any sort of 
unitary mass consciousness.”7 Collins locates a textual and cultural heterogeneity in the 
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phenomenon of mass culture, which is a crucial advancement on Adorno’s ‘consciousness as 
conformity’ of the (mass) culture industry.8 
 Jameson appreciates the ephemeral and highly subjective (and thus ideological) nature 
of the distinction between high and low culture: “They [the “newer postmodernisms”] no 
longer ‘quote’ such ‘texts’ as a Joyce might have done, or a Mahler; they incorporate them to 
the point where the line between high art and commercial forms seems increasingly difficult 
to draw.”9 What is unclear is if ‘effacement’ performs an eradication of the older distinction. 
If this is the contention, I would argue that it is premature. In spite of the deluge of 
intellectual work on cultures and subcultures, predominantly through its art and texts, this 
academic mode (observing and indeed practicing the effacement of high and low art) operates 
primarily as a social science. Consider, for example, Graeme Turner’s introduction to The 
Film Cultures Reader, a massive compendium of film writings that span the period from the 
advent of cinema to psychoanalytic perspectives on the horror genre, in which he writes: 
“These essays are not interested in establishing the artistic credentials of the texts in question. 
Rather, they are interested in establishing a more complex and nuanced understanding of the 
competing forces which frame the individual experience of popular culture in general, and 
popular film in particular.”10 Turner’s comment is less an apology for the lack of 
consideration of popular art than an acknowledgement that recent film theory is simply not 
interested in considering popular film in aesthetic terms, as an earlier body of theory might 
have done of a Joyce or a Mahler. Equally, he does not claim that these films are less than art 
(or low art). This is perfectly understandable insofar as popular art offers a means of analysis 
of the culture that brings it to fruition – producers, consumers, institutions, social and cultural 
relations. For Turner, this is popular cinema’s redeeming use-value. He merely affirms the 
acceptability of this position, and closes off the avenue to an exploration of popular film as 
aesthetically motivated and received. 
 While I would argue that viewing a film is fundamentally an aesthetic experience, this 
process is predominantly theorised through a rubric of its functionality – that is, the way in 
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which it impacts ideologically on the audience. Walsh suggests that “a lot of film theory and 
criticism has developed an eclectic mix of literary theory, Marxism, psychoanalysis, and 
other things. Generally the aim of such work is to show how films either cause or exemplify 
some wider social phenomena.”11 Implicit in such analyses is a notion of a popular audience, 
or at least an imaginary demographic upon which film makes its impression and inscribes its 
culture. But the notion of a popular audience is itself problematic. The theoretical model 
imposed on studies of audience is conventionally weighted one way or the other, on audience 
or text. Work that focuses on the formal characteristics of texts seems less interested in the 
reception of such texts by its audience; work that focuses on the demographics of audience, 
or the nature of spectator response seems less interested in the formal qualities of the 
cinematic text. In this way, Jancovich is able to critique one of the major exponents of genre 
theory, Rick Altman: “despite his discussion of pragmatics and of the necessary 
indeterminacy of genre definitions, Altman shows little interest in the consumption of genres, 
compared with his interest in their production and mediation.”12 For Jancovich, genre theory 
has traditionally expended its analytic energies on understanding the formal parameters of 
genre: genre is a way of understanding form. However, he suggests that this mode of analysis 
is limited as a description of the aesthetic response of mainstream audiences: “The audience 
that he [Altman] constructs for himself in order to understand genre is, if not homogenous, at 
least quite placid.”13 Jancovich’s piece is intended to “call attention to some important 
methodological issues” in formulating a theory of genre as it applies to horror;14 I would 
argue that such a consideration is necessary when addressing contemporary film genres  
per se.  
 Considering that genre theory is founded on a collation and analysis of textual types, 
and apart from what I would consider the occasional analysis of the aestheticisation of genre 
in Tarantino or Lynch, genre studies (and more broadly, film studies) functions as a way of 
revealing something of the historical, ideological and political life of the spectator. While 
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Paul Schrader has defined film noir as a specific mood or tone,15 recent theory explores the 
sustained marginalisation and subjugation of women in noir.16 Similarly, while Amy Taubin 
offers a nuanced reading of masculinity in Tarantino’s Reservoir Dogs, the film is for her 
initially and predominantly a site at which to consider masculinity (negatively) and abject 
femininity.17 
 My point here is that theory privileges a means-end functionality of the relationship 
between popular cinema and its audience. Films such as The Silence of the Lambs and De 
Palma’s Carrie are useful vehicles for exploring the masculine gaze. Scorsese’s Goodfellas 
or Taxi Driver, or Spike Lee’s Do The Right Thing become snapshots of a ‘kind of’ urban 
America. The film, in theory, is always already a continuum of ideologised images. Carroll 
draws a similar distinction between the scholarly obsession with ‘interpretation’ (that is, a 
mode of analysis in which the text services a hypothesis external to it) and the popular mode 
of analysis, which he terms ‘evaluation,’ “an aspect of film-going to which recent film 
scholarship pays little attention.”18 
 Of course, readings that inscribe an ideology into the film text are not in any way 
perverse. The opening shower sequence in Carrie in which an otherwise ordinary locker 
room becomes the site of a hyper-sexualised encounter between the prepubescent girl and the 
dollying camera offers the manifestation of a repressed masculine desire. De Palma’s camera 
leaves little to the imagination. Similarly, Scorsese and Lee are useful chroniclers of a period 
and vision of New York City. Scorsese’s masterpieces – Mean Streets, Taxi Driver, Raging 
Bull - are equally explorations of an urban myth and a reality that is vibrant, cinematic and 
historicized. Scorsese’s variations on the flaneur (Charlie Cappa [Harvey Keitel, Mean 
Streets], Travis Bickle [Robert De Niro, Taxi Driver], Jake La Motta [Robert De Niro, 
Raging Bull]) are voices of a kind of masculinity and a kind of urban subjectivity of post-
Vietnam America. Spike Lee’s Do The Right Thing, as Manthia Diawara suggests, “situate[s] 
spectators from the perspective of a Black “once upon a time.”19 For Diawara, Spike Lee, 
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John Singleton and the New Black Cinema are addressed as a race cinema because it is, 
ostensibly, a cinema about race relations “once upon a time” in America.  
 However, what is explicitly or implicitly a political or ideologically engaged cinema 
should not preclude the analysis of an aesthetic experience (which in any case it cannot, since 
film theory does not mediate the film experience for the majority of film-goers, as it must 
inevitably for the theorist), nor the establishment of a body of work devoted to collating and 
analysing a stylistics of film and its affectivity on the spectator. While this project of 
ideologising the text is imbued with good intentions and sound methodology, it marginalizes 
the aesthetic response. Furthermore, its predisposition to read ideology in the image, shot and 
sequence of the film renders its analytical ‘gaze’ somewhat obtuse. Consider the reading of 
John Shelton Lawrence and Robert Jewett of the Star Wars franchise, in which they perceive 
an “American monomyth” tantamount to a brand of neo-fascism.20 I do not wish to take issue 
with this reading except to suggest that cinematic ideology and an ideology of an external 
reality can simply not be freely exchanged. Of the conclusion to Star Wars, Episode IV: A 
New Hope, Lawrence and Jewett write: 
 
We were quite startled by the final awards ceremony for Luke, Han, and Chewbacca in A 
New Hope, an image reprised at the beginning of The Empire Strikes Back. It seemed to 
‘quote’ the most famous of the Nazi propaganda films, Triumph of the Will (Triumph des 
Willens, 1935), which was made by Leni Riefenstahl as a celebration of the Nuremberg 
Nazi party rallies of 1934.21 
 
The writers proceed to offer a detailed analysis of A New Hope as merely the most accessible 
and iconic performance in a long history of textual performances of the American monomyth. 
In Lawrence and Jewett’s reading, this myth is equally connected to Leslie Fiedler’s classic 
formulation of the plight of the protagonist of the American novel to flee society22 and Joseph 
Campbell’s “hero with a thousand faces”23 who must flee society as part of the maturation 
process. Lawrence and Jewett examine the Star Wars franchise as a set of discursive textual 
and cultural practices that ultimately revert to a form of fascism, suggesting that “[a]lthough 
American superheroes consistently strive to redeem corrupt republics, the definitions of their 
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roles and the means of their triumphs reflect fascist values that ultimately undermine 
democratic processes and hollow out the religious faith of the enchanted.”24 They do not 
return to Riefenstahl’s Triumph des Willens (Triumph of the Will) but rather assume that the 
ideological content of Riefenstahl’s propagandist Nazi film is transposed unproblematically 
onto Lucas’s studio produced mass culture entertainment. The intertextuality of Riefenstahl’s 
film is thus a reflection of the text and subtext of Star Wars. Intertextuality, in Lawrence and 
Jewett’s conception, has an outmoded ontological foundation insofar as the one text 
(Riefenstahl) literally informs the other. There is no consideration of intertextuality as an 
aesthetic conceit or broader textual strategy. The writers gloss over the fact that “Lucas’[s] 
Entertainment Company’s encyclopaedic ‘Insider’s Guide to Star Wars’ frankly 
acknowledges it in its scene commentary: ‘The final ceremony scene emulates, almost shot-
for-shot, a similar segment in Triumph des Willens (1934).’”25 The acknowledgement is frank 
precisely because Triumph of the Will is ‘quoted’ self-consciously, deliberately and 
cinematically (in much the same way that the conclusion to Return of the Jedi re-enacts a 
sequence in Griffith’s Birth of a Nation, an “objectively racist film”26). The shot-for-shot 
fetishising (which is precisely what it is) of the earlier sequence is essentially an aesthetic 
practice. We can say the same thing of Gus Van Sant’s shot for shot remake of Psycho, which 
is the perfect aestheticisation (and fetishisation) of Hitchcock’s masterpiece. One suspects 
that Van Sant’s fetishistic reproduction of the original is something of a commentary on 
Hitchcock’s own obsession with this theme in his films, most notably Rebecca and Vertigo. 
 Lawrence and Jewett’s willingness to install a detailed and discursive analysis of 
fascism in Star Wars on the apparent ideological reverberation of a film sequence does not 
take account of the hermetic cinematic image explored in Chapter One. The image in this 
case resonates as intertextual quote, but less in the sense of a literal transposition of 
ideological intent than as an aesthetically imbued textual practice. Lucas, Coppola, Scorsese 
and others were of the generation that attended film school in Los Angeles and New York, 
versed in American and international cinema, and willing to demonstrate the intertextual 
nature of film as an art form. Lucas quotes Triumph of the Will because there is an inherent 
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artistic value in the cinematic utterance that is simultaneously quotation.27 Furthermore, the 
fact that the quotation is made of a Nazi propaganda film confers an element of 
subversiveness on what is otherwise conservative family entertainment for a mass audience. 
It is significant also that the reception of the Star Wars franchise has rarely crystallised into a 
consensus over fascism, neo-Imperialism, neo-Liberalism or any other broad political or 
ideological rubric. Of a Star Wars poll conducted in 1986, Peter Kramer writes: “When asked 
whether ‘the movie is in favor of the conservative idea of “peace through military strength,”’ 
conservative respondents overwhelmingly said ‘yes,’ whereas the majority of moderate and 
liberal respondents said ‘no’. This poll suggests that Star Wars allowed everyone to extract 
from it precisely the political meaning they were most comfortable with.”28  
 Lawrence’s piece on Star Wars is obviously not exemplary of an entire tradition of film 
and cultural analyses that seeks to transpose cinema and ideology seamlessly. But I would 
argue that film has generally been drawn on too hastily in the service of an ideological 
project. Film (and art, for that matter) coheres only in its reception and interpretation by its 
audience, and while ideology theory unveils the hegemonic practices of film production and 
consumption, its willingness to foreground the ideological reading over the aesthetic installs a 
new mode of appreciation divorced from the performance of the cinematic spectacle. It is for 
this reason that I find analyses of cinematic violence for the most part unconvincing and less 
than actively engaged with the cinematic image. This is exemplified in Jane Caputi’s reading 
of Oliver Stone’s Natural Born Killers: “Natural Born Killers feels just like a prayer. It is not 
a critique, nor even a reflection of the ‘demon’. It is a paean, an outburst of worshipful and 
exultant praise, a ceremony not of exorcism but of invocation [to violence].”29 Caputi’s 
reading of the film is founded on an interpretation of the motivations and actions of 
characters. She also draws on a comment made by Oliver Stone (who, of any filmmaker, 
should not substitute as an authoritative voice): “There was in me, I feel, a huge violence 
when I was born.”30 But little is made of the way violence is captured on film or the way it is 
manifested visually, which must surely inform any analysis of the impact of violence on a 
spectator or mass audience. Caputi’s reading would benefit from a detailed shot and sequence 
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analysis of parts of the film which would offer a more nuanced reading of the way violence is 
transposed from character action to spectator participation. Ultimately, I reject the 
performance of Natural Born Killers on the spectator as an ‘invocation to violence,’ a notion 
I will consider in more detail in Chapter Four. 
 
While I acknowledge the important – indeed, invaluable – contribution of cultural studies 
(and its predecessors, psychoanalytic theory and Marxism) to film theory, I contend that the 
emphasis on the text as ideological/political/personal footprint does not engage with the 
practicalities of film production or reception. It cannot record or qualitatively evaluate the 
aesthetic reverberations of a Star Wars logo or a blue filter on a camera lens in Michael 
Mann’s Heat. It is even less successful in assessing the qualitative relations between an 
actor’s performance and the film’s aesthetic and cultural resonance. Consider Al Pacino, 
wielding a mini-gun in the last scene in De Palma’s Scarface - “Say hello to my little 
friends.” How does the film theorist evaluate the cultural and aesthetic discursivity of this 
filmic utterance? Perhaps it can be weighed in terms of an ethnicity, the immigrant taking 
what is held from him: He loved the American Dream – With a vengeance.31 In The 
Sopranos, in the scene in which Christopher Moltisanti says, “This ain’t negotiation time. 
This is Scarface, the final scene, fuckin’ bazookas under each arm, ‘say hello to my little 
friends,’”32 and the statement is re-uttered, how does the theorist manage the shifting 
ontology of cinematic quotation? In what sense is the original utterance reorganised in 
relation to its subsequent quotation? 
 I do not wish to suggest that the aesthetic is purely an appreciation of beauty or form in 
an essentialist way (as in the Raymond Williams excerpt above) but rather a complex and 
highly developed system of cinematic ‘reading,’ interpretation and ultimately consumption. 
Carroll correctly suggests that “there is a great deal of audience activity involved in the 
response to mass art.”33 Aesthetically engaging with contemporary cinema requires 
something quite removed from a ‘heightened’ though non-specific appreciation of film; the 
nature of its distinction needs to be conceptualised in terms of the film itself and the context 
in which it is received. This context extends to its formulaicness, or generic foundations, its 
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reflection on a discursive set of mythologies, and ultimately with its self-aware and self-
acknowledged status as art. Traditional theories of art and aesthetics that privilege an 
essentialist notion of truth, beauty and expression are incommensurate with the ontology of 
the cinematic image and quotation. Carroll suggests that “most art, maybe all art, is formulaic 
to some degree. All artists use some conventions, formulas, rules of thumb, traditional forms, 
donnees and so on.”34 The shift to an ontology of art as inherently formulaic is nowhere more 
apparent than in contemporary cinema. An aesthetics of popular cinema is founded in part on 
an aesthetics of the formulaic. In this sense, one can in fact embrace Adorno’s ‘consciousness 
as conformity’ (though of course Adorno intends it quite a different way), if conformity is 
evaluated in the context of the textual heteroglossia that gives it meaning. 
 
2.2 Culture as Commodity 
 
The creature who emerges from postmodern thought is centreless, hedonistic, self 
inventing, ceaselessly adaptive. He thus fares splendidly in the disco or supermarket, 
though not quite so well in the school, courtroom or chapel. He sounds more like a Los 
Angeles media executive than an Indonesian fisherman.35 
 
So jeans can bear meanings of both community and individualism, of unisexuality and 
masculinity or femininity. This semiotic richness of jeans means that they cannot have a 
single defined meaning, but that they are a resource bank of potential meanings.36 
 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to theorise contemporary culture without observing what 
Lyotard, Jameson and other writers address as the dominant aesthetic of postmodernity. As 
Eagleton indicates above, the postmodern condition is founded on a lack of centre or origin, 
and the consequential discursive expression of the self and culture. Broadly speaking, the 
postmodern is an aesthetic founded upon lack while earlier aesthetic forms strive toward 
completion or fulfilment. Brian Singer’s The Usual Suspects offers a remarkable transition of 
an earlier narratively focused cinematic aesthetic. It is an aesthetic innovation in which the 
film functions narratively on a narrative lack. Verbal’s (Kevin Spacey) account of events on 
the Santa Monica pier is an inscription of a fictitious story onto the cinematic narrative. The 
demands on the spectator reorganise the relationship of spectator to film such that the 
spectator takes her place alongside Inspector Kooyong (Chaz Palminteri), fumbling over the 
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narrative ‘truth’ which is erased in the telling of the story. Similar narrative inversions, or 
what I will call ‘entropic narratives’ inform some of Lynch’s work (Lost Highway is perhaps 
the best example) and David Fincher’s Fight Club. 
 The postmodern also refashions the earlier modern or classical subjectivity into a site of 
abjectivity, or the absence of an innate sense of self. The contemporary subject resides within 
this postmodernity divorced from an essentialist notion of truth, right and existential 
purpose.37 I do not share Eagleton’s assessment of the merits of the postmodern subject, 
though the notion of adaptability or reinvention is useful. Discursivity in my usage connotes a 
sense of perpetual displacement of the subjective consciousness (or the space in which 
meaning is finally established). Fiske puts this nicely when he suggests that “making sense of 
anything involves making sense of the person who is the agent in the process.”38 It is 
important here to stress the nature of culture as processional, or in flux. This is not to say that 
culture eludes meaning but merely that part of that meaning is located in the sense of its 
perpetual movement or change. But the notion of a cultural process in Fiske’s analysis is 
problematic because he does not indicate precisely what he means by “making sense.” The 
cultural theorist is hampered by the project of having to make sense of the subject in a 
complex discursive cultural system. Must a film ‘theorist’ be a ‘spectator’ to make sense of 
the “person who is the agent” in contemporary cinema? What is the nature of that agency? 
The problem arises in the necessity of having to make sense because this implies in the 
subject a status of having an inherent sense, or static sensibility, and this must undermine the 
definition of culture as process. But Fiske’s theoretical eye that is attuned to the cultural agent 
is a necessary starting point in any cultural analysis.  
 Fiske focuses on the ideology of the subject and cultural system in which the observer’s 
(or agent’s) consciousness is necessarily already ideological. I will begin here, using his 
paradigmatic analysis of popular culture as a point of departure. 
  
Fiske discusses the semiotic potentiality of jeans in a contemporary university in which jeans 
are accorded the special power of making meaning out of cultural commodities and revealing 
the importance of the semiotic system within the economics of production and consumption. 
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In this way, he formulates a mode of resistance to the ‘cultural logic of late capitalism,’ to use 
Jameson’s famous phrase. “At the simplest level, this is an example of a user not simply 
consuming a commodity but reworking it, treating it not as a completed object to be accepted 
passively, but as a cultural resource to be used.”39 Fiske’s efforts on behalf of a popular 
culture that engages semiotically with the market are to rescue popular culture from an 
“economic system which determines mass production and mass consumption… [in which] a 
commodity is ideology made material.”40 The commodity is not so much the perfect 
expression of the ideology that gives it life in the marketplace, but its ideology is all that it is. 
The ideology is not writ large on the product and its packaging as a unique and specific 
ideological statement; rather it is an all-informing, all-pervasive, ubiquitous system that 
incorporates the product and its consumer.  
 The problem I have with this notion of a cultural commodity is that while a product 
might be ideology made material, it is surely only ‘the ideology’ in the broadest sense. That 
is, the act of consumption, less an expression of cultural passivity, is an intervention in the 
process of the commodity from ideology to production to promotion to consumption. The 
franchise aesthetic in contemporary cinema reflects this process of the subject (usually a fan 
as opposed to the casual filmgoer) intervening in the system through the act of consumption 
in the marketplace. Purchase, possession, ownership, synthesis of product and self to form 
something new (for example, in the case of a fan donning the Matrix ‘mirrorshades’ to alter 
her self) – are very real interventions in the process that connects ideology and commodity. In 
this sense, consumption is in its purest form an aesthetic intervention, and the commodity is 
much more than a materialised ideology.  
 Fiske reads popular culture as implicated within a semiotic and economic system, a 
culture that must ultimately accede to the market if all it does it consume and reinsert 
commodities into the system. He conceives the notion of cultural ‘excorporation,’ whereby 
“the subordinate make their own culture out of the resources and commodities provided by 
the dominant system,”41 which may lead incrementally to “structural changes at the level of 
the system itself, in whatever domain… [which] occur only after the system has been eroded 
                                                
39 Fiske, Understanding Popular Culture, 11. 
40 Fiske, Understanding Popular Culture, 14. Fiske is perhaps also drawing on a classic formulation of 
Althusser’s ‘ideology as unconsciousness.’ See Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.” 
In Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (New York and London: Monthly Review 
Press, 1971), 127-134 and 141-148. 
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and weakened by the tactics of everyday life.”42 For Fiske, this act of making culture, 
refashioning the commodity so that it encapsulates and is encapsulated by a new field of 
meaning, is thus a significant step forward in the assessment of popular culture, which has 
commonly been one of passivity and aimless, ‘ceaselessly adaptive’ conformity.  
 However, the model of the excorporation of the commodity has profound limitations. 
On the one hand, Fiske fails to acknowledge that culture must be ‘made’ within the market, 
drawing on the market’s semiotic system, as well as of the market’s materials. I take on board 
his Marxist formulation of late capitalism, share his acknowledgement of its pervasiveness, 
yet reject the transparent relation between its ideology and its manifestation, the commodity. 
Disregarding this is tantamount to rejecting the ubiquity of the market, which I am perfectly 
willing to do. But this must constitute an obstacle to Fiske’s excorporation as a tool of a 
‘culture of resistance.’ After all, the individual must resist something, if only an ephemeral 
system of economic and cultural relations. In excorporation, Fiske offers what appears to be a 
vehicle to extricate the commodity from the dominant ideological agenda. But if the 
commodity is read within the marketplace, as it inevitably must, the emancipatory 
possibilities of excorporation are diminished.  
 Consider a young Aboriginal boy seated in the back of a public bus, wearing a two-
piece Eminem tracksuit. How would the cultural theorist, particularly one intent on charting 
the excorporation of the commodity, read such a confluence of cultural signs? On the one 
hand, the boy is aligned with (and aligns himself to) a minority disenfranchised culture, 
Aboriginal society in Sydney – he chooses to sit at the back of the bus, which is a well known 
gesture of resistance to orthodoxy. The Eminem tracksuit expresses his resistance to the 
hegemonic system, in this case a convergence of a conservative Liberal Australian 
government and the capitalist market. Conservatism is contrasted with the perceived poverty 
and oppression of black American culture represented in a ‘culture of rap.’ Rap has 
maintained its ethos of resistance to the dominant White society in spite of the dilution of rap 
resistance with Hip-Hop in the music of Destiny’s Child or Snoop Doggy Dog. The coding of 
the commodification (Aboriginality/Rap/Eminem) explicitly offers a message of resistance to 
a culture that is located as Other – White/conservative/wealthy/enfranchised. 
 Fiske establishes a dialectic of incorporation and excorporation in the process in which 
a dominant ideology is made material in the market. He suggests that  
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popular culture is organized around various forms of the oppositional relationship between 
the people and the power-bloc. This opposition always has the potential to be progressive, 
and in practice it generally is. Insofar as the popular forces are attempting to evade or resist 
the disciplinary, controlling forces of the power-bloc, they are working to open up spaces 
within which progressiveness can work.43 
 
There is a sense here that culture is either a site of resistance to hegemony or part of its 
mechanics – a solution or perpetuation of the problem. But in my opinion, the image of the 
Aboriginal boy in an Eminem suit lays bare the profound limitations inherent in this mode of 
analysis. How would the theorist distinguish between incorporation and excorporation? The 
‘Aboriginality’ of the boy in the suit is itself incorporated into the hegemonic ideology 
insofar as the purchase of the Eminem tracksuit implicates the boy in the market (and thus 
maintains the status quo, rather than forming a site of resistance); the ownership of the suit 
challenges the abject poverty and oppression of the Aboriginal and Aborigine. Fiske 
addresses the ‘residual’ ideology in the purchasing act:  
 
So how much of a resistance to this is wearing torn jeans? In the economic sphere there is a 
trace of resistance in that for jeans to become naturally ragged they need to be worn long 
past the time when they would normally be considered worn out and thus need replacing 
with another pair. Reducing one’s purchase of commodities can be a tiny gesture against a 
high-consumption society... One possible display of meanings here is of a display of 
poverty.44 
 
The only way the tracksuit functions as excorporation (or display of poverty) is if it is stolen. 
And in any case, torn jeans are merely a commodification of poverty as romanticised image 
rather than an expression of resistance to a widely manifested social poverty. The act of theft 
might offer an expression of resistance to the conventions of production and consumption in 
the marketplace, but its ideology is made material as purchased object when worn, 
representative of the semiotic and economic relations of the marketplace. The suit functions 
as an expression of the market – brands, types, etc., and associated Eminem paraphernalia. 
The site of meaning is configured only as commodity. 
 As an expression of cultural resistance, Eminem is commodified in the production and 
consumption – exchange of goods for money – in the market. It is difficult to conceptualise 
just what the semiotic relation is between the young Aboriginal boy and Eminem, and by 
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extension a suit bearing the Eminem brand name. If we consider a lyric like “I don’t make 
black music, I don’t make white music,/ I make fight music,”45 how would we locate 
Aboriginality in this context? How would we address the commodification of Eminem – as 
songwriter, rapper, brand name, movie star, icon, a plethora of pop-cultural images? I simply 
cannot perceive a way in which to insert the Aboriginal boy in his Eminem suit into a cultural 
model of passivity (Adorno) or resistance/excorporation (Fiske). I would perhaps side with 
Adorno only insofar as the suit as cultural commodity has nothing at all to do with resistance 
in a Utopian sense. Fiske’s notion that torn jeans are a symbol of poverty is dubious. That 
such a symbol offers an incremental challenge to an ‘imagined’ market (it is in fact an 
imaginary, or Utopian, vision, insofar as the wearer of the jeans is not engaging with the 
ideology of the market except to reflect it back upon itself) is equally optimistic; poor is 
‘cool,’ and ‘cool’ is commodified through consumption. However, ultimately, Adorno’s 
model falls equally short of describing the empowerment of the Eminem suit and a genuinely 
discursive aesthetic of resistance, which I will address later in the chapter. 
 What is missing from this analysis is a meaningful way of addressing the subjectivity of 
the boy in the suit. If cultural discursivity is predicated on the proliferation of texts, myths, 
signs, symbols and the various significatory mechanisms that are put together to formulate 
concrete meanings, the boy is implicated in this discursive process. Ultimately, the most 
complex and meaningful system of analysis of this ‘performance’ of a commodity must be 
aesthetic. The consumption and expression of the commodity (and if we are to follow Fiske, 
ideology made manifest) is founded on an aesthetic value accorded to the suit that occurs 
within the market system. The suit functions as a symbolic system of value, divorced from its 
ideological expression insofar as that ideology is incorporated in a discursive cultural 
process. Ideology no longer coheres in pure form at the site of representation in the 
commodity. Consumption alters the ideological fabric of the message, reconstituting the 
product at least in part as autonomous from the ideology of the prevailing system. The 
engagement with a product at the point of consumption is more than an ideological 
transposition.  
 There is something profoundly stimulating in the act of consumption because it is an 
intervention in an otherwise impersonal itinerary of the commodity. This is precisely the 
engagement with the consumption aesthetic that simultaneously reflects on and recuperates 
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market ideology, and yet expresses the discursivity of the ideological symbol. The semiotic 
system in which the Eminem suit coheres is less the literal transposition of a hegemonic 
agenda than a discursive performance of meaning and, ultimately, subjective value.46 
 Perhaps this is better illustrated with a more concrete example. The image that opens 
each instalment of The Matrix franchise is the classic Warner Bros. logo that heads the studio 
and signals the film’s status as a major production and distribution enterprise. However, 
while the logo is ordinarily coloured yellow, the Wachowski Brothers colour it with the green 
tinge that colours the entire film. The reasoning behind this is explained by John Gaeta, 
Special Effects Supervisor on the three films: 
 
The opening of the movie was important in that we wanted to alter the logo of the studios 
because we felt that they were an evil empire bent on breaking the creative juices of the 
average director or writer. So we felt that desecrating the studio symbols was an important 
message for the audience that we reject the system.47 
 
Unfortunately, as Gaeta speaks, Carrie-Ann Moss (‘Trinity’ in the film) can be heard 
laughing in the background. This renders Gaeta’s intention in making the comment unclear. 
However, opting for the less than cynical approach, I will assume that Gaeta is entirely 
serious and that the Wachowski Brothers are indeed making a statement (or ‘excorporating 
the commodity’) by altering the Warner Bros. logo. What is the impact of this on the studio 
system (which, though it might be crudely generalised, will be accorded the status of 
ubiquitous ‘system,’ as Fiske accords to the market)? What is the impact on the film itself? 
What is the impact on the spectator? And ultimately, what is the nature of the symbol as 
performance in the cultural sphere? 
 On one level, the symbol of resistance is an expression of the dominant (Warner Bros. 
and studio system) ideology. After all, the alteration to the logo has presumably been 
permitted by the studio executives. Yet it is, as Gaeta suggests, a perversion of the original 
and a challenge to its status in the system. When placed alongside Neo’s exit from a phone 
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booth to Rage Against the Machine’s Wake Up!,48 it appears that the film functions from first 
frame to last as an expression of resistance to a ‘system’ - in the film, The Matrix, in the 
spectator’s external reality, the market and the Hollywood studio system. The fact that the 
logo appears ‘inside’ the Matrix supports this reading. The logo is severed from its original 
ideological (and semiotic) intention; it is literally re-presented, and thus re-intentioned, in the 
film. And yet this alteration has been permitted by the system that has previously ideologised 
the message.  
 In this case, I would argue that the performance of the logo in the cultural sphere is 
discursive. It is a process that coheres and is ultimately signified only through networks of 
mediation. Resistance is aestheticised for the spectator, who simultaneously reconfigures the 
logo and yet affirms the residual ideology of the original. The reconfigured logo bears the 
aesthetic of individual heroic resistance to the system on behalf of the disenfranchised masses 
(in the film, humanity is a slave to Machine intelligence). But equally, it bears the aesthetic of 
The Matrix, a simulacral realm in which ‘residual self-image’ transforms the desert of the 
Real into the hyper-aestheticised imaginary of The Matrix. Immersion in the Real and the 
Matrix is thus founded upon an acknowledgement of the aesthetic value of the act of 
consumption (in this case, the logo is consumed in symbolic form at the ticket counter and 
onscreen). Fiske would no doubt suggest that the logo (or brand name) is merely the 
expression of the hegemony of the studio system, which it is: “Jeans are no longer, if they 
ever were, a generic denim garment. Like all commodities, they are given brand names that 
compete among each other for specific segments of the market.”49 But it is equally, and 
simultaneously, an expression of resistance to that system, an expression and strategy of 
resistance that will always be aestheticised (and thus severed from the initial ideological 
utterance) at the point of consumption – which is to say the point of inception of the 
hegemonic ideology.50 
 Perhaps this reading of Gaeta’s comment moves perilously close to a rejection of the 
possibility of cultural resistance, particularly in the notion of the consumption aesthetic. This 
is certainly not my intention. Individual and collective expression is after all a kind of 
resistance that impacts on real individuals and real cultures:  
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By repositioning and recontextualising commodities, by subverting their conventional uses 
and inventing new ones, the subcultural stylist gives the lie to what Althusser has called 
‘false obviousness of everyday practice’ (Althusser and Balibar, 1968), and opens up the 
world of objects to new and covertly oppositional readings.51  
 
I merely argue here that this reality has rarely been theorised from its initial point of contact 
with the culture it addresses. Cultural meanings do not cohere neatly between producers and 
consumers of meaning. Commodities do not negate cultural meaning or aesthetic value to the 
consumer.  
 One can see such a conflation of means and end with simplistic analyses of the 
Hollywood studio system. The system is in a narrow sense a business that seeks to maximise 
profits; cultures and individuals are incorporated in market strategies; demographics carry 
more weight than individual opinions; the system is more carefully attuned to the mainstream 
than unconventional cinematic forms – and this is all in part a business interest. But 
Hollywood is also a site at which creative impulses are manifested in commodity form for 
mainstream consumption. The system is involved in engineering creativity, regardless of the 
form this creativity takes. Apocalypse Now and Jaws are both major studio films; Apocalypse 
now is perceived as an artistic endeavour while Jaws is considered a mass marketing 
phenomenon. 
 The cultural coding of the commodity is difficult, if not impossible, to stabilise. 
Commodity consumption is a cultural investment, and it is this aspect of contemporary 
popular culture that has been too easily overlooked or disregarded. The aesthetic value of 
consumption is literally devalued or rejected out of hand beneath a Utopian vision of social 
and cultural resistance that may begin incrementally, but is projected as proceeding 
exponentially. I cannot see the value in this negation of a genuine aesthetic engagement of a 
commodity in the market. The painstaking investigation of an incremental excorporation of a 
consumerist culture does not engage with the reality of that culture, which seeks resistance 
for its commodity value within, and in relation to, the market system. 
 Theorising a resistance that must inevitably augment the object of that resistance (I refer 
specifically to the nature of consumption, or a ‘consumption aesthetic’ - I am not speaking of 
resistance per se) is fraught with complexity and abstract systems of meaning. Jameson 
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acknowledges this: “The hypothesis is that works of mass culture cannot be ideological 
without one and the same time being implicitly or explicitly Utopian as well.”52 In this sense, 
he defends his project, which is essentially Utopian; resistance must be aimed at a particular, 
and highly specific, end. But he also acknowledges that “until the omnipresence of culture in 
this society is even dimly sensed, realistic conceptions of the nature and function of political 
praxis today can scarcely be framed.”53 In this stage of the omnipresence of late capitalism, 
theory has less than adequately analysed the discursive nature of culture and its components 
in which resistance is concurrently radical and conservative. “No society, indeed, has ever 
been saturated with signs and messages like this one.”54 I would add that the discursivity of 
these signs and messages compromises the integrity of an ideologically-organised system 
(hegemony) and at least raises the issue of a hegemonic practice (market production and 
consumption) that is divorced from the institutions that originally provided its meaning. 
 
2.3 Culture as Industry 
 
The problem of postmodernism – how its fundamental characteristics are to be described, 
whether it even exists in the first place, whether the very concept is of any use, or is, on the 
contrary, a mystification – this problem is at one and the same time an aesthetic and a 
political one.55 
 
Guy Debord’s  powerful slogan is even now more apt for the ‘prehistory’ bereft of all 
historicity, whose own putative past is little more than a set of dusty spectacles. In faithful 
conformity to poststructuralist linguistic theory, the past as ‘referent’ finds itself gradually 
bracketed, and then effaced altogether, leaving us with nothing but texts.56 
 
Frederic Jameson’s writings on postmodernism are seminal works insofar as they attempt to 
formulate an aesthetics of the postmodern, drawing on various theoretical models, including 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment and the Culture Industry. Rita Felski is 
correct to suggest that “Jameson does not do Cultural Studies. His work is closer in spirit to 
Marxist aesthetic theory, especially the Frankfurt school and its gloomy vision of popular 
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culture as a form of capitalist domination.”57 While cultural theorists have examined the 
production and reception of popular culture, Jameson and Adorno, among others, are engaged 
in a project of evaluating culture in an aesthetic sense, in which the autonomy or semi-
autonomy of art is connected to subjective consciousness. Each project is founded upon a 
comparison between an authentic art as socially generative, and a false art spawning a false 
consciousness. For Jameson, the false consciousness58 is less a matter of cultural signification 
than the relations between a dominant mode of capitalism (‘late capitalism’) and social life,59 
which transforms “reality into images” and “fragment[s] of time into a series of perpetual 
presents.”60 By his own admission, the conceptual paradigm in which he has mapped 
postmodernism is totalising rather than founded on post-structuralism’s staple methodology 
of heterogeneous signs, proliferating subjectivities, and an infinitude of meaning.61 This 
totalising approach permits (and requires) broad claims about history and art, for which he 
has received criticism for a lack of specificity in both.62 He proceeds to defend the totalising 
approach on the grounds of a ‘level of abstraction.’ In this section, I apply Jameson’s theories 
of postmodernism and its dominant aesthetic to my own conception of contemporary culture. 
To conclude, I discuss Adorno’s broad-based conception of the Culture Industry and consider 
its significance in contemporary theories of popular culture and cinema. 
 Lyotard’s classic formulation in which he expresses an “incredulity toward the grand 
narratives,”63 including the Enlightenment rationalist project, Christianity and Marxism, is 
central to analyses of the ‘cultural turn,’ to use the title of a collection of Jameson’s writings 
on postmodernism. It is expressed in the theoretical trajectories of post-structuralism as well 
as the mandate of Cultural Studies to remain “open-ended.”64 Jameson’s writing on 
postmodernity constructs a set of grand narratives that describe the nature of the postmodern 
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moment. In the following section, I attempt to formulate an ‘authenticity’ of contemporary 
popular culture and film, focusing on Jameson, Baudrillard, Teshome Gabriel’s “Towards a 
Critical Theory of Third World Films,” and Walter Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age 
of Mechanical Reproduction.” 
 
Jameson’s conception of history, insofar as it is coherent in postmodernity, reflects on the 
origins of a Marxist project that is equally totalising and Utopian. This project is 
fundamentally attached to art as resistance and authentic expression, which “is dependant for 
its existence on authentic collective life, on the vitality of the ‘organic’ social group in 
whatever form.”65 It is Jameson’s claim that “capitalism systematically dissolves the fabric of 
all cohesive social groups without exception, including its own ruling class.”66 This 
dissolution of the collective group and subject (the realisation of the postmodern moment is 
commensurate with the ‘death of the subject’) signals the emergence of a new self (though 
selves and others are also anachronistic terms in postmodernism):  
 
Yes, once upon a time, in the classic age of competitive capitalism, in the heyday of the 
nuclear family and the emergence of the bourgeoisie as the hegemonic social class, there 
was such a thing as individualism, as individual subjects. But today, in the age of corporate 
capitalism, of the so-called organization man…today, that older bourgeois individual 
subject no longer exists.67 
 
In this way, late capitalism and its semiotic realisation perform a de-authentification of its 
own standards and of historical systems of meaning and value, cultural and aesthetic.  
 
Both of these modes [high modernism and popular art] have attained an admirable level of 
technical virtuosity; but it is a daydream to expect that either of these semiotic structures 
could be retransformed, by fiat, miracle, or sheer talent, into what could be called, in its 
strong form, political art, or in a more general way, that living and authentic culture of 
which we have virtually lost the memory.68 
 
                                                
65 Jameson, “Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture,” 140. 
66 Jameson, “Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture,” 140. 
67 Jameson, “Postmodernism and Consumer Society,” 6. Jameson categorises the ‘new’ subjectivity as a 
deterioration of the old, and of the loss of an essential self. 
68 Jameson, “Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture,” 140. 
 76 
Postmodernism is a self-creating and self-administering system in which authentic art is 
practised only in “marginal pockets of the social life of the world system.”69 These pockets 
have forged a critical space within, and in opposition to, the market. In Jameson’s 
formulation, art produced within the market is always already commodified and thus 
inauthentic. The collective production and consumption of commodities cannot be equated 
with an authentic expression that is in some vague sense a form of cultural resistance to the 
market, and which is emancipatory for the subjective consciousness. While Jameson rejects 
Adorno’s notion of the culture industry, at least within the parameters of the culture Adorno 
conceptualises, his dialectic of a culture of authentic resistance and the postmodern veers 
close to Adorno’s model. While Adorno requires an autonomy of the artwork, Jameson’s 
critique of this autonomy is less an argument about aesthetics against postmodern art than a 
devaluing of the culture that constitutes postmodern society. Adorno’s parameters of the 
culture industry, while reconfigured in Jameson within an elaborate economic and cultural 
analysis, are ultimately maintained.70 
 For Jameson, resistance and authenticity are meaningless in a culture that is 
systematically ahistorical. Signs and symbols are merely expressions of the market, imbued 
with meaning only in commodity form, valued only as a mechanism of exchange: “There is 
some agreement that the older modernism functioned against its society in ways which are 
variously described as critical, negative, contestatory, subversive, oppositional, and the like. 
Can anything of the sort be affirmed about postmodernism and its social moment?”71 In this 
gesture, Jameson negates the possibility of ‘art’ in the postmodern creative space, and renders 
the postmodern subject politically impotent, unaware and unconcerned. In the reflective glass 
of the Bonaventure hotel, a “total space, a complete world, a kind of miniature city,”72 
postmodernism’s inculcation of depth into so much surface area is perfectly realised. The city 
as historical space is here ahistorical, a textual trope or fluid motif, as in the postmodern city 
of Blade Runner or The Matrix,73 doomed to exist in a perpetual present, reflecting only on its 
insularity from an external reality. Ahistoricism equates to a spatial dispersion into 
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nothingness, and all that is maintained is the imaginary of a simulacrum. “For Jean 
Baudrillard, for example, the repetitive structure of what he calls the 
simulacrum…characterises the commodity production of capitalism and marks our object 
world with an unreality and a free-floating absence of ‘the referent’.”74 Equating commodity 
production in the postmodern era with the hyperreality of Baudrillard’s simulacrum divorces 
postmodern expression from any possibility of authenticity. 
 The postmodern subject (I speak as a writer not on the fringe of the market, but 
immersed in it), who must forge into being some semblance of herself, and some space for 
individual expression and aesthetic value, must reject each of Jameson’s claims. I have 
argued thus far that film (and art) is fundamentally aesthetic, and thus experiential. I 
concurred with Barbara Kennedy that what is required in the realm of popular culture to 
conceptualise its value is an affective theory,75 in which “a new aesthetic theory, which 
accounts for how the affective is formulated through color, sound, movement, force, 
intensity”76 holds sway with the plethora of theories of ideology. What is disappointing in 
Jameson’s writing is the willingness to reject all postmodern art (and thus all popular art, 
insofar as the phenomenon of popular art arises only with monopolistic capitalism, the second 
stage of Mandel’s model77) as inauthentic within the parameters of a totalising and Utopian 
project of personal, cultural, political and social emancipation. In this model, art is again 
functional, exemplary of this or that phase of human history, demonstrative of a social and 
cultural practice (or in the case or postmodernism, a lack thereof), ideologised into 
obsolescence,78 aestheticised only as reflection, or collage, or the emptiness of an endless and 
pointless proliferation of postmodern expressions. Forbidden the authenticity of art, the 
postmodern subject is doomed to endless repetition, and in this way is implicated in the 
performance of the market and its dominant aesthetic. “The distorted and unreflexive 
attempts of newer cultural production to explore and to express this new space must then 
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also, in their own fashion, be considered as so many approaches to the representation of (a 
new) reality (to use a more antiquated language).”79  
 Unfortunately, even beneath the guise of a possible creative agency of the postmodern 
subject, ‘distortion’ and ‘unreflexivity’ amount to working within the simulacra, or merely 
affirming the parameters of the prison-house. But surely the postmodern subject, 
unemancipated for the meantime, must reconceptualize postmodernity without recourse to a 
realm of inauthenticity. This is essentially where Jameson and I part in our approaches to an 
analysis of postmodernism or culture. 
  
Teshome Gabriel offers a more pragmatic approach to emancipate the subject from the 
marketplace, focusing on recent cinema and the methodology of film theory. Gabriel draws 
on the existing methodology of structuralism and the emphasis in cultural theory on 
hegemony to engage with what he calls “the struggle for freedom from oppression [that] has 
been waged by the Third World masses, who in their maintenance of a deep cultural identity 
have made history come alive.”80 It is significant that both Gabriel and Jameson locate 
authenticity in the “recognition of ‘consciousness of oneself’”81 that is possible only in 
dialectical opposition to a unifying and totalising system: for Jameson, the third and final 
phase of capitalism, for Gabriel the “Western Hollywood film industry.”82 Both look to 
contained pockets on the fringe of, or external to, the unifying system for cultural and 
aesthetic authenticity. Both initiate these cultural spaces as sites of resistance. Both idealise 
the oppositional agency in the authentic subjectivity, though for Jameson this idealisation is 
justified as a “level of abstraction” and is in fact a defence against the systematic destruction 
of dialectical and critical distance in the postmodern sphere: “A system that constitutively 
produces differences remains a system, nor is the idea of such a system supposed to be in 
kind ‘like’ the object it tries to theorise.”83 Against criticisms of a lack of specificity in his 
analyses of postmodernism, he attempts to write from within the system while maintaining a 
subjective critical distance from the object of his writing. The system, if it is functional as a 
descriptor of economic and social differences, is necessary to conceptualise the “sheer 
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heteronomy and the emergence of unrelated subsystems.”84 In this way, the Utopian aspect of 
the Marxist project is maintained and is in fact the radical aspect of the analysis.  
 Both Jameson and Gabriel are equally committed to an authentic aesthetics and an 
authentic cultural practice. In fact, the two spheres of society are intimately connected 
(perhaps in much the same way that Adorno perceives the ‘autonomy of art’ as the criterion 
of an art of resistance – art inherently possesses a social meaning). For Gabriel, the Third 
World film ‘matures’ from its first, originating phase of an “unqualified assimilation” into the 
system, to a “remembrance phase,” and finally the “combative phase,” in which is born a  
 
cinema of mass participation, one enacted by members of communities speaking indigenous 
language, one that espouses Julio Garcia Espinosa’s polemic of ‘An Imperfect Cinema,’ 
that in a developing world, technical and artistic perfection in the production of a film 
cannot be aims in themselves.85 
 
The imperfect cinema is contrasted with the apparent drive to perfection of the Hollywood 
film, exemplified in the genre films of the studio period. While I will expand on this later in 
the chapter, I will say here that the notion of an ‘imperfect cinema’ that is unique to the Third 
World is simplistic. Consider, for example, imperfection as a cinematic aesthetic. The French 
New Wave, as well as the Hollywood ‘auteurs’ of the seventies, experimented with quality of 
film, minimalism in sets and performances, stark realism. Godard’s jump cut edit was a direct 
challenge to the seamless ‘perfection’ of the traditional cinematic image.86  
 Gabriel and Jameson share a distinctly Marxist trajectory in their train of thought, 
particularly in the willingness to reject historical specificity in favour of an instrumental 
periodisation. Both paradigms are founded on a structural and functional appraisal of art and 
the culture that receives it. Jameson’s postmodernity is summed up by a crumbling of the 
‘centre,’ at which point earlier models of history and society are simply not applicable. He 
perceives this lack as pervasive, that is, as having infected every sphere of the postmodern 
present – personal, ideological and political. A critique of these models must begin by 
reinstalling a mechanistic historicity in postmodern society, a connection between the subject 
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and her history, culture, art, agency, and sense of belonging. This is achieved by, among 
other things, employing an empiricist approach to the realities of postmodern culture.  
  
Discussing his own brand of postmodernity, Jean Baudrillard relies on a wholly non-specific 
approach to a critique of contemporary society. Baudrillard writes:  
 
Above all, it is the referential principle of images which must be doubted, this strategy by 
means of which they always appear to refer to a real world, to real objects, and to reproduce 
something which is logically and chronologically anterior to themselves. None of this is 
true. As simulacra, images precede the real to the extent that they invert the causal and 
logical order of the real and its reproduction.87 
 
It is essential to recognise here that Baudrillard theorises not only a simulacrum of the Real, 
the imaginary and real space in which the reproduced consumes the Real, but its precession, 
its anteriority to the ontological truth of the real object. Baudrillard adds: “Benjamin, in his 
essay ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,’ already pointed out 
strongly this modern revolution in the order of production (of reality, of meaning) by the 
precession, the anticipation of its reproduction.”88 Benjamin does indeed conceptualise the 
ontology of art in the age of mechanical reproduction precisely in its reproducibility: “To an 
ever greater degree the work of art reproduced becomes the work of art designed for 
reproducibility.”89 But in what sense is this compatible with a precession of a simulacra in 
which the Iconoclasts (makers of religious icons) reveal only “that deep down God never 
existed, that only the simulacrum ever existed, even that God himself was never anything but 
his own simulacrum.”90 Baudrillard is pronouncing a final effacement of the Real in which 
the postmodern individual inhabits a simulacrum of images divorced from an anterior 
ontologically sound reality. Benjamin is pronouncing a cultural and economic system in 
which art is transformed from the authentic (possessing an ‘aura’) to the reproduced, which 
enables a qualified measure of social resistance, and in which “the public is an examiner, but 
an absent-minded one.”91 Indeed, conceptualising the mechanised society and its profound 
impact on popular art requires returning to Benjamin’s analysis of mass culture and the 
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institutions responsible for mass art, such as film studios and the star system. I cannot see that 
Benjamin envelops all in an already existing simulacrum. In Baudrillard’s simulacrum, war is 
realised only in a perfectly mediated form, through an infinite regression of images and 
signs.92 Thus we are to believe that the anteriority of the image (CNN or Fox News, or 
Coppola’s Apocalypse Now) to the object effaces the object, or erases its ontological core 
from existence. Baudrillard is quite explicit on this point: 
 
The War in Vietnam ‘in itself’ perhaps in fact never happened, it is a dream, a baroque 
dream of napalm and of the tropics, a psychotropic dream that had the goal neither of a 
victory nor of a policy at stake, but, rather, the sacrificial, excessive deployment of a power 
already filming itself as it unfolded, perhaps waiting for nothing but consecration by a 
superfilm, which completes the mass-spectacle effect of this war.93 
 
If we contrast this reading of the Vietnam War as simulacral procession with Coppola’s 
assessment of Apocalypse Now – “This film isn’t about Vietnam; it is Vietnam”94 – we have 
some sense of how far Baudrillard departs from Coppola’s objective to achieve the realism of 
war as a surrealist composition.  
 Theories of reproductions and repetitions are, as Jameson acknowledges, part and parcel 
of the dominant discourse of postmodernism: “At this point, I will merely note one further 
such theme, which has seemed to me to be of the greatest significance in specifying the 
antithetical formal reactions of modernism and mass culture to their common social situation, 
and that is the notion of repetition.”95 He sees this as originating with Kierkegarde and 
finding fruition in Baudrillard. I would add that Baudrillard’s simulacrum only makes sense 
after the ‘crisis of signification’ posited by the major post-structuralists. In fact, the 
simulacrum shares something with Barthes’s or Derrida’s deferment of meaning: “Text, on 
the contrary, practices the infinite deferment of the significant” that “accomplishes the 
plurality of meaning: an irreducible (and not merely acceptable) plural.”96 If anything, the 
Barthesian ‘plurality’ is a simulacrum, though it was Baudrillard that gave the term some 
currency in post-structuralist parlance.  
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 In Jameson and Baudrillard, one perceives a common trajectory charting the 
subjectivity of the postmodern subject in terms of her immersion in that which was always 
already reproduced, in what is essentially inauthentic and fake. Gabriel theorises something 
quite similar in his conception of Western cinema: “The Western experience of film viewing 
– dominance of the big screen and the sitting situation – has naturalized a spectator 
conditioning so that any communication of a film plays on such values as exhibition and 
reception.”97 But what are ‘such values as exhibition and reception’? In what way are they 
conceptualised? Is ‘exhibition’ equated with immersion in the spectacle, and thus of the ills 
of what Debord calls a ‘society of the spectacle’? And in what way is an alternative to the 
spectacle compatible with an alternative “film-making as a public service institution?”98 
Public-service cinema presumably engages with a collective culture and in the service of that 
culture; its political project must thus be founded on a social reality rather than a spectacle. 
But Gabriel’s resistance cinema falters in much the same way as Jameson’s sombre 
assessment of postmodern culture, in a lack of detail and specificity. In fact, it is precisely in 
this area that Gabriel reveals his reliance on the ‘passivity’ of the Western Hollywood-
inculcated spectator. Whereas the ‘performance effect’ of the folk or oral art form “expects 
viewer participation, therefore arouses activity and prepares for and allows participation,” the 
‘print or literate art form’ (and by association, the cinematic art form) “discourages viewer 
participation. Puts an end to activity. Inhibits participation.”99 This is merely one comparison 
Gabriel makes between an enlightened, resistant, authentic art, and its Western counterpart 
founded on hegemonic practices over its own culture and, in an imperialist sense, over the 
cultures of a marginalised Third World.  
 I would argue that the richness of the Hollywood cinematic tradition attests to a diverse 
range of aesthetic practices. Hitchcock’s Vertigo surely encourages the spectator’s 
participation in the viewing of the spectacle, as well as in interpretation. David Lynch’s Lost 
Highway demands repeated viewings to make sense of its non-linear, self-destructive 
narrative. If participation is literally to interact with the text, I would argue that cinema (and 
the ‘print or literate art form’) is an inherently participatory art. I revert here to Barthes’s 
“playing the text,” in which   
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the generation of the perpetual signifier…in the field of the text (better, of which the text is 
the field) is realized not according to an organic process of maturation or a hermeneutic 
course of deepening investigation, but, rather, according to a serial movement of 
disconnections, overlappings, variations.100  
 
Recent experiments in digital cinema, non-linear and real-time narrative and cinematic 
‘quotation’ surely have their origins in an innovative spirit that one can trace to Welles, 
Hitchcock and, later, Resnais, Truffaut and Godard. Mike Figgis’s Time Code or Tom 
Tykwer’s Run Lola Run require the audience’s interpretation and organisation of a dominant 
narrative (though ultimately both films maintain a field of resistance to the linear 
narrative).101 Singer’s The Usual Suspects and Nolan’s Memento are neo-noir, but they are 
equally narrative experiments that require the participation of the spectator in formulating a 
coherent narrative structure. The Usual Suspects presents the most interesting narrative 
experiment in recent genre cinema, particularly in its lack of a sound narrative ‘ontology’. 
Verbal’s (Kevin Spacey) account of the events on the pier are simultaneously a construction 
of the film’s narrative; thus the narrative trajectory is not the instigation of an objective 
‘storyteller’ but guided by a component of that narrative. Italo Calvino’s ‘reader as writer’102 
translates seamlessly to film. 
 Theories of simulacra and late capitalism are abstracted from the specificity of reality – 
of real, lived, social conditions – as well as the reality of textual participation in 
contemporary culture. Aesthetic experience that is incompatible with a Marxist aesthetic 
model or a nascent Third World filmic revolution is devalued, declared empty, or in the worst 
sense, inauthentic for its commodification of that which once was socially and culturally 
generative. Both Jameson and Gabriel contrive the aesthetic and cultural authenticity of an 
anti-popular art. That is, authenticity is realised only in opposition to - and ultimately in 
extrication from - the system. But neither Jameson nor Gabriel investigates popular art in any 
detail. Gabriel suggests that Third World films “see a concentration of long takes and 
repetition of images and scenes. In the Third World films, the slow, leisurely pacing 
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approximates the viewer’s sense of time and rhythm of life.”103 I have two objections to this 
claim. First, filmmakers have used the long take since the 1940s, most famously in Citizen 
Kane, Rope and Touch of Evil. It can then not be employed as a symbolic or ‘Third World’ 
cinematic tool of resistance; it falters at the second phase of maturation, the ‘assimilation’ 
phase. Second, the notion that “leisurely pacing approximates the viewer’s sense of time and 
rhythm of life” requires that these times and rhythms are shared by all spectators, which is 
clearly not the case. Joseph Natoli offers an interesting discussion about the viewing 
sensibilities of two generations separated by a proficiency in the reception of analogue 
(outmoded) and digital (the new cinematic aesthetic) images: “human consciousness and 
perception are undergoing a revolutionary change: the young are not only processing 
everything faster but they are not analogizing; they have no need to fill in the connect 
between word and world as a book reading generation is shaped to.”104 I would argue also 
that leisurely pacing, prevalent in avant garde cinema since the late fifties (consider John 
Cassavetes’s Shadows), is less an attempt to depict images in ‘real time’ than a very obvious 
contrast to the rigid editing and fast cuts of genre cinema (though even this is too generalised 
if we consider something like Welles’s Touch of Evil). The long take and leisurely pacing has 
been a staple of David Lynch’s work since Eraserhead (1977), but neither device functions 
as an approximation of real time or ‘real life.’ 
 Jameson’s conclusions of the postmodern moment are often founded on textual readings 
that are generalised or superficially engaged with the text. Walsh suggests that Jameson reads 
texts as ‘symptomatic’ of a social or cultural reality.105 While Jameson has defended himself 
in this respect, I consider the notion of a text as ‘symptomatic’ of a cultural condition dubious 
- for one, it fails to take account of the post-structuralist notion of the discursive and 
perpetually displaced textual signifier. Consider, for example, his notion of ‘pastiche’ and its 
perfect expression in the ‘nostalgia mode.’106 One of the inaugural films of what Jameson 
refers to as a ‘new genre’ (though he hastens to add, “if that’s what it is”) is Lucas’s major 
success in 1973, American Graffiti, which  
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set out to recapture all the atmosphere and stylistic peculiarities of the 1950s United 
States… Polanski’s great film Chinatown (1974) does something similar for the 1930s, as 
does Bertolucci’s The Conformist (1969) for the Italian and European context of the same 
period.107  
 
Jameson employs these films to signal the arrival of a new genre, the film of nostalgia, which 
will fit into his assessment of postmodern subjectivity which lives in a “perpetual present” 
and is thus perpetually reflecting on a lost (idealised) past. Yet anybody who has seen 
American Graffiti, Chinatown and Il Conformista (The Conformist) must be suspicious of the 
‘similarities’ between these films. The profound dissimilarities in plot, character, narrative 
structure, production and distribution must bring Jameson’s model into question. I will 
concede that Lucas’s film is a nostalgia piece in the mode of Rob Reiner’s Stand By Me 
(which appeared in the mid-1980s). I will also concede that the ‘nostalgia mode,’ for lack of 
an adequately defined genre, finds its seminal film in American Graffiti. But in what sense is 
Polanski’s Chinatown exemplary of the nostalgia mode apart from the obviousness of its 
period setting? It can hardly function as a pop-culture barometer alongside films such as Jaws 
and Star Wars, which would be released shortly after Chinatown and credited with 
establishing the ‘blockbuster’ phenomenon.108  
 Jameson places Star Wars in the nostalgia mode, but even so I cannot perceive a similar 
nostalgia in Polanski’s and Lucas’s sensibility. Of Star Wars, he writes: “Unlike American 
Graffiti, it does not reinvent a picture of the past in its lived totality; rather, by reinventing the 
feel and shape of characteristic art objects of an older period (the serials), it seeks to 
reawaken a sense of the past associated with these objects.”109 I disagree that Star Wars 
functions for a popular audience even remotely in the fashion Jameson describes. Merely on a 
level of textuality, the franchise is far broader and discursive than its aesthetic veneer of 
1930s and 40s serials. Certainly Lucas had conceived of a classic serial as a feature film, as 
he had with his story outline of Raiders of the Lost Ark. But I cannot perceive that this serial 
aesthetic is transferred as pastiche to a popular audience (the majority of which engage with 
the film through numerous viewings and a wide knowledge of cinematic traditions) in the 
categorical way described in Jameson’s model.  
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 Lucas has characterised Star Wars as “the fairy tale or the myth. It is a children’s story 
in history and you go back to The Odyssey…the myths which existed in high adventure, and 
an exotic far-off land…”110 He recalls here a system of mythology Fiedler describes as 
central to the American novel, which is certainly in keeping with the mythic structure of 
serials such as Flash Gordon. Chinatown, if anything, declares its contemporaneity with its 
critique of American capitalism and the rise of conspicuous consumption in middle class 
America. Gittes’s (Jack Nicholson) classic lines uttered to Noah Cross (John Huston) 
exemplify this as a subtext in the film: “How much better can you eat? What can you buy that 
you can’t already afford?” Jameson says very little about the film apart from: “as witness the 
stylistic recuperation of the American and Italian 1930s, in Polanski’s Chinatown and 
Bertolucci’s Il Conformista respectively.”111 Why ‘recuperation’ and not ‘representation,’ 
which would at least grant the film a sense of historical realism? Recuperation is literally the 
mode of pastiche, “the allusive and elusive plagiarism of older plots,”112 and thus denies a 
sense of aesthetic authenticity that is the privilege of art prior to its commodification in the 
market.  
 If American Graffiti “set out to recapture…the henceforth mesmerizing lost reality of 
the Eisenhower era,”113 I would argue that Chinatown was a decidedly contemporary film in 
1974, in which an entanglement in a convoluted plot in traditional film noir transforms into a 
profoundly existential crisis for the anti-hero. Robert Towne’s screenplay is ultimately an 
exploration of the deterioration of American ‘certainties.’ The overtones of conspiracy reflect 
the American fascination with conspiracy that began in the mid-seventies and found its most 
accessible expression in The X-Files in the late 1980s.  
 If Chinatown is a nostalgia film in which “generational periods open up for aesthetic 
colonization,”114 then surely The Godfather, Parts I and II are equally nostalgia (which is 
commodified reflection, or reflection detached from historicity), equally condemned to repeat 
the performance of the expressionless gesture, the “imitation of dead styles.”115 De Palma’s 
The Untouchables must be counted among these, particularly in the echo of De Niro’s Jake 
La Motta (Raging Bull) in his performance as Al Capone. Reiner’s When Harry Met Sally 
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must be a re-enactment of the relationship comedies of Ernst Lubitsch or George Cukor’s The 
Philadelphia Story; Sally’s (Meg Ryan) faked orgasm is merely the vulgar expression of 
earlier symbolic representations of sex (a train entering a tunnel in Hitchcock’s North by 
Northwest, or a searching spotlight in Casablanca),116 doomed to repeat prior performances. 
Jameson’s reading of Lawrence Kasdan’s Body Heat is particularly nuanced, yet always 
circumscribed by a desire to find pastiche “in which the history of aesthetic styles displaces 
‘real’ history.”117 Viewing Body Heat as pastiche celebrates it merely as the culmination of 
the postmodern aesthetic, exemplifying not only the requisite lack of historicity, but 
achieving a unique aptitude for revelling in the condition.  
 In these postmodern paradigms – Jameson, Baudrillard and Gabriel – postmodernism 
requires a lack of specificity; without the symptomatic (and to my mind, superficial) reading 
of the text, the totalising aspect of the model is brought into question. The nostalgia mode is 
one model in which the cultural theorist might approach American Graffiti, Chinatown and Il 
Conformista, and an idiosyncratic one at that. The narrative strategies and characterisations of 
these films have very little in common. The claim that they demonstrate a common mode is 
specious without a far more rigorous and detailed textual analysis. The notion that camera 
angle in Western cinema is “mostly governed by eye-level perspective which approximates to 
our natural position in the world”118 conflates a traditional cinematic style with a perceived 
lack of political intent. Film noir is often shot from low angles or overhead. Overtly political 
films like Warren Beatty’s Bulworth or John Sayles’s Matewan use traditional film stylistics 
as well as the more flamboyant innovations used by David Fincher or Quentin Tarantino.   
 Jameson’s aesthetics of the postmodern is intimately connected to Baudrillard’s theory 
of the simulacrum, though Baudrillard does not explicitly mention the connection between 
the simulacral precession and the dawning of late capitalism; in fact he seems to suggest that 
the simulacrum is the only true ontological Real, and that it has always been this way. Both 
are totalising visions from which nothing can escape. Presumably Jameson theorises from 
within the postmodern stranglehold over linguistics and modes of expression, and is doomed 
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to conceptualise only ‘new realities’ that are in actuality new mimetic, and thus, unreal, 
forms. 
 The totality of these visions allows for the inclusion of all texts into the dominant 
aesthetic (apart from those that oppose it from the cultural fringe). The ontology of this 
postmodern, or dominant Western art, is precisely as dead, as recuperative or re-performative, 
as having manufactured a dominant mode of expression in postmodernity: “Nostalgia films 
restructure the whole issue of pastiche and project it onto a collective and social level, where 
the desperate attempt to appropriate a missing past is now refracted through the iron law of 
fashion change and the emergent ideology of the generation.”119 The postmodern subject is 
hopelessly immersed, and, it seems, entranced. If I have argued for a reconsideration of 
cinema as affective, Jameson installs into the fabric of the postmodern (culture and subject) a 
pervasive ‘waning of affect,’ which signals “the end of the bourgeois ego or monad.”120 It 
signals also the end of ‘style,’ “the distinctive individual brushstroke.”121 I can only attempt 
to refute these claims with a consideration of the complexities of contemporary cinema and 
the culture that interacts with it. 
  
Is popular cinema unable to engage with an authentic subjectivity and culture? In what sense 
is it unable to provide an aesthetic experience that is personal and distinctive? Is the spectator 
truly no longer attuned to the text or actively engaged in interpretation? Is cinema no longer 
involved in its historical milieu and a perceived hegemonic structure that it can resist?  
 The triumph of capitalism in its third manifestation (and the consequent 
commodification of creativity) precludes the possibility of aesthetic and cultural authenticity. 
I do not wish to argue that Jameson’s assessment of the ‘omnipresence’ of the market (to use 
his term) is misguided or inadequately researched. However, if authenticity is 
incommensurate with popular art, it would benefit the cultural theorist to investigate the 
reality of postmodern aesthetics from within the marketplace and thereby address what I 
would consider a point of origin: the subjective experience of film viewing and the diversity 
of cinematic texts. Duvall is correct to suggest that “one of the great ironies of Jameson’s 
Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism is that even “as he announces the 
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death of modernism [and a stillborn postmodernism], and hence of its critical distance and 
emancipatory hopes, he reinscribes those same modernist hopes in his own writing 
practice.”122 Ultimately, Jameson’s model of a postmodern society is reflective. The Utopian 
schema of a system of thought arresting a cultural deterioration for the emancipation of that 
culture must reflect on a point of origin, an ideal (and idealised) imaginary in which the 
Utopia was once realised. For Jameson, it is the realist phase of capitalism, equating with the 
rise of the bourgeoisie and a predominantly realist aesthetic. I have argued thus far that it is 
precisely this realist aesthetic that must cease to function as a nostalgic point of reflection. It 
is not the irreducibility of the realist aesthetic that has been recuperated in pastiche, but 
pastiche itself that reveals the nostalgia of a Marxist hermeneutics that seeks only to 
recuperate old forms.  
 
Indeed, there is a kind of return of the repressed in Diamond Dust Shoes, a strange 
compensatory decorative exhilaration, explicitly designated by the title itself although 
perhaps more difficult to observe in the reproduction. This is the glitter of gold dust, the 
spangling of gilt sand, which seals the surface of the painting and yet continues to glint at 
us. Think, however, of Rimbaud’s magical flowers “that look back at you,” or the august-
premonitory eye-flashes of Rilke’s archaic Greek torso which warn the bourgeois subject to 
change his life.123 
 
The comparison between Warhol’s Diamond Dust shoes and Van Gogh’s ‘original,’ or 
Marilyn Monroe’s commodification in pop-iconomania with the reality of her person (that is 
effaced at the point of commodification) reveals only the detachment of a profoundly 
modernist aesthetics of emancipation from contemporary popular culture. As Hutcheon has 
convincingly argued, the reproduction is historically empowered precisely through the 
recuperative gesture.124 She is equally critical of Jameson’s apparent obsession to recover an 
old aesthetics: “what interests me is that, when he [Jameson] finds something nostalgic – be it 
in the theorizing of the Frankfurt School or the novels of J. G. Ballard – nostalgia is meant to 
be taken negatively as ‘regressive.’ Yet his own rhetoric and position can themselves at times 
sound strangely nostalgic.”125 Contemporary culture (and its theorists) must stake a claim for 
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its own innovative aesthetics (and at the very forefront of this aesthetic revolution is pastiche) 
without looking over its shoulder at what once was and could still be. 
 
2.4 Authenticity and Spectacle 
 
A canon – a shared understanding of what literature is worth preserving – takes shape 
through a troubled historical process.126 
 
The fact, however, is that when one speaks today of the aesthetics of seriality, one alludes 
to something more radical, that is, to a notion of aesthetic value that wholly escapes the 
‘modern’ idea of art and literature.127 
 
To celebrate the status of popular art in contemporary society – that is, an art of the masses 
and an art dialectically opposed to the masses, but which is still a commodity in the 
marketplace – is to acknowledge that authenticity is contextual, as Ohmann argues 
convincingly of the canon of literature. Authenticity can thus equally be anchored in the 
contemporary – in the ontology of the art and culture that must sustain the eye of the critic, 
theorist and consumer. To look outside popular culture for its authenticity (taking Jameson’s 
and Adorno’s lead, to look for this authenticity in some earlier point in history) is merely to 
affirm tired distinctions inscribed into the history of art and theory that privilege certain 
cultures and groups, and one epoch over another.  
 But what does it mean to apply these standards to what Debord calls a ‘society of the 
spectacle’? Presumably for Debord, this society is founded on a shared history, a shared 
spatial and temporal reality, a shared sense of its interconnectedness. We that are immersed in 
the spectacle are immersed together, companions in our collective passivity. But while 
Debord is explicit in his attack on this society, I maintain that the immersion in the spectacle 
is necessary for affectivity; it is paradoxically this awareness of and immersion in the 
spectacle that recuperates affect, the essential aesthetic response that Jameson contends has 
‘waned’ in postmodernity. 
 Spectacle is not merely the visual, that is, the singularly visual aspect of art (in this case, 
and in my analysis, the art of contemporary cinema), although this is a vital aspect of the 
growth of the spectacle aesthetic. It is more fundamentally a transformation of the traditional 
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interpretative mode in which realism functioned as a standard of excellence.128 For 
Manovich, new forms of representation are “precisely a code [used] to communicate all types 
of data and experience”: 
 
new media transforms all culture and cultural theory into an “open source.” This opening up 
of cultural techniques, conventions, forms, and concepts is ultimately the most promising 
cultural effect of computerization – an opportunity to see the world and the human being 
anew, in ways that were not available to “a man with a movie camera.”129  
 
I concur with Carroll when he says that “the realist approach to film theory, either as an 
ontological thesis, or in its more contemporary psychologised variations, is a dead end.”130 In 
this piece, Carroll attempts to conceptualise the reasons for the “intensity” of experience 
provided by the “movies” – what he describes as “popular mass media films, the products of 
what might be called Hollywood International.”131 It is this intensity, he claims, that cannot 
have its foundation in a traditional realist aesthetic.  
 Spectacle comments on this mode of realism and in so doing refashions it into the 
already textual, or the ‘spectacle’ of that which was once authentic. It is my endeavour to 
understand this new ‘authenticity’ anchored in the spectacle that I have argued is endemic to 
contemporary popular culture and its aesthetic mode. Eco discusses the ‘seriality’ of the art of 
mass culture, though he acknowledges “that we still know very little about the role of 
repetition in the universe of art and in the universe of mass media.”132 This seriality, in which 
the spectator is accustomed to the series, that is, the inherently connected and reproduced, 
rather than the authenticity of an original – is no doubt another crucial aspect of the society of 
the spectacle. It is possible in this sense to talk about the tendentiously ‘lowbrow’ cinema of a 
Michael Bay (Armageddon, Bad Boys) or a Roland Emmerich (Independence Day, The Day 
After Tomorrow) as exemplary of the spectacle aesthetic in which seriality, repetition and the 
visual foreground its attachment to, and reproduction of, prior forms of cinema and art. Thus, 
while the miraculous first twenty minutes of Saving Private Ryan (that seemingly carried the 
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130 Noël Carroll, “The Power of Movies.” Daedalus 114, no. 4 (1985), 80. 
131 Carroll, “The Power of the Movies.” 81. 
132 Eco, “Innovation and Repetition,” 184. 
 92 
film in critical and box-office circles) was lauded for its unprecedented realism, it is the 
acknowledgement of this ‘presentation’ of the Real that inaugurates the set piece as spectacle. 
At best, Spielberg’s storming the beaches of Normandy is an unprecedented cinematic 
realism. 
 The spectacle of cinematic realism, to my mind, has been rarely acknowledged, yet its 
departure from the real is very obvious. Consider, for example, the stylistics of Ryan’s 
opening set piece. The colour has been drained from the image to resemble black and white 
photography of the stock film footage of World War II. The spectator is positioned in 
explicitly cinematic spaces, underwater (recalling Jaws), extreme close-up, medium-overhead 
shot. The cacophony of the maelstrom, less than an indistinct barrage, maintains a cinematic 
clarity: the spectator is allowed an intimate audience with the dying, particularly those 
suffering brutal or cinematically visceral deaths. The sequence is painfully distended – a 
number of critics noted favourably the length of the set piece. These are cinematic tropes that 
conjure a reality on celluloid. Ridley Scott’s Black Hawk Down or even Terrence Malick’s 
The Thin Red Line offer similar cinematic images of war that poeticise the Real into the 
spectacle. Is Spielberg’s stylistics of cinematic realism any different from Lynch’s 
hyperrealism in Blue Velvet? Spielberg drains the colour from his opening set piece, Lynch 
saturates the images with colours and light/dark contrasts. Both spectacles are a form of 
hyperreality. The spectacle is ontologically far removed from the realism of European cinema 
of the 1950s that Bazin cherishes, which was motivated by the theatricality of its film 
predecessors. The first twenty minutes of Saving Private Ryan, installed as cinematic 
spectacle, divorced from the reality of carnage and brutality, is also perhaps the most 
beautiful war sequence on film. 
 Darley locates a new affectivity in an analysis of a diverse range of media practices and 
concludes that “we must resist the temptation to essentialize: the aesthetic dimension of late 
modern culture is not homogenous. On the contrary, it is highly sedimented with a 
multiplicity of image forms and corresponding kinds of spectator experience.”133 Rather than 
assume the starting point at an imaginary and wholly ahistorical paradigm of artistic 
authenticity, he locates the authenticity of a society of the spectacle precisely in its immersion 
within and manipulation of the mechanism of the spectacle: in his case, a new media poetics 
of “cinemas, special venues, amusement arcades, television, video players, game consoles 
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and personal computers.”134 Perhaps this is merely to say that at some point the aesthetic of a 
society of the spectacle and its varied forums must begin to interest – and impress – the 
cultural theorist. 
 But there is something else at stake here. Popular audiences are increasingly willing to 
challenge the supremacy of the canon by theorising and conceptualising their own art forms. 
Contemporary writing on film is simply not aware of the gulf that separates it from the 
culture it purports to describe. Consider the following passage that, while not exemplary of 
film theory, is indicative of what happens when mainstream film criticism addresses the 
popular cinema aesthetic: 
 
Just look at our top Oscar contenders. Gump was well made and had a certain sweetness, if 
you like that sort of thing, but it’s still a lot closer to Beaches than The Bridge on the River 
Kwai. Pulp Fiction was lively and clever, but at bottom it’s just an MTV version of old 
Hollywood themes, with all the boring parts left out. Quiz Show and Nobody’s Fool get 
points for trying, but they don’t exactly rank with The Third Man or Annie Hall or The 
Godfather. They’re closer to good efforts than good movies.135 
 
In this statement, Richardson falls back on the imaginary of the authentic work of art and 
thereby effaces the possibility of authenticity from the contemporary and the popular. “Pulp 
Fiction was lively and clever, but at bottom…” The quest for a bottomness, the eternal 
wellspring of authenticity, occludes the authentic from the contemporary. Authenticity is 
anchored only in the past, manifested in reflection, and is in this sense reactionary. 
Discussing Susan Stewart’s study of nostalgia as a social disease, Hutcheon writes: “nostalgia 
makes the idealized (and therefore always absent) past into the site of immediacy, presence 
and authenticity…nostalgia is, in this way, ‘prelapsarian’ and indeed utopian.”136 This crucial 
aspect of Utopianism as nostalgia has been little acknowledged. 
 But for Richardson, exiling authenticity from the present is never enough. It must be 
relocated to the essence of a particular cultural entity/discourse that is historical, contextual 
and the aesthetic dominant, traditionally the polar opposite of what has been perceived to be 
popular or of the masses: a high or elite culture.  
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After that, the bottom drops off dramatically: the dreary sameness of all the erotic thrillers 
and buddy-o-matic action epics, the dispiritingly endless stream of sequels and remakes and 
Disney comedies. So many movies feel cobbled-together these days – action films like True 
Lies and Patriot Games are so distended by their set piece action sequences that the rest of 
the movie feels like filler, and comedies from Wayne’s World to The Adam’s Family are so 
perfunctory about their stories that they make the Bob Hope and Bing Crosby road movies 
seem downright sophisticated.”137 
 
At bottom here is Richardson’s failure to appreciate the spectacle aesthetic, and even the 
willingness to investigate what it might be. This arises from the implicit rejection of the 
possibility of authenticity from the contemporary and popular at the point of its inception in a 
nostalgic and idyllic past. To argue that True Lies and Patriot Games have distended action 
sequences fails to appreciate the cinematic literacy of the contemporary spectator, for whom 
action set pieces are deliberately distended into performative spectacles.138 In fact, I would 
argue that the aestheticisation of the spectacle occurs only in the distended sequences in 
which movement and contrast is foregrounded, and narrative, thematic and character 
continuity de-emphasised. For the lack of characterisation that Richardson perceives in True 
Lies, the film compensates in a fabric of intertextual references. When Tasker (Arnold 
Schwarzenegger) removes his wet suit to reveal an uncreased tuxedo beneath, the spectator 
recalls an almost identical sequence in Goldfinger – Tasker is equally an original 
characterisation, inhabiting a textual present, and a reflection on Sean Connery’s James 
Bond. The extended (and distended) chase sequence in which Tasker pursues a terrorist on 
horseback is a marvellous set piece in which the pursuit begins gradually but gains 
momentum exponentially, accompanied by increasingly complex visual compositions and a 
rising music theme. The chase sequence in The Matrix Reloaded is unprecedented as a set 
piece of movement and rhythm incorporating visual and aural stimuli. 
 Contemporary cinema has achieved a virtuosity of the spectacle unparalleled in the 
history of visual media. It is essential to distinguish between classical representation and a 
kinetic cinematic sequence that arrests its audience’s attention while simultaneously de-
emphasising the narrative. The sequence in which “Bohemian Rhapsody” or “Foxy” is 
performed in Wayne’s World functions as a spectacle within the narrative. Once the film is 
concluded, these spectacle elements have a residual impact on the spectator that surpasses 
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that of the film’s narrative, which Richardson rightly calls “perfunctory.” Darley appreciates 
the transcendence of the spectacle in contemporary narrative cinema: “As the corpus of films 
attached to this rejuvenation of special effects has developed and expanded – from Star Wars 
to the likes of True Lies and Titanic – so has the narrative element of such films distinctly 
receded in favour of the stimulation, impact and astonishment that can be produced by new 
and revamped techniques of image-capture and fabrication.”139 Set pieces in spectacle cinema 
are at once visually iconic and transposed into a consumer market, there substituted for new 
aesthetic experiences (in the way that the STAR WARS title screen achieves an autonomy 
from the narrative – or indeed, from what some have called the ‘mythology’ of the franchise). 
But these set pieces are also amenable to a series of repetitions. Thus, the “Bohemian 
Rhapsody” sequence is Wayne’s World was endlessly repeated on television, music videos 
and the advertising media, forming a ‘series’ (Eco) that filtered into pockets of popular 
culture dissociated from the originality (and authenticity) of the film. The perfunctory story is 
necessary for the performance of this spectacle in cinema. The CGI sequence in The Matrix 
Revolutions in which a horde of Armoured Personnel Units (APUs) take up arms is striking 
because of its status as spectacle, divorced from the Real, achieving the realisation of its 
reproductive perfection in computer imaging. In relation to the spectacle of contemporary 
popular cinema (and here I include Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey and Lucas’s Star Wars 
franchise), all ‘stories’ are perfunctory. The ‘good stories’ are told in ages in which authentic 
artworks and the aura of the real maintain their powerful statuses. How else is one to 
appreciate Tarantino as one of the most significant filmmakers of the last decade but as a 
director with a new kind of (meta)cinematic impulse – which is to say, immersion in cinema 
as spectacle? 
 This spectacality is perhaps the realisation of what Benjamin had in mind with his 
classic formulation of the mechanically reproduced work of art. In the age in which 
mechanical reproduction has consumed all prior artistic modes (which is to say our age in 
which cinema dominates the other art forms as mass culture entertainment), the spectacle 
impulse subsumes the narrative and thematic. And this ontology of the spectacle, that I have 
argued must form the kernel of any analysis of contemporary popular cinema, is precisely 
that which has reconciled itself to its status as reproduction. The spectacle acknowledges its 
inauthenticity, and it is this that renders it vital and affective to its audience. In celebrating its 
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pure spectacle, its pure textuality, its status as already reproduced, cinema relieves itself of 
the burden of a humanist and/or Marxist aesthetic impulse towards authentic art and its 
failing aura. 
 Aylish Wood’s excellent reading of the opening of The Matrix appreciates the centrality 
of the spectacle aesthetic in the composition of that franchise. “The photography of this 
sequence gives the impression of time appearing to be both slowed down and speeded 
up…The subsequent chase scene over the rooftops is captured in a series of shots that 
accentuate movement, an effect that adds to the vibrancy of the opening sequence.”140 One 
suspects that Richardson might value The Matrix over True Lies or Patriot Games, but on the 
basis of the ingenuity of its story, or its finely wrought intertextual fabric (though he fails to 
appreciate this in True Lies or Wayne’s World, both significant examples of what Collins 
refers to as the ‘genericity of the nineties’) rather than the merits of its ground-breaking 
action sequences and innovative special effects. Warner Bros. provided the hundred million 
dollar plus budget for the film after the Wachowski Brothers had shot the opening action 
piece, demonstrating their remarkable camera innovation, “bullet-time,” and the expertise to 
convey their complex storyboards on film.141 By their own acknowledgement, the executives 
of Warner Bros. could not make sense of the story. It seems that the corporate element of the 
filmic process better understands the aesthetic of a society of the spectacle (or at least its 
market value to a contemporary audience) than the cultural theorists who struggle over the 
mythic or religious foundations of the franchise. I return to a detailed discussion of The 
Matrix Franchise in Chapter Three. 
 Contemporary spectacle cinema presents a challenge to traditional theoretical 
paradigms. Ultimately, the spectacle is authentic expression, and this is something that 
cultural theory and Marxist hermeneutics has had trouble reconciling with its emancipatory 
projects. Even I acknowledge that it would be perverse to argue that all cinema is equally 
worthy of attention, but the nature of this worth cannot be located in traditional aesthetics 
practiced in outmoded discourses of cultural and artistic elitism, nor in contemporary 
paradigms in which theorists describe cinema and its various ideologies that are divorced 
from an experience of film or an acknowledgement of its profound affectivity on the 
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spectator. And what a theorist like Jameson fails to appreciate is that ultimately his rejection 
of mass art is as resounding an expression of its authenticity as its acceptance by the masses. 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Text and Spectacle in The Matrix Franchise 
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3.1  
 
Understood in its totality, the spectacle is both the outcome and the goal of the dominant 
mode of production. It is not something added to the real world – not a decorative element, 
so to speak. On the contrary, it is the very heart of society’s real unreality. In all its specific 
manifestations – news or propaganda, advertising or the actual consumption of 
entertainment – the spectacle epitomizes the prevailing mode of social life.1 
 
Some of my favorite films are made entirely of clichés: Casablanca, Every Which Way but 
Loose, The Prisoner of Zenda. They’re clichés, yes, but they have broken free of that 
problem, because the clichés slide through the narrative at refreshing orthogonal 
angles…The Matrix is a postmodern philosophical movie in which fragments of philosophy 
do this Casablanca cliché dance.2 
 
I think that in order to transform a work into a cult object, one must be able to break, 
dislocate, unhinge it so that one can remember only parts of it, irrespective of their original 
relationship with the whole.3 
 
For Eco, cult status and cultural authenticity are not mutually exclusive, or in some sense 
contradictory. Cult cinema (and its impact on what he calls the “cult culture”) indicates the 
great journey culture has undertaken to recuperate some notion of its so-called lost 
authenticity. For Benjamin, “the uniqueness of a work of art is inseparable from its being 
imbedded in the fabric of tradition” which finds its “expression in the cult.”4 This chapter is 
an attempt to draw on Eco’s aesthetics of a cult culture to develop the notion of the spectacle 
as dominant in contemporary popular cinema. Eco speaks more directly and urgently to a 
popular sensibility in which the authenticity of the traditional cult expression (aura) is 
appropriated into a plethora of intertextual quotations – a functional meta-textuality.  
Chapters One and Two theorised a departure from a conventional cinematic realism, 
and the corollary transformations in the cultural sphere. Chapters Three and Four present the 
various manifestations of the intertextual, hyperreal, discursive, hypermythological and 
metacinematic – in short, the triumph of the spectacle aesthetic.  
Rather than a purely visual sensibility, the spectacle aesthetic is founded on what I 
have introduced and will develop in this chapter as textual and cultural ‘discursivity’; a 
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cultural predisposition that ‘sifts’ the spectacle from story, plot, character and theme. The 
spectacle is ultimately the only means of establishing authenticity in postmodern cinema. 
While traditional elements of the text are maintained, and are indeed crucial to any reception 
of mainstream film, the dominance of the spectacle has reorganised the relation between 
realism and its representation on the screen. I suggest also that the triumph of the spectacle 
aesthetic requires a transformation in the ontology of the traditional film or cultural theorist, a 
notion I will explore at some length. I focus primarily on a reading of several mythological 
structures in The Matrix Franchise. However, I conclude the chapter with a discussion of 
various alternatives to Bazin’s realist image strategies of classical cinema, drawing on the 
advent of digital cinema, and more specifically, what I term the ‘ontology of bullet-time.’ 
  
3.2 Further Musings on Authenticity and the Spectacle 
Contemporary theory presents a challenge to textual analysis; the endeavour to analyse text in 
the traditional way, as Barthes has argued, is anachronistic.5 Rather, in a standard post-
structuralist substitution for interpretation, one ‘plays’ the text. But even playing an open-
ended text is not perfectly satisfactory, fraught as it is with open-ended meanings and post-
structuralism’s perpetual displacement of signifiers. The open-ended text is useful in 
demystifying the traditional bourgeois subject, and thus the author, the affirmation of which 
“is to impose a limit on that text, to furnish it with a final signified, to close the writing.”6 But 
without authors and conclusive meanings, the reader (and spectator) is dissociated from the 
meaning-making process. In being fully liberated, born anew as the reader,7 the subject 
realises that perfect liberation is akin to perfect stagnation. This is the kind of stagnation 
Shohat and Stam perceive in post-structuralist discourse: “Post-structuralist theory reminds 
us that we live and dwell within language and representation, and have no direct access to the 
‘real.’ But the constructed, coded nature of artistic discourse hardly precludes all reference to 
a common social life.”8 In Chapter Two, my analysis of Jameson’s position was founded on 
his recuperation of the authorial and evaluative eye (a nostalgia for a lost realism and, though 
at times he argues to the contrary, modernism), and the reinstatement of critical distance. The 
                                                
5 Barthes, “From Work to Text,” especially 159-160. 
6 Roland Barthes, “From Work to Text.” In Image Music Text, trans. Stephen Heath (London: Fontana, 1977), 
147. 
7 Barthes, “Death of the Author,” 148.  
8 Shohat and Stam, 179.  
 101 
cloying paradox for Jameson lies in his pronouncement of the dissolution of critical distance 
while accepting that this pronouncement is made from beyond the same critical distance he 
has dissolved.  
 I suggest that popular culture requires a transformation in the theorist’s sensibility (or 
ontology, which is nearer to the nature of the transformation that is required). It has always 
been perfectly acceptable to address Shakespeare’s works as a benchmark in humanist art, 
and equally as representing the inception of a ‘modern’ aesthetic.9 The same can be said for 
the literary canon, though this distinction has more recently been shown to be problematic.10 I 
argue that a problem endemic to critical theory is not only how to read popular culture (that 
is, privileging the ideological/structural over the affective/aesthetic), but even more critically, 
locating the cultural co-ordinates in which the theorist must position herself. In a superb 
piece, Tara Brabazon, writing about the youth response to George Lucas’s Star Wars, 
Episode 1: The Phantom Menace, describes this deficiency in the influential Birmingham 
School of cultural studies:  
 
Cultural studies theorists carry the baggage of the Birmingham Centre into any history of 
youth culture. The taken-for-granted ‘youth as resistance’ mantra, embodied in Resistance 
Through Rituals (Hall & Jefferson, 1976) and Subculture: The Meaning of Style (Hebdige, 
1979), transformed young people into the ventriloquist’s puppet of cultural studies.11 
 
While Brabazon does not explicitly address the position of the theorist in relation to the 
‘culture of resistance,’ her argument is founded on this perceived lack of communication, or 
disparity, between the theorist and the individual (and collective) subjectivity of popular 
culture. For example, Hebdige considers the aesthetics of punk, among other things, as a 
ritualised, though strategic, resistance to hegemony, suggesting that to classify subcultural 
production as ‘high art’ is to miss the point: “Subcultures are not ‘cultural’ in this sense, and 
the styles with which they are identified cannot be adequately or usefully described as ‘art of 
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a high degree.’ Rather, they manifest culture in the broader sense.”12 Hall perceives 
something very similar for the project of popular culture: “Popular culture is one of the sites 
where this struggle for and against a culture of the powerful is engaged…It is not a sphere 
where socialism, a socialist culture – already fully formed – might be simply expressed. But 
it is one of the places where socialism might be constituted. That is why popular culture 
matters. Otherwise, to tell you the truth, I don’t give a damn about it.”13 
 But to whom does popular culture matter in this way? If Hebdige can be accorded 
some latitude is constructing an aesthetics of punk as resistance to hegemony (which, in any 
case, is limited), Hall’s popular culture as a mechanism for socialist change misses the point 
entirely. Most popular culture is not practised in service of an emancipation project 
conceived by intellectual theory. In this sense, I concur with Felski that “the problem with 
literature departments…is not that they study literature, but that they often see themselves as 
having a monopoly on what counts as aesthetic experience.”14 For Hebdige and Hall, the 
aesthetic of high culture is exchanged for a social and political theory of the popular. For 
aesthetic beauty and truth, literary and cultural theorists rarely look to popular art forms.  
Brabazon suggests that “to discuss a Lucasfilm’s conspiracy of slick marketing is to 
completely misread the event. The uncomfortable recognition that too many journalists seem 
unable to grasp is that millions of men and women possess an emotional investment in this 
film.”15 I would argue that Brabazon’s journalists and the majority of film theorists could be 
classified in much the same way. The contemporary film theorist struggles not only to make 
sense of what popular cinema means to its audience, but how this product makes its meaning. 
Recall Lawrence and Jewett’s reading of a ‘quotation’ of Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will in 
the last scene of Star Wars. The authors suggest this quote reflects the film’s fascist 
tendencies. I argue that this is a categorical misreading based on a failure to appreciate the 
way popular cinema is composed of prior myths and texts, and the way it addresses its 
spectator. Even if the authors wish to argue that Lucas is a closet fascist, the Riefenstahl 
quotation is not satisfactory textual evidence. 
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Conceptualising this disparity in affective (and indeed, critical) distance between the 
theorist and the popular culture spectator is increasingly difficult because of what I have 
described as the inherent discursivity of popular culture. Redressing this disparity must be 
done in a series of tentative gestures. One such gesture that reverberates within popular 
culture is Brabazon’s confession that popular cinema has a powerful personal appeal and a 
currency that demands critical attention. The anecdotal (and confessional) opening to her 
piece is disarmingly real:  
 
A few Saturdays ago, my 71-year-old father tried to convince me of imminent 
responsibilities. As I am considering the purchase of a house, there are mortgages, bank 
fees, and years of misery to endure. Unfortunately, I am not an effective Big Picture Person. 
The lure of the light sabre is almost too great. For 30 year old Generation-Xers like myself, 
it is more than a cultural object. It is a textual anchor, and a necessary component to any 
future history of the present.16 
 
While The Phantom Menace does not have quite the same appeal for me, I confess that I have 
a thousand such “textual anchors” to popular culture, and few are founded on a personal or 
collective project of resistance to a hegemony. Following Brabazon’s lead, then, I will 
approach popular cinema as a subject immersed in its textual, mythological and cultural 
strategies, acknowledging that this culture exists as a system of meanings of which I am an 
integral part. I am not privileged with the critical distance of Jameson to assess the relative 
advantages or disadvantages of this position. I accept that culture is suffused with a plethora 
of ideological positions actively engaged with my own response as theorist, spectator and 
consumer. But though I may locate myself in opposition to these ideologies, I am in much the 
same position as John Gaeta, who claims (futilely) that the desecration of a Warner Bros. 
logo enacts a rejection of the studio system by the creative and artistic minds under their 
control. As I have argued, the transposition of this symbol as ideology is mediated by several 
strata of cultural meanings, and conceivably affirms the pervasiveness of the studio system. It 
is what Fiske might call the incorporation rather than the excorporation of the symbolic logo, 
ultimately leaving the hands (and corporate minds) of the studio executive, destined to return 
to its ideological point of inception after a circuitous textual route. The fact that Tom Cruise 
can demand twenty-five million dollars in a 150 million dollar studio production because he 
constitutes a product for consumption in the marketplace (and is thus deserving of the fee – 
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economic rationalism has always been the cornerstone of the Hollywood star system) seems 
absurd. And yet as a spectator I am immersed in the performance of the star system, which is 
only one corollary of the studio system that has dominated Hollywood since the 1930s. 
Popular audiences are emotionally and psychically invested in the ‘spectacle’ persona of a 
Tom Cruise or Angelina Jolie. The spectacle aesthetic requires iconic stars to function 
affectively; iconicity requires consumptive leverage in the marketplace. How else can one 
explain the fascination with ‘Hollywood’s Hundred Richest’ lists but to attach the icon to its 
consumptive value? This is to say simply that Tom Cruise is not Tom Cruise without the 
eight-figure salary freely available as information (merely another means of consumption) to 
the interested consumer. Butler is correct to suggest that 
 
The star’s image dominates movie posters and appears on dozens of magazine covers; it is 
clearly one of the principle commodities that is used to market a film to an audience – equal 
in importance, in the minds of film producers and film viewers alike, to a compelling story 
or majestic scenery or a trendy director.17 
 
But while trendy directors occasionally have an art house hit that pleases the studio 
(Reservoir Dogs (Tarantino), Sex, Lies and Videotape (Soderberg), Eternal Sunshine of the 
Spotless Mind (Gondry/Kaufman)), Leonardo Di Caprio can bolster what is in my opinion a 
turgid romantic melodrama (Titanic) into a billion-dollar economic franchise.  
Gabriel’s celebration of the political aesthetic of Third World Cinema and his critique 
of mainstream Hollywood, in these terms in which “consumption can be its own aesthetic 
reward,”18 is absurd. I cannot fathom a way in which Third World Cinema offers an 
alternative yet viable aesthetic in the cultural arena without altering the economic and social 
fabric of that culture. Of course, for Gabriel (as for Jameson, Hall and Hebdige), such an 
alteration is precisely what is required to find something of aesthetic worth, and such an 
approach will always be profoundly limited, even self-defeating. I do not wish to reject the 
ideological nature of the arena in which this affectivity is expressed, but to suggest that 
ideological analyses divorced from the affective are conceptually simplistic and generalised. 
                                                
17 Jeremy G. Butler, “The Star System and Hollywood.” In American Cinema and Hollywood: Critical 
Approaches, ed. John Hill and Pamela Church Gibson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 116. My 
emphasis. 
18 See Bruce Isaacs and Theodore Louis Trost, “Story, Product, Franchise.” In Jacking in to The Matrix 
Franchise: Cultural Reception and Interpretation, ed. Mathew Kapell and William G. Doty (New York and 
London: Continuum, 2004), 73. 
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This kind of analysis often results in theory prescribing the analysis of texts, which occurs 
frequently in psychoanalytic readings of popular cinema19 or so-called scientific studies of 
the impact of cinematic violence on the spectator.20 
 
3.3 A Brief Note on (Mis)Reading Cinema 
What I am suggesting is a return to the screen as a spectator (whether a television, movie 
theatre, computer monitor, or some other site of representation) as the initial point of contact 
between film and theory. In a piece devoted to the study of the serial killer sub-genre, Barry 
Keith Grant suggests that “the structural repetitions inherent in the act of serial killing seem 
to echo the repetition compulsion in our own intensive consumption of narratives about it.”21 
Preceding this paragraph, Grant opens his piece with the claim that “Jonathan Demme’s 
Silence of the Lambs won several academy awards and brought serial killing squarely into the 
mainstream. In short, as Martin Rubin has noted, fin-de-siècle America seems especially 
obsessed with the figure of the modern multiple murderer.””22 The implication is that Silence 
of the Lambs constitutes a phenomenon in the serial killer sub-genre, conforming to a general 
narrative structure (a killer stalking and then killing women) as well as the more recent 
“repetition compulsion” of popular society. But if Grant looked closely at Silence of the 
Lambs, he would notice that all the female victims are killed before the film begins (they are 
literally back-story – Catherine Martin is abducted but rescued by Clarice Starling (Jodie 
Foster)), violence is implied rather than overt (the act of violence is almost never shown; 
rather the film seems interested in the image of the consequence of graphic violence) and that 
serial killer films such as Michael Mann’s Manhunter, Demme’s Silence of the Lambs or 
                                                
19 See Slavoj Žižek, “The Matrix: Or, the Two Sides of Perversion.” In The Matrix and Philosophy, ed. William 
Irwin (Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 2002), 240-266. The article’s title works as an in-joke with 
Jameson’s “Postmodernism: Or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism” – the two together offer a veritable 
prison-house of theory. Žižek’s conclusion is formulated on a crucial misreading of the scene in which Neo 
exits the telephone booth as the reborn One. “At the same time, Neo addresses people still caught in the Matrix 
as the Savior who will teach them how to liberate themselves from the constraints of the Matrix” (263). But Neo 
does not address people caught in the Matrix. Rather, he addresses the Machines: “I’m not here to tell you how 
this will end. I’m here to tell you how it will begin.” And as Morpheus says, those imprisoned in the Matrix 
must ultimately “free themselves,” attested by the fact that at the conclusion of The Matrix Revolutions the 
machines will free only those who want to be freed. The film’s conclusion is thus not an inconsistency in the 
way that fits with Žižek’s theoretical bent. 
20 For an extensive and detailed analysis of the ‘misreadings’ of film and television violence, see Ill Effects: The 
Media/Violence Debate, ed. Martin Barker and Julian Petley (Routledge: London and New York, 2001). Of 
particular interest is Martin Barker’s chapter, “The Newson Report: a case study in ‘common sense’” (27-46).  
21 Barry Keith Grant, “American Psycho/sis: The Pure Products of America go Crazy.” In Mythologies of 
Violence in Postmodern Media, ed. Christopher Sharrett (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1999). 23-24. 
22 Grant, 23. 
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even Powell’s earlier Peeping Tom do not instantiate a new approach to violence that is 
pervasive, or even broad-based.  
It is astonishing that Grant can make a claim such as: “The scene in Pulp Fiction 
(1994) where two hapless hit men must deal with the splattered blood and brains of their dead 
hostage Marvin demonstrates that we are more likely to laugh at blood on the upholstery than 
to be shocked.”23 Surely this oft-discussed scene demonstrates nothing of the kind. On one 
level, we can say simply that violent acts take their ‘meaning’ from the context in which the 
violence appears on screen. Marvin’s death is funny not because we (for whoever ‘we’ are in 
Grant’s analysis) are desensitised to violence per se, but because the situation involving 
Vincent (John Travolta) and Jules (Samuel Jackson) is patently absurd. The humour is 
created not because the spectator can’t appreciate the horrible ‘reality’ of physical violence 
but because the situation constructed by the narrative is overtly humorous. Marvin’s death is 
a brilliant example of postmodern absurdism (less in the sense of an existential absurdism as 
endemic to modern life) divorced from the Real. If we contrast Marvin’s death with a similar 
unintentional shooting in Reservoir Dogs,24 it becomes clear that the coding of the violent act 
on screen is contingent on its narrative context. We can also say that a Jules/Vincent 
situational absurdism was certainly not the norm in mainstream cinema in 1994 any more 
than it is in 2006. 
 
3.4 Spectacle and Technology 
Investigating the spectacle aesthetic requires an alteration in the ontology of the theorist. 
Grant’s position on Silence of the Lambs is exemplary of a criticism that employs popular art 
in the service of an ideological agenda without a close analysis of that art. But more 
significantly, if a response to cinema is indeed fundamentally affective (as I have argued), the 
analysis must begin precisely with collapsing the critical distance treasured by traditional 
theory rather than constructing some ideological project at the outset. Rejecting the utopian 
(and equally nostalgic) impulse, as Hutcheon does, makes some headway towards this new 
ontology. Hutcheon’s notion of nostalgia, or in a broader sense, history, in the postmodern 
world is radical in light of Jameson who rejects a postmodern historicism. To this, Hutcheon 
                                                
23 Grant, 33. 
24 I am thinking here of the scene in which Mr Orange (Tim Roth) is shot by a female driver while escaping the 
scene of the robbery. He is then forced to shoot her at close range, killing her, and this allows Mr White (Harvey 
Keitel) to engineer their escape. 
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retorts: “The view that postmodernism relegates history to ‘the dustbin of an absolute 
episteme, arguing gleefully that history does not exist except as text’ (Huyssen 1981, 35), is 
simply wrong. History is not made obsolete; it is however being rethought – as a human 
construct.”25 
Accepting also that the plethora of new technologies is a meaningful contribution – 
and thus substantial alteration – to the way cinema is viewed and the impact it has on popular 
audiences, is also a crucial step in the process. I disagree with John Belton that digital cinema 
is a “false revolution” because it cannot do more than “elmina[te] jitter, weave, dirt, and 
scratches from the projected image.”26 Rather, the gradual acceptance of digital cinema has 
come only after a lengthy trial period in the use of special effects, which has only affirmed 
the centrality of spectacle cinema to popular culture. In adapting the graphic novels of Dennis 
Miller, Robert Rodriguez’s ‘digital aesthetic’ in Sin City is compatible with the hyperreality 
of the comic strip. Rodriguez could have shot Sin City on 35mm but the use of digital 
technology offers a new kind of cinematic realism. 
While Belton is correct to say that digital films do not look substantially different to 
35mm, he fails to appreciate the significance of the phenomenon of digital technology as an 
innovation on, and departure from, the traditions of cinema that preceded it. Discussing the 
influential U.S. critic, Roger Ebert, Belton writes that he is “one of the few people speaking 
out against digital cinema. Ebert’s chief objection is that digital projection cannot duplicate 
the experience of 35mm film. In this respect his argument is much subtler than my own.”27 
But their respective arguments are less a question of subtlety than conception. For Ebert, the 
distinction between 35mm and the digitally filmed image is fundamental; Ebert 
acknowledges a profound disparity between the product of a digital camera and 35mm film 
stock. One might speak of the ‘glorious Technicolor’ of Gone With the Wind as an innovation 
towards realism in the early use of colour in the Hollywood studio film (though I would 
argue that the colour saturations of David Lynch and those of Gone With the Wind have a 
                                                
25 Linda Hutcheon, “Representing the Postmodern.” In A Postmodern Reader, ed. Joseph Natoli and Linda 
Hutcheon (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 256. 
26 John Belton, “Digital Cinema: A False Revolution.” October 100 (2002), 107-108. 
27 Belton, 114. The Australian critic David Stratton has said the same thing of digital cinema, rejecting the 
innovations of the Dogma ’95 Group; Stratton seems to cherish Bazin’s ‘myth of total cinema.’ Ironically, the 
Dogma group championed digital technology to distance itself from the emphasis on spectacle and special 
effects cinema of the Hollywood mainstream (see Lessard). 
 108 
great deal in common), and the washed surfaces of Sin City as a deliberate aestheticisation of 
the film image. 
 
3.5 The Matrix Phenomenon 
Before proceeding, let me say a brief word in defence of The Matrix franchise, which is 
perhaps necessary in light of the reviews of The Matrix Reloaded and The Matrix 
Revolutions.28 I argue simply that the discursivity of popular culture is reflected, in 
‘orthogonal angles’ (to use Sterling’s interesting phrase describing the use of cliché in 
cinema) in The Matrix Franchise. The heteroglossic utterance of a young Aboriginal boy 
wearing an Eminem tracksuit finds some form of expression in a popular film that traverses 
Plato, Descartes, Baudrillard, Marxism, late capitalism, the poetics of postmodernism and a 
new and interactive media. The additional interpretative frame in which the film (or trilogy) 
is received by popular culture as a franchise is equally significant. The performance of the 
text does not end when the credits roll. Rather, The Matrix finds expression in corporate 
advertising and product placement (Samsung mobile phones, Energizer batteries), action 
figures, leather jackets and boots, DVD box sets with additional features, tie-in comic books 
that delve into the ‘Zion Archives’ (and thus also the textual archive of the franchise), film 
soundtracks, sound bites on T.V. advertisements, the console game Enter The Matrix 
(available on PC, Sony Playstation and X-Box), the interactive website and associated blogs, 
the star system (Keanu Reeves, Carrie-Anne Moss, Lawrence Fishburn) and its culture of 
celebrity, the recuperation of Rage Against the Machine as resistance not to social hegemony 
in the United States or contemporary late capitalism, but to the Matrix. The Matrix franchise 
is less a cinematic text than a popular culture entity as Star Wars once was and is again in the 
year of Revenge of the Sith. On a narrative level, the franchise is incomplete, subject always 
to revolution: at the end of The Matrix Revolutions, the shot immediately after Neo’s ‘death’ 
shows the Matrix rebooting, the simulation reforming, its dialectic opposition to the Real 
reconstituted. This is what Eco means by repetition, which equates not only to the repeat 
performances of the serial or soap opera, but the sophisticated recycling of the product in the 
                                                
28 For two mainstream reviews exemplary of the film’s critical reception in the U.S., see Todd McCarthy, “The 
Matrix Revolutions.” Variety, 2 Nov. 2003; and A. O. Scott, “The Game Concludes With Light and Noise.” The 
New York Times, 5 Nov. 2003.  
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cultural arena, and the complementary coming to awareness of the cult status of popular 
culture: 
 
The required expertise is not only intercinematic, it is intermedia, in the sense that the 
addressee must know not only other movies but all the mass media gossip about movies. 
This third example presupposes a ‘Casablanca universe’ in which cult has become the 
normal way of enjoying movies. Thus in this case [the case of Casablanca] we witness an 
instance of metacult, or cult about cult – a Cult Culture.29 
 
 What is also remarkable about The Matrix franchise is its reception in academic and 
literary (referring to an arena in which literature is discussed, rather than the self-conscious 
literariness of the New Yorker or McSweeney’s) circles. In addition to its acknowledged status 
as film and pop cultural phenomenon, “in 2002 no fewer than six full-length scholarly books 
were published with The Matrix as its primary subject matter.”30 Several more have been 
published since. Cyberpunk aficionados Bruce Sterling and William Gibson have praised the 
film’s technical and thematic richness.31 Baudrillard, who perceives in The Matrix and The 
Matrix Reloaded a conflation of the Platonic illusion and the simulation, has felt the need to 
forge his own position in relation to the franchise.32 Esteemed film and literature scholar, 
Slavoj Žižek, has published a piece postulating the Matrix as “the big Other.”33 Chris Seay 
has written an entire book describing the essence of The Matrix as “belief”: “The Matrix 
films call us to a spiritual life beyond simple cause and effect, beyond what can be measured 
by our senses, sometimes even beyond what makes sense.”34 Andrew Gordon suggests that 
“The Matrix, like the Star Wars and the Star Trek series, has spawned dozens of articles and 
even a few college courses exploring its philosophical, religious and scientific dimensions. A 
science-fiction film like The Terminator, with similar action and complex themes, did no 
such thing.”35  
                                                
29 Eco, “Casablanca: Cult movies and Intertextual Collage,” 454. 
30 Bruce Isaacs, “Popular Postmodernism: The Cultural Logic of The Matrix.” New Media Poetics (2003), 1. 
31 William Gibson, “Afterword.”  In The Art of the Matrix, ed. Spenser Lamm (London: Titan Books, 2000), 
451; see also Sterling, “Every Other Movie is the Blue Pill.” 
32 Aude Lancelin, “Baudrillard Decodes Matrix.” Le Nouvel Observateur, trans. anon, no. 2015 (19 Jun. 2003); 
posted in trans. 8 Nov. 2003.  
 http://www.teaser.fr/~lcolombet/empyree/divers/Matrix-Baudrillard_english.html. Accessed 24 Nov. 2003. 
33 Žižek, “The Matrix: Or, the Two Sides of Perversion,” 244-250. 
34 Chris Seay, The Gospel Reloaded: Finding Spirituality and Faith in The Matrix (Colorado Springs: Piñon 
Press, 2003), 158. 
35 Andrew Gordon, “The Matrix: Paradigm of Postmodernism? Part II.” In Taking the Red Pill: Science, 
Philosophy and Religion in The Matrix, ed. Glenn Yeffeth (Dallas: Benballa Books, 2003), 96. I would suggest 
that Star Wars has not had as significant a response from the academic community. There are indeed dozens of 
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 I employ The Matrix franchise in this chapter as the nearest approximation to the 
performance of the spectacle aesthetic. The text of the franchise functions as a self-aware 
exploration of the postmodern consciousness, schizophrenic and fragmentary, vacillating 
between political and social conservatism and romantic radicalism, realist authenticity and 
simulacral reproduction – in short, a variation on what Baudrillard has called the hyperreality, 
or Collins the “hyperconsciousness” of the postmodern spectator.  
 
3.6 Towards a Notion of Textual Discursivity 
I argue that the notion of discursivity to which I alluded in Chapter Two is necessary to 
traverse the gulf that separates theory about popular culture and the consumption experience 
of partaking of that culture. Partaking of culture is, as Brabazon says, “an emotional 
investment.”36 Culture is constituted by a process in which texts affect the spectator; it is less 
a system of signs that cohere as meaning than a site of interaction, or engagement, with the 
text. Simply put, what films, books, or comic strips mean is only one component of the way 
they are consumed.  
To experience the text, I argue that the spectator must appreciate it as a reproduction, 
or simulation, of prior textual forms. This is perhaps the most crucial aspect of the spectacle 
aesthetic, and it is what makes discursivity central to any notion of contemporary cinematic 
culture. Whereas Barthes’s distinction between the Text and Work offers something very 
similar about the incompletion of the Text and the finitude of its production in the Work,37 
Barthes was not writing about a filmic franchise that acknowledges its status as ‘already 
reproduced,’ or what I have referred to as non-authentic. In a very real sense, The Matrix is a 
film about the perpetual displacement of textual authenticity. ‘What is Real?’ in the franchise 
reverb is just as easily ‘What is the Real interpretation?’ for the spectator. The franchise 
offers an investigation of how the postmodern spectator might discover an aesthetic value in 
a text that practices a revision of such values. Ultimately, what The Matrix franchise means is 
contingent on how the spectacle aesthetic makes meaning. 
                                                                                                                                                  
articles and the occasional college course, but the academic material brought to bear on The Matrix franchise is 
of a scholarly register that cannot be found in other popular franchises. While films such as Scott’s Blade 
Runner and Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey have received significant scholarly attention, their relative impact 
on popular culture at large has been minimal - I can only draw on box office receipts and personal experience to 
make this judgement.  
36 Brabazon, 8. 
37 Barthes, “From Work to Text.” 
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The spectacle aesthetic appreciates textual meaning as ‘displaced,’ or perhaps more correctly, 
it appreciates text as a site of ‘displaced meaning.’ The spectator experiences what Bauman 
calls “ambivalence” to the text.38 While several theorists have posited a traditional ‘grand 
narrative’ of The Matrix franchise,39 I argue that the franchise embodies an aesthetic in which 
various grand narratives are reconstituted as simulacral tropes, or cinematic quotations. This 
aesthetic is necessarily one in which the text is reconstituted through spectator engagement 
with it as a commodity in the market. I have termed this notion of engagement 
‘consumption.’ 
 
Discursivity is essentially a cultural aesthetic. This formulation is indebted to Jameson’s 
notion of postmodernism as a cultural aesthetic. Postmodernism is for Jameson more than a 
system of ideas, or an adjunct to post-structuralist discourse. It is rather a sense of individual 
and collective cultural ‘being,’ incorporating art, values and ideals that are coherent only in 
the late capitalistic market. Discursivity, in my usage, connotes something similar, a cultural 
aesthetic rather than a singular practice or process, but without the pejorative slant. The 
necessary abstraction of discursivity is something akin to Barthes’s distinction between the 
Text and a work in which the Text decants the work. For Barthes, the Text is discursive and 
unfinished, the work its tactile expression, perhaps a volume in a library: “the Text is 
experienced only in an activity of production. It follows that the Text cannot stop (for 
example on a library shelf); its constitutive movement is that of cutting across (in particular, 
it can cut across the work, several works).”40 For Barthes, the Text is engaged in a process of 
displacement; it cannot be read because it is engaged in an open-ended itinerary.  
Hall says something similar about the ‘textuality’ of cultural theory. This is why the 
cultural theorist cannot posit a ‘theory’ without having an awareness of its immersion in 
“theoretical legacies,”41 and without being suspicious of its veracity in relation to a real, 
living culture. Theory is equally commentary and an inscription of something altogether new. 
                                                
38 Zygmunt Bauman, “Postmodernity, Or Living With Ambivalence.” In A Postmodern Reader, ed. Joseph 
Natoli and Linda Hutcheon (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 21-24. 
39 See, for example, Laura Bartlett and Thomas B. Byers. “Back to the Future: the Humanist Matrix.” Cultural 
Critique 53 (2003), 28-46; see also Seay. For a similarly orthodox narrative reading of the Star Wars franchise, 
see Lawrence. 
40 Barthes, “From Work to Text,” 157. Original emphasis. 
41 Stuart Hall, “Cultural Studies and its Theoretical Legacies.” 
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For Hall, theory is implicated in the pluralism of the Text, being itself subject to plurality and 
open-ended meanings; thus, negotiating the plurality of the Text and the politics of cultural 
theory is a very real and necessary tension.  
A notion of Barthes’s Text is necessary to conceptualise the work. It is possible in this 
sense to say that a discursive culture decants its subjective expression. The Text decants a 
closed interpretation, but its discursivity remains intact. For Barthes, this is a textual reality, a 
veritable life of the Text. I argue that The Matrix franchise performs this abstract relationship 
between the Barthesian Text and Work. 
 
It should be said here that the distinction between the Text and the work is hardly new; it is 
perhaps the foundation of post-structuralism. Culture, in fashionable theoretical models, is a 
site in which “science, for all one knows and can know, is one story among many.”42 For 
Barthes, the distinction is crucial precisely because it recuperates some notion of the 
authenticity in the contemporary work: “In particular, the tendency must be avoided to say 
that the work is classic, the text avant-garde; it is not a question of drawing up a crude 
honours list in the name of modernity and declaring certain literary productions ‘in’ and 
others ‘out’ by virtue of their chronological situation.”43 For Barthes, the work that is 
decanted from the Text is an authentic cultural artefact. 
However, acknowledging a relationship between textual discursivity and a subjective 
interpretation does not assist in understanding how the textuality of a film franchise impacts 
on the spectator. Knowing that a story is merely one story seems inadequate as a way of 
understanding how postmodern culture, or a new aesthetics of spectacle cinema, might work. 
Knowing the limitations of the discursive text in abstract theoretical terms is perfectly 
feasible. We can agree that Text is ‘open,’ or that it ‘cuts across’ the work, laying bare a 
plethora of interpretive positions. But how do spectators continue to engage with a spectacle 
cinema that is no longer an authentic (or classic) art form? In the Barthesian model, what 
stands in for authenticity?  
 
                                                
42 Bauman, 22. 
43 Barthes, “From Work to Text,” 156. 
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3.7 Intertextuality and Discursivity 
In response to the challenge of the pervasiveness of intertextuality in popular culture, Eco 
suggests that popular cinema must compensate for the consumer that cannot recognise the 
cinematic quotation.44 If one criteria of Eco’s cult cinema is intertextuality, the spectator 
oblivious to the cinematic quotation must find some other aesthetic charge. But between the 
spectator that recognises the quotation and the spectator who remains ignorant, there is surely 
a vast array of interpretive positions. Compensation for the ‘ignorant spectator’ does not 
equate with an understanding of the way cinematic quotations impact on an audience. Eco 
merely assumes that some will ‘get the message’ while others will miss it. He assumes also 
that there is a single message to get, which it seems to me is not the case. 
How can the theorist be sure that the discursive textuality of The Matrix franchise is 
appreciated, or even dimly recognised, by the spectator? To some spectators a first viewing 
of The Matrix might ‘give up’ its intertextual debts to Sergio Leone or James Cameron’s The 
Terminator and Aliens. But it is left to the theorist to speculate about the reverberation of 
these quotations on a culture at large. This is where the analysis invariably suffers, because 
intertextuality, contrary to Jameson’s belief that “it seems at best to designate a problem 
rather than a solution”45 (and can therefore be disregarded altogether) is perhaps the most 
fundamental component of the spectacle aesthetic. Film theorists must appreciate how 
popular texts function as Text in a discursive culture; how the Text is read, and by whom. 
Popular cinema audiences are resistant (or oblivious) to theory and the intellectualising of 
popular art. In the popular culture sphere, theory is hardly necessary for the majority of 
spectators to engage with mainstream cinema. I would also argue that theorists are in the 
main oblivious to the mainstream response to popular cinema. To my knowledge, very little 
work has been done to actively investigate the impact of intertextuality on film audiences, 
particularly at cinema multiplexes where the box office takings first register. This is precisely 
why Chris Rock’s interviews conducted at a multiplex in Los Angeles are something truly 
innovative and increasingly necessary.  
To speculate on the relationship between the discursive culture and the response to the 
intertextuality of a film franchise, the theorist must attempt, first and foremost, to speak for 
herself as incorporating (in the Fiskian sense of the incorporation of the commodity) this 
                                                
44 Eco, “Innovation and Repetition,” 177. 
45 Jameson, “Reification and Utopia,” 134. 
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cultural discursivity, embodying all modes of thought, all ideological utterances, and a 
comprehensive version of what Eco calls the ‘encyclopaedia’ of the spectator.46 (Of course, 
the imaginary encyclopaedia can never be comprehensive, but the belief in its 
comprehensiveness is necessary for an appreciation of the intertextual utterance.) The theorist 
must address the text with an inherent ‘full’ awareness of its strategies and impact on the 
audience. While this is in one sense perfectly obvious, this approach serves to shrink the 
critical and affective distance between the theorist and the imaginary spectator. The theorist 
is thus implicated in the non-authentic culture, simultaneously theorist, spectator and 
consumer; there must be a sense in which the theorist and the consumer share a ‘collective 
consciousness.’ 
What is crucial in this “speaking for oneself” is the positioning of the theorist within 
popular culture. The theorist is simultaneously aware of the text as ideological utterance and 
incorporated commodity. This is essentially what Eco means by the Cult Culture, which is 
maintained only through the collapse of the distinction between high and low culture, and 
more specifically in this argument, theory and spectacle. Eco’s formulation is a significant 
advance on Jameson’s notion of a postmodern culture described in Chapter Two. For 
Jameson, such a transformation is a diminishment of an earlier aesthetic system. While he 
describes postmodernism as having collapsed this critical distance through the convergence 
of high and low art, the inherent nostalgia of his position reinscribes the critical distance into 
his paradigm. While he argues for the loss of critical distance, his mode and strategy of 
argumentation is founded precisely on this critical distance he claims has vanished. In this 
model, the theorist is doomed to observe (and abstractly theorise) culture from beyond its 
borders – from a perceived cultural fringe that resists commodification. This is precisely the 
approach to culture and cinema that must cease to function as having a monopoly on 
authenticity. 
Eco distinguishes between two forms of quotation in popular cinema, one of which 
“the author is aware but that should remain ungraspable by the consumer,” and the other 
“when the quotation is explicit and recognizable, as happens in literature or post-modern art, 
which blatantly and ironically play on intertextuality.”47 The deliberate intertextual text for 
Eco is something akin to Kevin Williamson’s Scream in which the film’s narrative functions 
                                                
46 Eco, “Innovation and Repetition,” 170.  
47 Eco, “Innovation and Repetition,” 170. 
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as a commentary on the horror, or more specifically, the slasher film genre. The intertextual 
quotation is foregrounded and explicit. The conventions of the genre dictate – and indeed 
construct - the course of the narrative: “only virgins survive horror films” dictates that the 
chaste and morally worthy Sidney (Neve Campbell) will survive the film, while the flirtatious 
(and, we assume, promiscuous) Casey (Drew Barrymore) is disembowelled in the opening set 
piece. In another scene, a janitor (played by Wes Craven, director of both Scream and A 
Nightmare on Elm Street) clad in Freddy Kruger’s tattered clothes, mops a bathroom floor. 
Eco argues that this form of intertextuality is typical of postmodern textual practices, 
and he is no doubt correct. He suggests, for example, that the scene in Spielberg’s Raiders of 
the Lost Ark in which Indiana Jones is confronted with a “giant Arab” engages with an 
“original topoi. In the case of the giant, it is a situation typical of the genre.”48 “In both cases 
the topoi are recorded by the ‘encyclopaedia’ of the spectator; they make up part of the 
collective imagination and as such they come to be called upon.”49 What we should bear in 
mind here is the intriguing notion of a collective rather than a single imagination, which is 
intrinsic to the performance of intertextuality in cinema.  
What interests Eco less is “stylistic quotation, in those cases in which a text quotes, in 
a more or less explicit way, a stylistic feature, a way of narrating typical of another author.”50 
However, in so doing, I feel that Eco underestimates the pervasiveness of intertextuality in 
popular film. I would argue that stylistic quotation is often no less intended, nor less explicit 
in contemporary cinema. One could consider Scott’s Blade Runner as a stylistic cinematic 
quotation from beginning to end, visually and aurally recuperating film noir, cyberpunk and 
European existentialism. The stylistic quotation becomes literal, for example, in the use of 
the Millennium Falcon set (of Star Wars) in several interior shots of Blade Runner. Fincher’s 
Se7en establishes its lineage to classical film noir in a number of stylistic tropes: wet streets, 
low lighting, low camera angles. It is not as explicit as Jean Paul Belmondo’s (Breathless) 
fidgeting with his earlobe to recall Bogart’s Phillip Marlowe in The Big Sleep, but the issue 
                                                
48 Eco, “Innovation and Repetition,” 170. Eco’s discussion here is detailed and fascinating. He goes on to 
suggest that “the topos in Raiders is quoted in order to contradict it (what we expect to happen, based on our 
experience, will not)” (170). Interestingly, Spielberg had intended to follow through precisely in accordance 
with Eco’s topos, that is, an elaborate set piece in which Indiana Jones (Harrison Ford) battles the giant. But 
Ford, suffering from food poisoning in Tunisia, was unable to complete the sequence. Removing the sequence 
entirely, Indiana Jones, in perhaps the most iconic moment in the franchise, casually dispatches the Giant with a 
single bullet. 
49 Eco, “Innovation and Repetition,” 170. 
50 Eco, “Innovation and Repetition,” 170. 
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of the relation between an intertextual stylistics of cinema seems to me as vital, if not more 
vital, than a traditional (literally inscribed) intertextuality that Eco has so thoroughly 
explored.51 It is this stylistic intertextuality that is most obviously compatible with the 
spectacle aesthetic and finds unique expression in The Matrix Franchise. The opening 
sequence of The Matrix establishes an intertextual reference frame to classical film noir, yet 
the green colour tinge over the image recalls the hard chromatic visuals of a cyberpunk 
world. The stylised dress (notably Trinity’s black leather outfit and pale features) establishes 
a broader stylistic (and intertextual mise en scene) of neo-gothicism and cyborg androgyny. 
These ‘quotations’ are in every sense stylistic rather than literal. It is this stylistic intertext 
that establishes the cinematic text as a quotation drawing on Eco’s encyclopaedia of 
references. 
In assessing the impact of intertextuality in the consumption of film, whether it is in 
the form of subtle stylistic quotation (Se7en) or an explicit textual reference (Scream52), it is 
necessary to distinguish between the ‘potentialities’ and the ‘actualities’ of spectator 
response. In coming to terms with popular cinema franchises and the spectacle aesthetic, 
surely the most pressing question must be: exactly how is a discursive text received by its 
audience? 
Although I will return to a close analysis of the film, for the moment let us consider 
the sequence in The Matrix in which Neo is reborn. Recall that the Matrix is a cyberspace 
modelled on our contemporary world that can be entered, negotiated and lived within. The 
human mind ‘jacks’ into the Matrix (the subjective consciousness is literally downloaded into 
                                                
51 See also Eco, “Casablanca: Cult Movies and Intertextual Collage.” 
52 A number of critics have viewed Scream as exemplary of the postmodern incorporation of art as commodity, 
and the centrality of pastiche to postmodern aesthetics. In such criticism, there is a sense of this mode as 
redundant. See, for example, David Sanjek, “Same as it Ever Was: Innovation and Exhaustion in the Horror and 
Science Fiction Films of the 1990s.” In Film Genre 2000, ed. Wheeler Winston Dixon (New York: State 
University of New York, 2000), 113-114: “neither Williamson (Scream) nor very many of his contemporaries 
appear to be interested in critiquing or subverting those [genre] parameters. Instead, they merely call attention to 
them in the most blunt and obvious fashion. As a result, and unlike the work of those aforementioned directors 
and scriptwriters, the ideological dimension of much if not most of the horror and science-fiction narratives of 
the 1990s is paltry or pacified.” Sanjek makes the obligatory mention of George Romero (Night of the Living 
Dead, Dawn of the Dead, Day of the Dead). Where I object to his reading of Scream is in its comparison of the 
lack of ideological intent in Scream with Romero’s ideologically suffused films. While on one level the 
distinction is obvious (Romero’s Night of the Living Dead works as a neat metaphor for the paranoia of the 60s 
and Dawn of the Dead is a vague critique of 1970s American capitalism), it must also be said that Romero was a 
B-grade horror director who started out with midnight screenings of his film. Scream was a studio production 
directed by Wes Craven. A more apt comparison would perhaps be Romero’s Dawn of the Dead with the 
independent Canadian production, Cube, or the Japanese cult film, Ring. This is to say that Scream and Night of 
the Living Dead do not operate on audiences in the same way, or for that matter, on the same audiences at all. 
 117 
the computer-generated simulation), leaving the body behind, docile, ineffectual and 
obsolete. For those of humanity (indeed, the multitude imprisoned in “fields of pods”) living 
inside the Matrix, “the Matrix is [literally] everywhere…You can see it out your window or 
on your television. You feel it when you go to work, or go to church or pay your taxes.” Prior 
to Neo’s death and rebirth, the Neo of the Real is seated in a chair on board the 
Nebuchadnezzar, jacked in to the Matrix; the Neo of the Matrix, clad in black coat and 
leather boots, is killed by Agent Smith in the Heart Of the City Hotel. These two actions take 
place simultaneously. Death in the Matrix is contiguous with death in the Real. In assessing 
potential and actual responses to the film’s intertextual fabric, I want to consider the impetus 
for Neo’s resurrection. Precisely what brings him back to life? 
According to Eco’s model, this sequence fits into the “explicit and recognisable” 
quotation.53 A number of intertextualities imbue Neo’s death and resurrection with an 
extratextual knowledge.54 The sequence is connected to an encyclopaedia of cinematic 
references that have accrued up to this point in the film: Vertigo (the medium shot of Trinity 
pursued over a rooftop), The Terminator (the image of an agent landing on a rooftop in the 
same pose as the Terminator when he materialises in the present), a face-off in a subway 
station reminiscent of Leone’s Fistful of Dollars or Woo’s Bullet in the Head, film noir 
(stylistic), classical Hollywood melodrama (stylistic), cyberpunk and postmodern 
apocalyptism (stylistic). While Eco argues of Raiders of the Lost Ark that “there remain 
plenty of possibilities for the naïve spectator, who at least can always enjoy the fact that the 
hero gets the best of his adversary,” this sequence in The Matrix requires the spectator to 
appreciate the network of textual references (or at least a healthy proportion of them) to make 
sense of a critical moment in its plot: the resurrection of the hero. The narrative cannot 
explain the resurrection of the One without recourse to a stream of textual quotation.  
The resurrection partakes of the narrative of the death and resurrection of Christ. The 
textual precursor (the Christian narrative) is a license to transgress what the audience expects. 
Reality (even the ‘reality’ of the Matrix) dictates that Neo is dead, destroyed finally by his 
nemesis, Smith. While the Matrix is a simulation, it is still subject to the rules of an external 
reality. Nothing in the film thus far has permitted the resurrection of Neo. Morpheus is 
explicit on the point that death in the Matrix is contiguous with death of the mind and the 
                                                
53 Eco, “Innovation and Repetition,” 170. 
54 Eco, “Innovation and Repetition,” 176. 
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material body. Therefore, the quotation of the resurrection of Christ is necessary to transgress 
the cinematic boundaries of a conventional cinematic realism. Rather than an explicit 
quotation, the Christian mythical frame functions as a separate strata of meaning altogether.  
After Neo’s death, Trinity leans over Neo’s lifeless corpse and murmurs: “Neo, I’m 
not afraid anymore. The Oracle told me that I would fall in love, and that that man, the man I 
loved, would be the One. So you see, you can’t be dead. You can’t be…because I love you. 
You hear me…I love you.” She kisses him as the sparks from the acetylene torches of the 
sentinels rain over the ship in an ethereal fireworks display. A romantic theme rises as Trinity 
says: “Now get up.” Neo’s life returns with the sound of a heartbeat on a monitor. The scene 
cuts to the Matrix as Neo is ‘reborn,’ then cuts back to the Real as Morpheus (in close-up) 
says: “He is the One.” There is a final cut to the Real, where a generic religious score rises 
and Neo confronts Agent Smith in a corridor of the Heart Of The City Hotel.  
The significance of the two pieces of music is crucial as an indication of two separate 
intertextual streams that permit the resurrection of the One. The Christian narrative comprises 
one stream, the classic Hollywood romance comprises the other. The spectator/theorist is 
something of an intertextual ‘spotter.’ The kiss of life is no doubt immediately recognised by 
some spectators as a recuperation of the Sleeping Beauty story. In this case, the gender roles 
are reversed. Neo is rescued from an archaic form of religious martyrdom and brought back 
to life; Trinity is the agent of this rescue operation. (Of course, in the broader scheme of the 
narrative, the male ultimately rescues the female (insofar as Neo rescues all of humanity), 
and Neo does in fact bring Trinity to life at the end of The Matrix Reloaded.55) Unlike the 
specifically intended quotation, these two levels of intertextual meaning are as central to the 
narrative as the storyline: Neo needs to be Christ for the resurrection to take. The superhero, 
alienated youth, anonymous monomythic quester, must make room for the Christian 
referential frame. But he must simultaneously take his position as the sleeping ‘Prince,’ 
awakened by the kiss of a knight in shining armour (who wears Spartan clothes in the Real 
and black leather in the Matrix), Trinity. The One is thus resurrected through two separate 
though simultaneously functioning referential frames. Within the levels of meaning are 
                                                
55 For a sample of the wealth of material discussing The Matrix franchise as gender-conservative, or more 
broadly ideologically conservative, see Martina Lipp, “Welcome to the Sexual Spectacle: The Female Heroes in 
the Franchise.” In Jacking in to The Matrix Franchise, ed. Mathew Kapell  
and William G. Doty (New York and London: Continuum, 2004), 65-79; see also John Shelton Lawrence, 
“Fascist Redemption or Democratic Hope?” In Jacking in to The Matrix Franchise, ed. Mathew Kapell and 
William G. Doty (New York and London: Continuum, 2004), 80-96. 
 119 
specific intertextual quotations that inform the whole. Thus, the sparks from the sentinel’s 
acetylene torches constructs on one level a generic romance scene in which love is confessed 
and requited.56 On another level, the ethereal light shower recalls specific cinematic 
romances back-dropped by fireworks, such as the scene in which Grace Kelly and Cary Grant 
kiss in Hitchcock’s To Catch a Thief. I am not suggesting here that the Wachowski Brothers 
contemplated this sequence as a quotation of Hitchcock’s film (though this may very well be 
the case). Rather, it is born of a wellspring of cinematic references, Eco’s collective 
encyclopaedia. Similarly, at the film’s conclusion, I cannot say that the newspaper that 
flutters across the deserted train station like tumbleweed recalls Leone’s theatrical precursor 
to a duel in Once Upon a Time in the West, yet the ‘quotation,’ less than explicit on screen, is 
no less potent as textual performance. 
The potential responses to this sequence can surely not equate with the dominant 
subjective response in mainstream popular culture. How much of this sophisticated 
intertextual network is consumed by the spectator? I perceive three potentialities. Perhaps the 
‘naïve spectator’ does not appreciate either of the intertextual levels of meaning: Neo as the 
resurrected Christ or Neo/Trinity as Sleeping Beauty/knight in shining armour (and the 
corollary Neo/Trinity as Hollywood romance). This spectator does not pause to reflect on the 
conspicuous use of an extreme close-up on Trinity’s face during her speech. The close-up and 
extreme shallow focus give the fireworks a benignly ethereal quality (the spectator thus holds 
two separate symbolic images simultaneously: hostile acetylene torches, ethereal shower 
prefiguring the ‘consummation’ of love). It appears as if the sparks are descending to the 
floor in a dream-like slow motion, but it is merely a contrivance of the close-up and focal 
length. In this case, what is not central to the shot is indeed as crucial to its meaning as what 
is. This spectator does not immediately connect the resurrection of Neo with the resurrection 
of Christ, nor the kiss of life. Perhaps for this spectator, it is merely enough that Morpheus’s 
unfailing belief in the One and his incredulous murmur, “It can’t be,” are enough to authorise 
the resurrection.  
                                                
56 Consider a similar iconic scene in The Empire Strikes Back in which Princess Leia finally confesses her love 
to Han Solo before he is frozen in carbon, perhaps never to return: 
 Leia: I love you. 
 Han Solo: I know. 
The exchange works very much in the way Eco suggests of the Indiana Jones/Arab Giant confrontation insofar 
as the viewer expects Han Solo to reply, “I love you, too,” ‘consummating’ their love in a generic exchange. 
Solo’s alteration is all the more intertextually innovative for its recuperation of, and departure from, the generic 
form. 
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Another spectator perhaps recognises the intertextual quotation, both in specific form 
and in the broader textual scheme: Christian death and resurrection, Sleeping Beauty brought 
back to life. The quotation is aesthetically charged and permits the spectator to reflect on her 
own awareness of its textual sophistication. The quotation also permits the resurrection and 
thus furnishes a credible conclusion to the narrative. For this spectator, the resurrection is not 
only permitted, but a sophisticated method of advancing the narrative and bringing the story 
to a point of closure (the two sequels were not originally intended). 
A third spectator recognises the quotation, the two levels of meaning that furnish the 
narrative with a conclusion, but also an inherent intertextuality of the sequence as narrative, 
image, trope, motif and symbol – a meta-textuality. This spectator considers the implication 
of the sequence as ‘pure’ intertext, and its inherent discursivity: that is, as drawing upon an 
encyclopaedia of textual references of which her own set is merely a component. This 
spectator appreciates that an intertextual stylistics is operating alongside Eco’s explicit 
quotations - for example, the filter that provides a green tinge to the sequences in the Matrix 
recalls the use of a yellow filter in Polanski’s Chinatown (which in turn recalls the 
sepia/nostalgised colour tones of a ‘cinematic’ representation of the 1930s) – which in turn 
operates in accordance with plot, character and theme. Intertextual quotation operates upon 
the ‘interior’ coherence of the work.57 
I am not suggesting that The Matrix is beyond any concrete interpretation because of 
its intertextuality. I am not arguing for a reversion to infinite pluralism and the 
uninterpretability of all texts. Popular culture texts (and certainly The Matrix franchise) are 
profoundly engaging; the spectator is involved in forging a meaning out of its intertextuality. 
But an awareness of the possibilities of its intertextual frames of meaning reveals its inherent 
discursivity. There is no ‘authentic’ (or literal) reading of Neo’s resurrection; the literature 
published on the franchise has certainly not arrived at such a consensus.  
Theory, in applying a methodology to an investigation of popular culture, must 
engage with the phenomenon of intertextuality and its challenge to traditional modes of 
                                                
57 For an oft-cited attack on the insularity of external and internal frames of text, see Paul de Man, “Semiology 
and Rhetoric.” Diacritics 3, no. 3 (1973): “The development of intrinsic, formalist criticism in the twentieth 
century has changed this model [literary ‘form’ as superficial]: form is now a solipsistic category of self-
reflection, and the referential meaning is said to be extrinsic. The polarities of inside and outside have been 
reversed, but they are still the same polarities at play: internal meaning has become outside reference and the 
outer form has become the intrinsic structure” (27-28). De Man wishes to negate this divide between the inside 
and outside of the text. 
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interpretation. This is equally a strategy of abstract theorising and an empirical study of 
audience response to popular culture, which is only now being seriously investigated as a 
component of cultural theory and/or film studies.58 I have not attempted here to provide a 
theoretical model that provides a solution to the challenge of intertextuality that is, as 
Jameson acknowledges, a very real problem to current and future investigations of popular 
culture. As Eco suggests, the contemporary spectator (or better still, theorist/spectator) draws 
on a wealth of cinematic references and simultaneously, and as significantly, on a range of 
mass (and other) media that commentates on cinema and culture. The spectator/theorist is 
thus immersed in a spectacle that recycles prior textual modes (but in which cinema is 
indisputably the dominant), forming its own discursivity while aware of (or naïve to) the 
inherent discursivity of popular cinema. Yet I concur with Eco that the textual ‘awareness’ of 
audiences, and the consequent challenge to traditional hermeneutics, is ever more apparent: 
“It will be a sad day when a too smart audience will read Casablanca as conceived by 
Michael Curtiz after having read Calvino and Barthes. But that day will come. Perhaps we 
have been able to discover here, for the last time, the Truth.”59  
The discursivity of text is manifested in The Matrix Franchise as a meta-textuality. 
The Matrix is about the performance of the Text; but it is equally a performance of this vital 
new aesthetic. The franchise foregrounds its immersion in prior texts, prior cinematic mise en 
scene, realising a spectacle that comprises a popular ‘consciousness’ rather than an 
interpretive ‘mind.’ For contemporary popular culture, perhaps Calvino and Barthes are only 
vaguely felt, if at all – If On a Winter’s Night, a Traveller is hardly the same publishing 
phenomenon as Harry Potter. But perhaps J. K. Rowling’s intertextual universe can 
substitute just as easily for Calvino’s, albeit without the degree of authorial awareness of the 
theoretical implications of intertextuality. Equally, one does not need Roland Barthes to 
appreciate that the integrity of ‘The Real’ is being challenged in The Matrix. 
 
                                                
58 For an interesting analysis of audience-oriented theory, see Will Brooker and Deborah Jermyn, 
“Introduction.” In The Audience Studies Reader, ed. Will Brooker and Deborah Jermyn (London: Routledge, 
2003), 1-4. See also Sut Jhally and Justin Lewis, “Enlightened Racism. The Cosby Show, Audiences and the 
Myth of the American Dream.” In The Audience Studies Reader, ed. Will Brooker and Deborah Jermyn 
(London: Routledge, 2003), 279-286; and Tamar Liebes and Elihu Katz, “The Export of Meaning: Cross-
cultural Readings of Dallas.” In The Audience Studies Reader, ed. Will Brooker and Deborah Jermyn (London: 
Routledge, 2003), 287-304. It is worth noting here the degree to which the authors rely on empirical research in 
the service of cultural theory. 
59 Eco, “Casablanca: Cult Movies and Intertextual Collage,” 455.  
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3.8 Myth and Text in The Matrix Franchise: Gorging on the Sacred Past 
 
But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good 
appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the 
universal author of all things beautiful and right…and the immediate source of reason and 
truth in the intellectual.60 
 
However it be defined, contemporary literary interest in myth indicates an emphasis upon 
content in addition to literary form, quite in contrast to the Aristotelian mythos, which 
referred essentially to the formal sequence of thematic units (topoi) or to what subsequently 
was called plot.61 
 
Doty defines the primary organisation of myth as two-fold: content and form. He suggests 
furthermore that literary theory emphasises the importance of the content of the myth rather 
than its mode of organisation (a system of themes or ideas). In contrast to this dialectical 
approach, Bruce Sterling refers to the presentation of myth in The Matrix as “brain salad,”62 
suggesting that it is both intellectual food for the brain and an eclectic array of myths, texts 
and pop culture clichés tossed together like a mixed salad. He is blasé about the ‘value’ of 
such a textual (or franchise) strategy - “True, it veers perilously close to another [H. G.] 
Wells problem: ‘If anything is possible, nothing is interesting’,”63 – but concludes that “you 
get all the intellectually sexy head-trip kicks of philosophizing without any of the boring 
hassles of consistency of rigor.”64  
Between Doty’s functionality of myth and Sterling’s “brain salad,” a profound 
transformation has occurred in the way popular culture approaches textual mythology. The 
conclusion of The Matrix, which I have discussed in terms of the resurrection of the One, is 
simultaneously a thinly veiled performance of the coming to full consciousness in Plato’s 
Allegory of the Cave. The film’s narrative establishes a dialectical opposition between the 
Real and the illusion, its inauthentic reproduction. The individual is ‘woken up’ (indeed, the 
film’s concluding shot in which the One ascends into the heavens of the Matrix is 
accompanied by Rage Against the Machine’s “Wake Up”65) from the ‘prison for the mind’ 
and springs alive to enlightenment and full awareness of the controls of the Matrix. Neo reads 
                                                
60 Plato, “Republic.” In Dialogues of Plato, ed. and trans. J. D. Kaplan (Pocket Books, 1950), 361-362. 
61 William G. Doty, Mythography (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1986), 174. 
62 Sterling, “Every Other Movie is the Blue Pill,” 23. 
63 Sterling, “Every Other Movie is the Blue Pill,” 25. 
64 Sterling, “Every Other Movie is the Blue Pill,” 24-25. 
65 Rage Against the Machine. 
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the simulation as the coded artifice or simulation of the Real66 as Plato’s prisoner realises the 
disparity between the illusion and the Real. 
I argue that the purity or authenticity of Plato’s allegory is challenged by the mode in 
which it is performed in the conclusion of The Matrix. Neo’s coming to full consciousness is 
indeed a performance of the allegory, but setting it alongside the redemption of The One 
based upon faith (which is to say, drawing on the Christian frame of reference discussed 
earlier) renders the allegory as merely one fragment in a sprawling collage. Analysing the 
play of mythic representation in The Matrix, Sterling suggests that “small wonder that Neo 
runs back into the fantasy. He’s living in the pixels [of the digitised collage], stepping out of 
a phone booth, and flying. That is his victory, limited and illusory though it is. The cyber-
messiah didn’t change a thing, not really; when it came to the crunch, it was all smoke and 
mirrors.”67 For Sterling, The Matrix is indeed a place to hide from the Real, experiencing 
rather than understanding the simulation. 
Doty’s distinction between a classical (Aristotelian) mythos (a formal mythic pattern) 
and content cannot be applied to the performance of myth in The Matrix. On one level, the 
spectator responds to the Allegory of the Cave and simultaneously what is, at least on a 
philosophical level, the dialectically opposed allegory of the resurrection of Christ. On 
another level, the spectator appreciates the confrontation between – and/or synthesis of – the 
two. An analysis of The Matrix franchise must consider the relationship between the 
reproduction (the text and its performance as franchise in the cultural sphere) and the original 
- or, to use its own terminology, between the simulation and the Real. Both the Christian and 
Platonic mythic frames are revisions of an original utterance that now finds itself played in 
the discursive textual arena of the franchise. Such an analysis is invariably implicated in 
concerns of authenticity, textual value, ideological function, and the impact of the 
reproduction on a society that has lost its memory of the original utterance. A traditional 
literary theorist like Harold Bloom would consider the bricolage of the reproduction as 
                                                
66 See Aylish Wood, “The Collapse of Reality and Illusion in The Matrix,” 120. I concur with Wood that “The 
Matrix, whilst very different to eXistenZ, is as full of gaps and uncertainties, and that these gaps and 
uncertainties lead to a mistrust of the reality status of both the Matrix and the Real World. In The Matrix, the 
extent of the illusion, or the depth of the rabbit-hole, is not the only thing in doubt; so too is the question of 
where it begins and ends.” The second and third instalments of the trilogy further compromise the dialectic 
between Real and illusion, though I will say more about this in due course.  
67 Sterling, “Every Other Movie is the Blue Pill,” 28. For a provocative reading of religious pluralism and its 
self-defeating philosophy in The Matrix, see Gregory Bassham, “Religion in The Matrix and Problems of 
Pluralism.” In The Matrix and Philosophy, ed. William Irwin (Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 2002), 111-
125. 
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another phase in the “shocking process of dumbing down our cultural life.”68 It is thus the 
duty of the spectator/theorist to conceptualise the way classical myth works in a wholly 
anachronistic film medium. 
 
3.9 Cinema and the Contemporary Mythology 
The Matrix franchise offers neatly formed parcels of traditional mythology, accessible and 
eminently recognisable to a contemporary popular culture audience. When Morpheus 
declares, “Now do you believe?” and the aphoristic, “He is the One,” this audience silently 
cheers at a performance of a popular, age-old confluence of narratives of destiny and 
individuality. We recall the plight of the young Luke Skywalker in Star Wars, the boy from a 
backwater town who saves the galaxy; his twin sister Leia may stem from a royal upbringing 
and noble patronage, but it is crucial for the monomythic presentation of the One that he arise 
from obscurity and ascend to a position of centrality (of the village, town, city, country or 
universe). Campbell describes the monomyth as central to western cultural myths;69 Jewett 
and Lawrence trace in detail its recuperation by Hollywood and popular culture.70 While I 
would argue that the particularities of the myth are crucial in differentiating one text or 
franchise from another (the monomyth performed through the maturation process of Luke 
Skywalker is not identical to the process of maturation for Neo, which is something Jewett 
and Lawrence overlook), there is a resemblance in the narrative structure of the major 
popular film franchises that conforms schematically to the monomyth: Star Wars,71 Indiana 
Jones, The Terminator, Alien/s, Back to the Future, The Matrix, Harry Potter, Independence 
Day. The narrative/thematic structure as monomyth is connected to cinema as a popular 
culture phenomenon. A recognisable mythic foundation requires a paring down of plot and 
character, and a sophisticated development of the visual aspect of cinema. It is thus 
significant that each of the franchises mentioned above are stylistically innovative and 
technologically pioneering; Indiana Jones could perhaps be considered an anomaly, but the 
emphasis on visual and aural spectacle is everywhere apparent.  
                                                
68 Harold Bloom, “Dumbing Down American Readers.” Los Angeles Times, 24 Sep. 2003. My emphasis. 
69 Campbell, 30-32. 
70 Jewett and Lawrence, The American Monomyth, 169-197. 
71 For a detailed and thorough analysis of the mythic structure of Star Wars, see Andrew Gordon, “Star Wars: A 
Myth For Our Time.” Literature/Film Quarterly 6, no. 4 (1978): 314-326. 
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 The Matrix locates itself in this lineage of film franchises. It presents a clear Christian 
mythological foundation – the One is killed and resurrected, only to be killed again at the 
conclusion to The Matrix Revolutions. Yet even this death is not final as the Oracle suggests 
that Neo will indeed return –the One is resurrected a second time, though the nature of this 
resurrection is withheld. Larry Wachowski suggests that “we’re [The Wachowski Brothers] 
interested in mythology, theology and, to a certain extent, higher-level mathematics. All 
human beings try to answer bigger questions, as well as The Big Question.”72 The narrative is 
attuned to the staple mythic and textual elements of contemporary popular culture, yet it is 
hardly the stuff of esoteric intellectualism.73 The shooting script of The Matrix includes a 
scene in which Morpheus explicitly references Baudrillard when explaining the Matrix to 
Neo, but this sequence was omitted from the film.  
 The characters that enter the mythological structure are archetypal, though not 
caricature – a mythic resonance invests the characters with a quasi-profundity. Morpheus, a 
god of dreams in a Greek mythological structure, foregrounds the mythical aspect of his 
character at the end of The Matrix Reloaded: “I have dreamed a dream, and now that dream 
for me is gone.” Adopting the Greek mythological structure is merely an interim position, 
perhaps what Stuart Hall would refer to as an arbitrary closure on the ever-expanding 
bricolage of the text.74 Morpheus simultaneously partakes of the Christian mythical structure 
as a refashioned John the Baptist, of whom it is prophesied that he will find the One. Leather 
clad, wearing rimless mirror shades (an old cyberpunk trope75), Morpheus speaks in the 
highly clichéd, stilted dialogue of a Master Yoda or Obi Wan Kenobi: “Neo, I can only show 
you the door. You’re the one that has to walk through it.” Or consider the exchange: 
 
 Neo: I know what you’re trying to do. 
    Morpheus: I’m trying to free your mind. 
 
The archetypal and clichéd resonates because it is contrived and recognisable to the spectator. 
Familiarity breeds a pop accessibility. 
                                                
72 Cited in Richard Corliss, “Popular Metaphysics.” Time, 19 Apr. 1999. 
73 See Roger Ebert, “The Matrix Reloaded.” Chicago Sun-Times, 14 May 2003. Ebert writes that “it [The 
Matrix Reloaded] plays like a collaboration involving a geek, a comic book artist and the smartest kid in 
Philosophy 101.” 
74 Hall, “Cultural Studies and its Theoretical Legacies,” 278-279. 
75 For an interesting discussion of the significance of mirror shades in cyberpunk fiction, see Bruce Sterling, 
“Introduction.” In Mirrorshades: The Cyberpunk Anthology, ed. Bruce Sterling (London: HarperCollins, 1994). 
 126 
 While Neo sees (no doubt through a glass darkly) the path of the One, a separate 
strata of mythologies is gradually set on his shoulders, reconfiguring the prevailing mythic 
structure. The Matrix opens outside the Heart of the City Hotel, connoting a centrality of the 
contemporary postmodern space, a realm of similar textual and cultural legacy that spawned 
the dystopias of Blade Runner, Se7en, The Terminator and Akira. The notion of a ‘heart’ or 
essentiality of the postmodern is rejected; the postmodern centre is ultimately an imaginary 
construct in the Heart of the City Hotel, cohering spatially and temporally only in the 
simulacrum. ‘Viewed’ from the perspective of the Real, the city exists in a perpetual present, 
subject to re-simulation, or rebooting. Hugo Weaving’s first appearance as Agent Smith 
outside the hotel recalls the hard-boiled, stylised dialogue of Chandler’s Phillip Marlowe or 
Hammet’s Sam Spade. The conspicuous use of high contrast recalls classical film noir; the 
recuperation of the noir city in the simulacrum is thus a literal reproduction that antecedes the 
Real.76  
The spectator is introduced to Thomas Anderson in a studio apartment “overgrown 
with technology” in which “weed-like cables [coil] everywhere, duct-taped into thickets that 
wind up and around the legs of several desks.”77 Anderson is recognisable as the 
contemporary alienated man, (recalling Chuck Palahniuk’s nameless narrator in his cult 
novel, Fight Club78), a cyborg in his relationship to a technology of which he is a part, the 
creator and construct. He inhabits a body dislocated from the digital realm of cyberspace. It is 
the body that is alien, the mind splintered by the absurdity of physical effort. Donna Haraway 
discusses the literary (and cinematic) cyborg as “resolutely committed to partiality, irony, 
intimacy, and perversity. It is oppositional, utopian, and completely without innocence.”79 
The cyborg is a textual trope that is a confluence of intertextual subjectivities. Interestingly, 
Haraway’s attempt to mould a cyborg identity that transgresses a Western patriarchal 
subjectivity does not at all accord with Thomas Anderson/Neo as cyborg. Indeed, Haraway 
would perhaps view Neo less as radical political agent than reactionary, an agent of the 
                                                
76 The ingenious contrivance of the narrative is that for the spectator in the movie theatre, who is assumed 
herself to inhabit the Matrix, external reality and its historicity is a construct, a simulation of a prior (but no 
longer extant and recoverable) Real. Thus, film noir as a cinematic tradition exists only in the Matrix. The Real 
is severed from history in the city of Zion, a post-apocalyptic limbo beneath the surface of the earth. 
77 Larry Wachowski and Andy Wachowski, “The Matrix: Shooting Script.” In The Art of The Matrix, ed. 
Spenser Lamm (London: Titan Books, 2000), 280. 
78 Chuck Palahniuk, Fight Club (New York: Norton, 1996). 
79 Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York: Routledge, 1991), 
151. 
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political hegemony of the times even while superficially engaged in resistance. The 
conclusion of The Matrix Revolutions suggests that Neo is a synthesis of human and machine, 
issued of a ‘Source,’ which is of course also absent from Haraway’s postmodern-inclined 
cyborg world. 
 Existential alienation meets the collective in millennial angst, apocalyptism, 
eschatology. In the Matrix, it is 1999, “the peak of human civilisation.” In the Real, “it is 
closer to 2199.” Both epochs are at the turn of the century, both demand revolution. The 
conclusion to The Matrix Revolutions recalls a fascination with pyrotechnics in a pointed 
homage to Akira: archetypal good and evil collide, producing a mushroom cloud that 
resembles the catastrophic birth of Neo-Tokyo in Akira. Theology, contemporary 
existentialism and apocalyptism are commingled with healthy doses of Hollywood 
blockbuster populism – hyperbolic action, stylised depictions of violence, clichéd romantic 
melodrama. In The Matrix Revolutions, Neo finds himself stranded in a Mobil station, a less 
than subtle anagram of Limbo, installing a Buddhist mythological structure that was vaguely 
apparent in the first two films.80 
 The challenge to the theorist/spectator is to assess the various ways in which these 
mythic structures resonate within the franchise and within the discursive culture that actively 
engages with these mythic structures. The task is thus two-fold. First, to consider the way in 
which mythic structures are incorporated in the text (the formal arrangement, or what Doty 
refers to as the classical mythos). Such an analysis would consider the structural coherence of 
the whole – a ‘mythical narrative’ that informs the text – as well as its accessibility to a wider 
audience.  Second, to assess the impact of the ‘original’ mythic utterance on a contemporary 
spectator and culture (content). Doty offers a broad definition of mythology as “narrative 
fictions whose plots read first at the level of their own stories and then as projections of 
imminent transcendent meanings. Such plots mirror human potentialities, experiences with 
natural and cultural phenomena, and recognition of regular interactions between them.”81 In 
these terms, the function of myth is essentially communicative at the literal, or intratextual, 
level. Myth enables the spectator to incorporate the original content, or initial utterance, into 
                                                
80 For two excellent analyses of Buddhism in The Matrix, see James L. Ford, “Buddhism, Mythology and The 
Matrix.” In Taking the Red Pill: Science, Philosophy and Religion in The Matrix, ed. Glenn Yeffeth (Dallas: 
Benballa Books, 2003), 125-144; and Michael Brannigan, “There is no spoon: A Buddhist Mirror.” In The 
Matrix and Philosophy, ed. William Irwin (Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 2002), 101-110. 
81 Doty, 16. 
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the reproduction. Thus, the spectator draws on Plato’s Allegory of the Cave in its essentiality, 
that is, in its embryonic mythic form. Neo is substituted for the prisoner in shackles who is 
freed and comes to full consciousness in the light of goodness and truth. He is equally 
substituted for Christ in death and resurrection, and must believe he is the One before he can 
realise it. He is also Sleeping Beauty on board the Nebuchadnezzar. These mythological 
narratives are transposed on a literal, explicitly communicative level. 
 However, the limitation of Doty’s paradigm becomes apparent when assessing the 
mythological structure holistically. If on a literal level, the mythic content of the franchise is 
at least problematic (if not incoherent), the prevailing mythic structure of the narrative is a 
site of contestation rather than a literal transposition of myth to spectator. The original 
utterance is reconfigured by its association with – and position in relation to – separate 
mythic structures. A mythic (or textual) utterance is aestheticised when reproduced and 
simultaneously severed from an original mythic form. Myth is reconfigured as spectacle, the 
eclecticism of mythical narratives are invigorated with life and meaning in popular cultural 
practices. This is to say that the ontology of myth is fundamentally altered in the spectacle 
presentation. Popular culture does not receive mythic narratives in a traditional unmediated, 
and thus uncontaminated, form. The discursivity of culture finds expression in, and indeed is 
reliant upon, the discursive formation of mythic and textual narrative. Eco’s tentative 
conclusions towards a ‘cult culture’ are indeed prescient: “Thus in this case we witness an 
instance of metacult, or of cult about cult.”82 However, what is more significant than a ‘cult 
about cult’ is a cult that is always already cult. Popular culture cannot dissociate itself from 
the myth as cult text. In fact the desire to reflect on idealistic mythic messages has well and 
truly expired. Film theory requires that cult cinema be about the status of cinema as 
reproduction. But this form of creative self-awareness, so fashionable in the work of Calvino, 
Borges, Eco (The Name of the Rose is a particularly fine example of the text as post-
structuralist labyrinth83), Paul Auster and others, has less currency in the pop culture arena in 
which myths have residual or spectacle resonance without the required sophistication of 
postmodern pastiche.84 Pastiche operates in popular cinema as a form of commentary on prior 
                                                
82 Eco, “Casablanca: Cult Movies and Intertextual Collage,” 455. 
83 For a fascinating ‘reading’ of his novel, see Umberto Eco, Reflections on The Name of the Rose (London: 
Secker and Warburg, 1985). 
84 I use ‘pastiche’ here in the sense of being an empty reproduction. This is a definition of the term I do not 
share with Jameson and others. I argue essentially that pastiche is intrinsic to the spectacle aesthetic. 
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myths, narratives and textual forms, and this without a necessary recourse to theories of irony 
and nostalgia that has informed a great deal of writing on the topic. This is ultimately what 
Jameson fails to appreciate in his reductive assessment of postmodernity: that pastiche is not 
an aesthetic destruction but rather a profoundly new and vital creative impulse.  
 
3.10 Conceptualising the Hypermyth 
The performance of myth and text in a media savvy culture is divorced from traditional 
myths and their importance to the individual. I have suggested that myth is divorced from its 
first order, or denotative, message – a literally transposed idea drawn from a mythic structure. 
I have also argued that myth is divorced from what would be conventionally considered its 
second order, or connotative, message – a myth reworked into a contemporary context but 
maintaining the veracity of its original utterance, its indissoluble and unaltered ‘truth.’ In this 
way, myth is often considered a timeless part of the maturation process for the individual and 
culture – this orthodoxy is assumed to persist for contemporary cultural receptions of myths 
and texts. For example, consider Anne Lancashire’s reading of the Star Wars franchise in 
which “the overall message of the Star Wars trilogy – that life’s ordeals, and even death itself 
as fearful, can be overcome through human growth towards mature and compassionate love 
and self-sacrifice…is in part the message of some of the world’s most successful religions.”85 
While Lancashire’s reading of the narrative of the Star Wars franchise as a traditional 
mythic/religious structure is persuasive, the analysis does not take into account the 
performance aspect of the mythic structure, that is, the way in which it is reconfigured at the 
point of expression (on the cinematic screen) and reception (by the mass culture spectator in a 
movie theatre). Myth recuperated as spectacle initiates a third order, or discursive, message.86 
I designate this alteration the transition from myth to hypermyth, an ontological position in 
                                                
85 Anne Lancashire, “The Phantom Menace: Repetition, Variation, Integration.” Film Criticism 24, no. 3 
(2000), 24. 
86 Timothy Druckrey, “Fugitive Realities, Situated Realities, ‘Situational Realities,’ and or Future Cinema(s) 
Past.” In Future Cinema: The Cinematic Imaginary After Film, ed. Jeffrey Shaw and Peter Weibel (Cambridge, 
Mass: MIT Press, 2003), 60. Discussing the traditions of cinematic apparatus, Druckrey suggests “three 
‘regimes’ of ‘presence,’ ‘representation,’ and ‘simulation.’ This conforms roughly to the ‘regimes’ of 
signification I have discussed – denotative, connotative, discursive. Druckrey focuses on the image-apparatus of 
the cinema in which his argument has something in common with Deleuze’s distinction between the action 
image and the time image. For Druckrey, a contemporary immersive art is predicated on an aesthetic of 
simulation. 
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which “a viewer is no longer referred to a world outside the image” but a “crystalline 
representation [that] refers only to itself.”87 
 
3.11 Baudrillard and a Simulated Mythology 
 
Rather than disorientation, these strategies of rearticulation that reflect a hyper-
consciousness about the impact of images on social categorization are a process of 
fundamental reorientation conducted on and through that double referentiality.88 
 
An early scene in The Matrix depicts Thomas Anderson (Neo) awaking from sleep to a 
message on his computer screen: “Wake up Neo…The Matrix has you.” A knock sounds at 
the door and Anderson exchanges illicit software for money. He removes the software from a 
hollowed-out copy of Baudrillard’s Simulacra and Simulation. The copy appears to conform 
to Baudrillard’s book, displaying chapter 11, “On Nihilism.” The book is closed and returned 
to the shelf. Morpheus, when attempting to explain the Matrix to Neo, returns to a 
Baudrillardian model of the simulation of the ‘desert of the Real’; the simulation, once 
functional, destroys the oasis of the Real and installs a wasteland in its place.  
The relation of the copy of Simulacra and Simulation stored on a shelf in the Matrix 
to the one currently resting on a desk before me mirrors the relation between the Real and the 
simulation in the narrative of the film. What is the status of the ‘real’ object inside the 
simulacrum? And of greater interest is the ontological status of Baudrillard’s book when 
inserted into the Matrix. I distinguish here between a work and the Text, drawing again on 
Barthes. The infinitely discursive Text remains an abstract theoretical consideration that 
implicates the Matrix in its performance; indeed the polysemal Text knows no boundaries. 
But the work is sanctioned off, subject to ‘arbitrary closure’ and a reading/moulding of its 
contents into a semblance of form. What would a reading of a work (rather than Text) within 
the Matrix produce? 
 Baudrillard suggests that the Wachowski Brothers conflate simulacrum with illusion 
in the narrative structure of The Matrix and The Matrix Reloaded.89 According to Baudrillard, 
                                                
87 Barbara Filser, “Gilles Deleuze and a Future Cinema: Cinema 1, Cinema 2 – and Cinema 3?” In Future 
Cinema: The Cinematic Imaginary After Film, ed. Jeffrey Shaw and Peter Weibel (Cambridge, Mass: MIT 
Press, 2003), 214. Filser draws on Deleuze here in a conceptual of the fragmentation of the ‘action-image’: 
“Description stops presupposing a reality and narration stops referring to a form of the true at one and the same 
time” (Deleuze, Cinema 2, 135). 
88 Collins, 255. Original emphasis. 
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Neo represents the prisoner in shackles in the Allegory of the Cave, who comes to 
enlightenment and a discovery of the essential Truth above and beyond the perversion of the 
simulation. This is ultimately the meta-narrative of the franchise: that the One is destined to 
discover the inherent artifice of the simulation, rendering it obsolete and the Real eminently 
visible. The Wachowski Brothers thus bear recourse to a Platonic philosophical paradigm in 
which the Real and its simulation are distinct and dialectically opposed.  
Conversely, Baudrillard says, his theory of the simulation (as opposed to illusion) is a 
performance of a once indissoluble truth that simultaneously erases that truth through its 
performative aspect. Accepting the performance reveals the absence of the Real; there 
remains only the apparition, the phantasm. Whereas in The Matrix the Real and the 
simulation are contiguous and dialectically opposed, the inception of the simulacrum in 
Baudrillard’s conception severs the connection with the Real and destroys memory (history 
and time) and geography (space). The crucial distinction lies in the resultant precession of the 
simulacra: the simulation of the Real erases the Real and installs the simulation as the only 
point of origin. In this reading of The Matrix, Baudrillard seems to concur with Bartlett and 
Byers’s claim that The Matrix is “Pomophobic,” or avoidant of postmodern tenets, attaining 
only a neo-conservative dichotomy that esteems transcendental truth over a system of 
authoritarian-controlled lies.90 Radical postmodern polemic, in Baudrillard’s estimation, is 
merely a façade in the film for a run-of-the-mill blockbuster action film. 
 I disagree with Baudrillard’s reading of The Matrix. I will argue this point only to 
suggest that the status of the object in the simulation is irretrievably simulated. This is a 
crucial point because the effacement of the dialectic between Real and simulation is 
necessary for the performance of the hypermyth. The Wachowski Brothers are aware of 
Baudrillard’s reputation as a radical post-structuralist. Norris describes Baudrillard as a “cult 
figure on the current ‘postmodernist’ scene,”91 whose ideas are “picked up from the latest 
fashionable sources.” “And so it has come about that a thinker like Baudrillard can proffer his 
ridiculous ‘theses’ on the Gulf War with every confidence that they will gain wide attention 
among watchers of the postmodern cultural scene.”92 In the context of the film, we are not 
                                                                                                                                                  
89 Lancelin. 
90 Bartlett and Byers, 30.  
91 Christopher Norris, Uncritical Theory: Postmodernism, Intellectuals and the Gulf War (London: Lawrence 
and Wishart, 1992), 11. 
92 Norris, 31. 
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dealing with a matrix, but the Matrix. The copy of Simulacra and Simulation that appears 
briefly in the film constitutes a manual for reading the Matrix. But, crucially, its status as 
already simulacral strips the work of its political and ideological agency, as well as its 
descriptive power. Appearing inside the simulation effaces its status as Real object. 
Suggesting that the Matrix is ultimately subservient to the Real in the first two films, 
Baudrillard fails to appreciate the simulation as a postmodern condition rather than a textual 
‘reality.’ The simulation contaminates the Real, compromising its integrity, eradicating its 
authenticity, decanting a once indissoluble Real into a stratum of residual mythic and textual 
images. The appearance of Simulacra and Simulation in the Matrix of the film affirms 
ultimately that the Real (including subversive theories of the simulation postulated by 
Baudrillard in his book) is always already simulated. The manual that the spectator/theorist 
draws on to “lay bare” the reality of the simulation is itself trapped within the simulation. The 
work is thus hollow, bereft of content. The conclusion to The Matrix Revolutions is less an 
ending than a reversion to the start, a cycle in which the narrative and mythic structure is 
eternally returned.  
Accepting the contamination of the Real by the simulation does not however equate 
with a rejection of the Real. This is a crucial point on which Baudrillard and I disagree. The 
notion that the simulation literally precedes the Real borders on the nonsensical. Baudrillard 
suggests that the subject “require[s] a visible past, a visible continuum, a visible myth of 
origin, which reassures us about our end. Because finally we have never believed in them.”93 
But wouldn’t the opposite be the case? That we require a visible past to affirm the reality of 
our belief over and above its simulation? I find it difficult to make sense of myself without a 
visible past (which I acknowledge is subject to its simulated form, but yet maintains a 
striking resemblance (and relation) to the Real). Baudrillard acknowledges this resemblance – 
“Everywhere we live in a universe strangely similar to the original – things are doubled by 
their own scenario”94 – but seems to view the simulation as inherently sinister and a 
deterioration of the ideal Real. He does not explore the possibilities of self in the simulation 
as much as revel in the decadence of the destroyed Real. 
For Baudrillard, the ‘awareness’ of the precession of the simulacra is commensurate 
with the effacement of the subject as theorist and spectator. This is clearly premature. The 
                                                
93 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, 10.  
94 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, 11.  
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Matrix, after all, functions according to “rules that are no different from the rules of a 
computer system. Some of them can be bent. Others can be broken.” I have argued that 
popular culture offers a site of engagement with its mythic and textual legacies. This 
engagement, to my mind, requires at least the semblance of subjectivity, and such a 
semblance precludes the precession of the simulacra. The nature of the work within the 
simulation presents a point of mediation between the simulacral precession and the Platonic 
ascent to truth. I have designated this a realm of the hypermyth, in which myths are 
transposed from their origin into a simulated form. The relation of myth to hypermyth 
corresponds to Baudrillard’s abstract relation between the Real and the hyperreal, in which 
the simulation is more than the Real. ‘Hyper’ connotes an increase or energising of the object 
exhausted of its potential as concrete referential. The Real in Baudrillard’s conception is a 
tired form, stripped of its capacity to describe a contemporary culture founded on its erasure. 
The subject no longer engages with the Real object, but its simulated reflection. I wish to 
employ Baudrillard’s theory of the precession of the simulacra as a defence of the spectacle 
in popular cinema. The attachment of ‘hyper’ to ‘real’ in the simulacrum implies a 
transformation of the Real. But what precisely is Baudrillard suggesting has become of the 
Real once the simulation has taken hold and become the dominant aesthetic? 
The hypermyth reflects a cultural and subjective discursivity, a capacity to engage 
with what Barthes calls the infinitude of Text while permitting the arbitrary closure Hall 
demands of contemporary cultural and aesthetic practices. If the Real is contaminated into 
obsolescence, Baudrillard’s theory of the simulacrum comprises merely another abstract 
reflection on the lost authenticity of the Real; it is merely another form of nostalgia disguised 
as radical nihilism. Ultimately it is the latest incursion into the dominance of the popular (that 
is perceived as a deterioration of aesthetic value) as well as a plea for the usefulness of the 
theorist after the collapse of critical distance. This mode of nostalgia is thus equally a strategy 
of self-preservation. Castigating the contemporary for its aesthetic fall from grace affirms 
tradition and forms commensurate with an earlier age. Vanquishing the Real enacts the 
coming into being of the sinister simulation, the omnipresence of a Disneyland space and 
time of images. 
Rejecting the contamination of the Real altogether is an act of denial in the face of 
evidence of the pervasiveness of the mediated image. Real connotes the uninterrupted means 
and ends of contemplation, a transposition of the message without mediation by the carrier. 
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This is clearly not the way meaning is disseminated in the cultural sphere, which would be 
acknowledged by even the most tenaciously political theorist. Culture is a mediated field. 
Mediation is fraught with epistemological and ethical problems illuminated by Marshall 
McCluhan in the 1960s and tacitly accepted ever since.95 Post-structuralism offered a 
paradigm in which to explode the act of mediation in such a way that it constituted the 
centrality of textual theory. Thus, post-structuralism privileges form over content, which is to 
say, content as form. This is surely only a single step to Baudrillard’s precession of the 
simulacra. Norris, one of the sternest critics of Baudrillard’s radical epistemology, concedes 
that the Gulf War 
 
[was] indeed in some sense a ‘postmodern’ war, an exercise in mass-manipulative rhetoric 
and ‘hyperreal’ suasive techniques, which does undoubtedly confirm some of Baudrillard’s 
more canny diagnostic observations. How else could one explain the extraordinary inverse 
relationship between extent of coverage and level of informed public grasp.96 
 
 
The contemporary cultural theorist does not so much set her sights on the radiance of truth 
and beauty as merely the most perfect semblance of it. Classical Platonic forms are less than 
fashionable in cultural studies. For Lyotard, this analytical strategy has profound limitations:  
 
The fact is that the Platonic discourse that inaugurates science is not scientific, precisely to 
the extent that it attempts to legitimate science. Scientific knowledge cannot know and 
make known that it is the true knowledge without resorting to the other, narrative, kind of 
knowledge, which from its point of view is no knowledge at all.97 
 
There is no recourse to a knowledge that does not compromise its own status as scientific. 
Baudrillard’s simulation bears much the same resemblance to the imaginary Real. Yet, if as 
for Norris the mediation of images does not prevent the capacity for “argued critical 
resistance,”98 equally, the awareness and acceptance of the simulation as a dominant aesthetic 
form does not render the Real unintelligible. Rather it incorporates the reflection of the Real 
into the simulacral image, the vestige of reality into the hyperreal representation. 
                                                
95 For a now classic formulation, see Marshall McLuhan, The Medium is the Massage (New York: Bantam 
Books, 1967), 26: “All media work us over completely. They are so pervasive in their personal, political, 
economic, aesthetic, psychological, moral, ethical, and social consequences that they leave no part of us, 
untouched, unaffected, unaltered.” 
96 Norris, 25. 
97 Lyotard, 29. 
98 Norris, 27. 
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Hypermythology connotes a reorganisation of the original mythic utterance, and a 
transformation in the ontological status of myth such that the Real is merely a template for 
the ‘residual mythic image’99 performed within the simulation. The hypermythologising of 
myth is necessary to function affectively as a discursive aesthetic in which myth is merely 
textual quotation. Without recourse to an abiding Truth or reality, the spectator must find 
aesthetic worth in the recuperation of myth into new forms.  
What coheres ultimately in the internal logic of The Matrix franchise is a panorama of 
residual mythic images. The tools required to decode these images (a component of which is 
Eco’s encyclopaedia of film references) are a part of contemporary postmodern consumption 
practices as much as traditional textual interpretation. The spectator/theorist is aware of the 
parameters of the construct/simulation in which the text is played. There is thus a necessary 
ambivalence in aesthetically responding to the simulated myth as artificial. A hope lingers to 
partake of the original, the true One whose replication is that which Plato considered a 
‘familiar,’ merely the paltry reflection of an ideal and radiant form. It is this ambivalence that 
forms the emotional core of the discursive subjectivity. The hypermyth, divorced from an 
originary mythic truth, enables the simultaneous performance of separate and contradictory 
mythic structures that resonate for a subjectivity immersed in the simulation. 
 
3.12 Screening the Hypermyth  
Hypermythology finds expression as performance. It is the performative aspect that revises 
the prior mythic form (a mythic Real) into a simulated textual utterance. To demonstrate this 
performance, consider the following textual itinerary of the grand finale of The Matrix 
franchise. 
 
The romantic hero (Keanu Reeves is a useful combination of tough guy and effete male) 
departs from his destined Love in an excruciating and wonderfully sentimental exchange, 
demonstrating what Jewett and Lawrence call the “sexual segmentation” of the monomythic 
hero.100 This segmentation is necessary to establish the plight of the One as heroic-
individualist. Physically blinded, he confronts a heavenly simulacrum, a realm of “white on 
                                                
99 Morpheus describes the image of the self in the Matrix as “residual self image.” The simulated self is literally 
a residual component of the self that originates in the Real. 
100 Jewett and Lawrence, 59. 
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white,”101 or in this case, light on light. Heaven is a construct, a mechanically functioning 
simulation. The artifice is maintained in the quasi-God figured Deux Ex Machina, a construct 
of component sentinel parts. 
 Upon jacking into the Matrix, the hero dons the cinematic ethos of the anti-hero in a 
second re-presentation of a Sergio Leone Western showdown (the first takes place in a 
subway station in The Matrix). The Wachowski Brothers tip their hats to Leone’s films, 
acknowledging their presence on screen and their revised performance within the Matrix. 
Neo’s flowing coat is as suitably a religious cassock as the dust jacket of the Cheyenne 
romantic bandit in Once Upon a Time in the West.  
 The anti-hero is further inscribed by the mirror-shades. The Wachowski Brothers use 
the motif of images reflected in mirrorshades several times in the franchise. The reflection 
draws attention to the image as refracted in a cyberpunk trope; the spectator perceives the 
image in the simulated Matrix through a lens. The camera that rests on Neo’s black boots 
(that are configured elsewhere in the series as sexual fetish) and ascends his body recalls 
Cameron’s The Terminator, a film that looms gargantuan over this franchise. The opening 
shot of the confrontation between Smith and Neo replicates the entrance of Schwarzenegger 
in The Terminator and is the crucial indication that the spectator is watching a performance 
of a prior cinematic piece. 
 Performance as an aesthetic value permeates this sequence. Indeed, Reeves as actor 
steps aside to admit Neo as actor. The sentimentalism of the contemporary leading man 
(“Trin, you can’t die!) is refigured into stoic, transcendental heroism. “It ends tonight” 
functions as a depthless (to be sure, hollow, as in Baudrillard’s bible of the simulacrum, and 
infinitely regressing, as in Barthes’s inexhaustibility of the Text) reverberation of every line 
prefiguring a confrontation. The archetypal Good versus Evil confrontation is reconfigured as 
a stylised homage to Hong Kong kung fu cinema of the 1970s. The spectator recalls Neo’s 
impersonation of Bruce Lee in a sparring duel with Morpheus in a simulated dojo. The 
silhouetted shot of the fighters in an abandoned warehouse (that seems miraculously to 
appear within the simulation) is a familiar trope of classic Hong Kong cinema and, 
incidentally, is used to astonishing effect in Tarantino’s Kill Bill, Volume 1. 
 Three other cinematic references are significant and operate to construct a discursive, 
performative frame of reference. The mid-air tussle between Neo and Smith is reminiscent of 
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the climactic duel between Superman and General Zod in Superman II; the Christ figure 
partakes of the Marvel Comics heroic tradition. The second, and more obvious homage is the 
circular energy field that explodes from the confrontation between Neo and Smith, replicating 
the shot of a nuclear explosion in Akira that leads to the formation of the futuristic dystopia 
of Neo-Tokyo. More distantly, the general visual style recalls Dragonball Z, a cult animé 
series popular both in Japan and the U.S.  
 
This reading of a sequence in The Matrix Revolutions offers a conception of the franchise as 
a cinematic simulacrum – a discursively performed metacinema – that inscribes Neo 
simultaneously as the apotheosis of the monomythic figure and its redundancy. The arisen 
Christ is equally a superhero inhabiting a textual realm drawn from classical mythology, 
comics, animation and popular cinema. The franchise functions as mythology in flux, 
simultaneously locating and then displacing textual utterances. As spectacle, the franchise 
consumes its textual precursors, gorging on a sacred past, so to speak, but without the 
disparaging and debilitating recourse to Jameson’s cinematic pastiche. Instead, the 
redundancy of the monomyth takes place at an acceptance of the text as discursive and 
constructed – a simulacrum functioning onscreen and off. 
 
3.13 The Discursivity of the One 
 
                                               Morpheus 
Residual Self Image: it is the mental projection of your digital self.102 
 
                                               Neo 
I believe that the Matrix can remain our cage or it can become our chrysalis, that’s what 
you helped me to understand. That to be free, truly free, you cannot change your cage. You 
have to change yourself.103 
 
 
The Matrix as chrysalis suggests a space of transformation of the consciousness that has 
profound implications for the conception of the Matrix in the franchise. Rather than 
Baudrillard’s sinister simulacrum, the Matrix presents a possibility for the subject to evolve 
beyond the parameters of the Real: authenticity, truth, right, purpose. Remarkably, this 
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103 Wachowski and Wachowski, 393. 
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passage in the shooting script was omitted because preview audiences did not know the 
meaning of the word ‘chrysalis.’ Instead, Neo informs the machines that humanity wishes to 
reclaim its freedom outside of the Matrix. At least this is the implication with the omission of 
‘chrysalis’: “where we go from here is up to you.” The inclusion of chrysalis in the passage 
implies that freedom is ultimately attainable only in relation to the Matrix, that is, after 
understanding the contours of the simulation in relation to the Real. This notion is borne out 
in The Matrix Reloaded and The Matrix Revolutions. Neo is a cyborg, a machine/human 
synthesis issued from the ‘Source,’ an original mythical point that draws equally on 
Christian, Buddhist, Agnostic, Manichean, technological, cyberpunk, pop culture narrative 
structures. However, cyborg in The Matrix franchise implies more than a machine/human 
combination that allowed Arnold Schwarzenegger to resist bullets and yet express a human 
emotion through tears in Terminator 2: Judgement Day. The cyborg in The Matrix universe is 
a conduit between the Real and the simulation, a native to each imaginary plane. The Matrix 
shows Neo’s gradual control over the rules of the Matrix; The Matrix Reloaded extends this 
control to include a control over the Real. At the conclusion to The Matrix Revolutions, 
Morpheus’s rhetorical final question, “Is it real?”, uttered while gazing upward at a heavenly 
glow, subverts the project to recuperate the Real through the destruction of the Matrix. The 
question resonates as a repetition of Schwarzenegger’s final line in Verhoeven’s Total Recall. 
Standing beneath a Mars sunrise that recalls an image from a Hollywood Technicolour 
production, he murmurs, “What if I’m dreaming?”, to which his love replies, “Then kiss me 
before I wake up.” The Sleeping Beauty/Prince tale is reworked here to dazzling effect. 
Morpheus’s recuperation of the sequence in Total Recall is thus an incursion into the internal 
logic of The Matrix narrative. The textual fabric that touches The Matrix franchise and Total 
Recall draws also on the classic metaphysical conundrums of Philip K. Dick, upon whose We 
Can Remember It For You Wholesale104 Total Recall was loosely based. Dick’s open-ended, 
often self-effacing metaphysics105 pervade the textual play of The Matrix franchise. 
 Morpheus’s suggestion that an awareness of the Matrix (or the ability to recognise its 
parameters) allows a heightened appreciation of the nature of the Real is thus misguided. 
Rather, the ‘residual self image’ of the One, initiated within the Matrix, offers a “consensual 
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hallucination,” to quote William Gibson in a very similar context.106 The subjective 
consciousness evolves, immersed within the simulation, partaking of the Real as residual 
mythic image in which Real self and simulated Other are conjoined in a symbiotic 
relationship. Neo, simultaneously of the Real and the post-historical, a functioning 
recuperation of the original mythic form as simulated spectacle, is a ‘child of the Real.’ He is 
“irrevocably human,” to quote the Architect in The Matrix Reloaded, but equally the progeny 
of the virtual.  
 Motifs of fractured identity (machine/human, male/female, real/virtual) appear 
throughout the franchise. In the scene in The Matrix in which Neo and Trinity enter a 
government building to rescue Morpheus, the two forms are androgynous reflections, almost 
identical in clothing, make-up and movement. Reeves and Moss look uncannily alike. In her 
reading of the first film, Martina Lipp does not appreciate the significance of the 
androgynous sexuality of the One, preferring instead a masculinization of the ‘female 
hero.’107 The neo-fascist motif of leather boots functions as a symbol of deviant sexuality, 
sado-masochism and neo-gothic grunge culture. After the destruction of the building in 
perhaps the franchise’s most impressive visual sequence, the camera offers a close-up of 
Trinity’s leather boots (emphasised with a squeak on the floor tile), installing the simulated 
Trinity as masculinized hero, feminine sidekick, and cultural deviant. 
 The image in the machine city of a flesh-like organic tube attached to a 
mechanical/organic womb is an explicit quotation of the confrontation between Ripley 
(Sigourney Weaver) and the Queen alien in Cameron’s Aliens. In Alien: Resurrection, Ripley 
is reborn as an alien-human hybrid, which resembles Neo’s symbiotic form of human and 
machine, real and virtual, at the conclusion of The Matrix Revolutions. In terms of the 
franchise’s convoluted metaphysical position, agency is equally a matter of free will 
originating in the Real and mechanical determinism that functions as the metaphysical core of 
the machines. The synthesis of Real and simulation compromises the integrity of both 
systems of metaphysics. The Oracle’s “you cannot see beyond the choices you don’t 
understand” is superficially impressive but less than philosophically conclusive. 
 The most obvious intrusion of the simulated form into the Real occurs in the 
affectivity of the One. The Matrix is a perversion of the Real, a trance-like hallucinogenic 
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state in which sensuality is divorced from the physical body. The spectacle offers the 
transformation of the banality of the Real into the hyperkinetic visuality of the simulation. 
Residual self image is the only image-form of the One. The Matrix offers the uninhibited 
expression of the repressed self (or a self imprisoned within the cave of the Real, yet 
perceiving the possibilities of a simulated ‘self-image’). The capacity for transformation is 
infinite, subject only to the parameters of the imagination that reflects on the limited form of 
the Real. In peril on a rooftop, with escape only possible in a military helicopter, Neo asks of 
Trinity: “Can you fly that thing?” She replies, “Not yet.” The ability to fly the helicopter is 
literally realised through a download into the imaginary, and infinitely discursive, 
consciousness. A number of theorists have commented on the disparity between the subtext 
of the franchise as anti-technological while revelling in the possibility of technology to make 
the self ‘more than real.’ I will not labour the point except to say that the hypermythological 
(which connotes also the simultaneous awareness and appreciation of contradictory mythic 
utterances) functions as an aestheticisation of the Real, which is to say, a license for rejecting 
technology while revelling in technical innovation on film. Lucas did something very similar 
with the Star Wars franchise. 
 The transformation of Thomas Anderson into the One constitutes the initiation of the 
analogue self – the corporeal, tactile body of the Real – into the digital coding of the 
simulated Matrix. The Matrix Revolutions offers a death in the simulacrum as the original 
offered a birth. The One is resurrected within the Matrix – the virtual consciousness awakes 
to the kiss of life while the inert, inactive body remains asleep. The quasi-religious 
enlightenment is not to “read through” the Matrix, as Trost suggests,108 but to read and write 
it. The evolution in the consciousness of the One (the Matrix as chrysalis) is not the 
extrication of the subject from the simulation but the immersion in the residual mythic 
recuperation of the original utterance. When the One exits the phone booth, reborn in the 
simulation, he ascends into a simulated heaven with simulated mythical wings (or equally, a 
simulated mythical cape). He wears simulated mirror shades. Immersed in the simulated 
spectacle, the One reads, writes and consumes the code that constructs its discursivity. The 
critical transformation occurs at the point of resurrection in which the One no longer sees the 
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Platonic object, but the digital code – streams of data as semblance of form – that constructs 
it. 
 The image of Neo as a re-presentation of Christ on the cross (at which point the Deux 
ex Machina utters, “It is done”109) performs an absence rather than a presence of the Christian 
mythic structure. Neo is Christlike, but he is not Christ. He is not an avatar, descended (or 
arisen) into a fallen world to save humanity from its sins. It only appears this way from a 
monomythic perspective. The dominant aesthetic of spectacle cinema is image-consumption 
in which original mythic utterances are reorganised as commodities in a simulacrum. The 
residually Real functions as a commodity, alterable, in flux, re-readable, rewriteable. The 
spectator, divorced from the sacred origin, consumes and simultaneously aestheticises the 
commodity as replacement. The potentiality of the cinematic spectacle offers the discursive 
text as fractured reflection of the Real, aware of its constructedness, its component parts, its 
inherent artifice, its inauthenticity. Rather than seeking a newly arisen Christ, it seeks a new 
Christ image, subject to an eternal return, but also an eternal transformation (consider also 
that Neo is the sixth One, a return of the previous five but equally a transformation of the 
prior form). The newness of the One, the essential ‘Neo,’ is an incarnation of an original 
mythic form that has been recuperated into obsolescence. Neo is only Christ insofar as he 
coheres in a simulated Matrix “with a set of quotation marks that hover above [him] like an 
ironic halo.”110 
 The play of myth and text in the simulacrum is not Jameson’s pastiche. This kind of 
pastiche functions not merely as recuperation, but as a strategy of deterioration – its 
performance results in a lessening of the original utterance, or a loss of an essential meaning. 
In this postmodern aesthetic, Plato is always less than Plato when re-presented. But equally, 
the hypermyth is not necessarily a consequence of what Hutcheon has called the irony of 
postmodern textual strategies.111 Rather it is a consumption of the modalities of the Real; the 
Real is not effaced, but merely perpetually transformed. This consumption does not require 
the spectator/theorist’s awareness of its status as reproduction. In fact, I would argue that 
very little so-called postmodern cinematic reception is founded on irony. I disagree that irony 
is a useful strategy for cultural resistance to a hegemonic social structure. Such strategies 
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need development and mobilisation, and irony, as Hutcheon acknowledges, is profoundly 
subjective.112 Rather, the performance of the hypermyth presents the Real for consumption: a 
history that is rewritten, remythologised, and commodified as the One sees fit. 
 
3.14 The Visibility of Style: Image Strategies in Contemporary Cinema 
 
Digital Code…has radically altered the epistemology and ontology of the moving image.113 
 
What remains of Breathless today, what speaks to a contemporary, young audience – when 
jump cuts figure in every second TV commercial?114 
 
Deleuze locates the great transformation of modern cinema after the Second World War, at 
which point the action-image was exhausted of its capacity to provide a meaningful aesthetic 
in cinema. The image loses its credibility as an ‘account’ of movement and time after 
suffering a brief crisis “defined by a number of characteristics: the form of the trip/ballad, the 
multiplication of clichés, the events that hardly concern those they happen to, in short the 
slackening of the sensory-motor connections.” These conditions “made possible, but did not 
constitute, the new image.”115 According to Deleuze, after the war, films increasingly 
demonstrate a conformity to the time-image, a condition in which cinema is a “purely optical 
and sound situation.”116 Filser concludes that the time-image constitutes a cinematic language 
in which “the real and the imaginary, which in organic narration are discrete, opposed, are 
occluded. Real and virtual become indistinguishable.”117 The future of the time-image, and 
thus the ontology of a future cinema, in Filser’s estimation, would equate with an “audio-
visual image in its most complex form, permanently interrogating information as to its source 
and its addressee. Perhaps this future cinema à la Deleuze may be defined as follows: that 
which forces information to think and us to think information.”118  
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 An interesting body of work has found a foothold in film theory over the last decade. 
This work is neither traditional literary/cultural theory, nor contemporary film theory but a 
synthesis of ‘apparatus’ theory119 (in which the significance of the medium is emphasised as 
a site of meaning) and visual arts theory (specifically, contemporary design and an aesthetics 
of new media).120 While there are obviously dissimilarities within the body of work (the 
notion of a synthesis is a generalisation, but a useful one), these authors attempt to theorise an 
alteration in the ontology of the visual image, as Deleuze did in his books on cinema. This 
new ontology permits an approach to cinema vastly removed from the instrumentalist theory 
of culture, which I have argued is founded on a traditional realist aesthetic. It permits also an 
exploration of the aesthetic mode, or cinematic stylistics, that suffers in traditional film 
theory. Simply put, it offers a conceptual framework within which the spectator/theorist may 
ask: what are the implications of a visual/aural stylistics of cinema? 
 In this chapter, I have discussed various departures from traditional cinematic 
practices in terms of intertextual quotation and the recuperation of myth. The following 
section is an account of the stylistic innovations of contemporary cinema, focusing on ‘bullet-
time’ in The Matrix franchise, and various image-strategies that are increasingly apparent in 
mainstream cinema. I contrast my own version of the spectacle of contemporary cinema with 
theories of new media and art, and its conceptual of the immersion of the spectator in the 
image in avant garde digital art. 
 In the 1940s, the Hollywood studio film conveyed to the spectator a seamless reality 
that functioned self-evidently on relations of cause and effect in the pursuit of historical truth 
(the quest for a narrative truth offered a cinematic substitute). Thus, a remarkable number of 
studio films depict protagonists who attempt to solve a mystery using a prescribed set of 
clues that amount to a comprehensive back-story, the plot (what was actually depicted) and 
probable future developments (the causal consequences). Narrative closure was presumed (in 
spite of increasingly convoluted storylines) and rarely challenged. The spectator was 
subjected to a ‘realist’ performance of the image conveyed in a seamless reproduction of 
what she took to be a reality shared by herself and other spectators. This subjection was 
accomplished through the invisibility of style (visual and aural components synthesized in a 
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way that deflected the gaze from the inherent constructedness of the image) and the emphasis 
on narrative and plot development. The image functioned as a conduit to narrative solution, 
and was thus merely a means to an end. In this sense, realism and genre (invisible stylistics 
and familiar narrative patterns) were fundamentally attached, forming a dominant cinematic 
aesthetic. This aesthetic has prevailed ever since, albeit it in a somewhat altered form.121 
 A second feature to which Bordwell alludes122 and on which Ray significantly 
expands123 is a hermetically sealed frame of representation. In the studio film, action depicted 
was required to cohere within the sacrosanct boundaries of the film narrative. Formal 
cinematic technique was predetermined by the story, of which narrative was merely a 
necessary and unobtrusive function. Cinematic narrative was an enclosed, insular plane that 
functioned without intrusion of an extraneous agency, whether creative or administrative. The 
studio film narrative presented the story according to the dictates of a ‘real world’ that was 
presumed by the spectator to inform the cinematic world holistically. Indeed, directors such 
as Frank Capra and John Ford were esteemed in American film culture because of a fidelity 
to the Real. Ford’s long shots of Monument Valley in The Searchers are an elegy for that 
which makes the American frontier what it is in the collective (and reflective) imagination. 
Paradoxically, the hermetically sealed world of the studio narrative ensured the lasting 
influence of realism in American mainstream cinema. 
 The ‘new’ cinematic image, divested of the burden of the Real, draws attention to 
itself as a component of a manufactured media. But it also declares its rejection of the once 
glorified ontological status of the image as reproduced reality (Bazin). Codognet offers the 
following assessment of the status of the new image:  
 
An important characteristic of virtual environments is the possibility for the spectator to 
interactively move within such spaces and perceive the virtual world as through a 
subjective camera… But with virtual worlds we are moving away from the metaphor of the 
map to that of the path, from the third-person point of view (God’s eye”) to the first-person 
point of view…We are thus leaving, in the virtual experience and exploration of an 
unknown artificial world, the Cartesian paradigm of the Euclidean, homogenous and 
objective space in which points could be described in an allocentric manner by triple (x, y, 
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z) co-ordinates for a new paradigm of a more constructive, egocentric, and indeed 
subjective space.124 
 
He shares the fascination of theorists of new media and art with the possibility of the 
spectator to engage with the image, to wrestle it to a unique and wholly subjective form. In 
Deleuzian terms, the spectator is able to unburden herself of the itinerary of the action-image 
and explore the convolutions of spatial and temporal (and thus virtual) time-images. This is 
perhaps what Courchesne has in mind in his conception of a reformed cinema and the 
‘immersion’ of the spectator: “Cinema and television are good storytelling devices, but will 
always fall short of providing a believable interactive experience. In my opinion, cinema 
couldn’t become immersive without a deep transformation of its content’s structure and 
development, and if it did it would have to be called something else.”125 In this model, to 
embrace the possibilities of a new media that reorganises the relationship between the screen 
and the spectator, cinema would need to be reconstituted entirely. 
 But perhaps an ontological transformation of the image on this scale is not entirely 
necessary. To what extent has Deleuze’s time-image, or the ontology of the image in various 
interactive media, intruded into mainstream or art cinema? While it is clear that the 
mainstream film image partakes of elements of the time-image, the limitation of theories of 
new media lies precisely in its specificity as a medium and its relative obscurity to popular 
culture. While I would agree that mainstream cinema offers the spectator a site of 
engagement with the product (the cinematic text), immersion in interactive art forms presents 
something else entirely. Courchesne suggests that the immersion aesthetic of installation art 
has intruded on some mainstream cinematic practices that extends to the origins of cinema: 
“This [immersion] is exemplified…by Abel Gance’s multiple-screen feature film, Napoléon 
in 1926, or by Waller’s Cinerama in the 1950s and today’s IMAX and OMNIMAX 
technologies.”126 The notion of IMAX as immersion is particularly interesting insofar as it 
has gradually expanded from the purely visual and documented (Discovery Channel 
documentaries) to the narrative (the recent Polar Express is a good example). But even so, 
the narrative structure of mainstream cinema and its emphasis on “telling stories” is a 
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limitation on the visual image as a site of spectator immersion. IMAX is not a regular 
screening forum for a Hollywood blockbuster, and in any case its technology and capacity for 
immersion would not be commensurate with the narrative (and specifically genre) form. 
Mainstream cinema requires a viewing perspective from which the spectator can address the 
image holistically. The image is addressed as a single entity rather than a splicing together of 
separate and distinct visual components. In the immersion of the spectator in the interactive 
work, “immersion is cognitive before being perceptive. The ‘reality’ of immersive work is 
distinctly invented and recreated by the viewer – and not just perceived and undergone.”127 
However, seated anonymously in the darkened movie theatre, the spectator inheres in an 
imaginary centrality in relation to the image. Regardless of her location in the room, the 
spectator assumes a position shared by every other spectator. Equally, the spectator locates 
herself in a viewing relation to the image that is guided by the shot and spatial co-ordinates of 
the image: point of view, overhead, low angle, long, medium, close-up, zoom, etc. The 
spatial dimension of the shot steers the spectator’s gaze in a particular direction. This is often 
accomplished through a shift in focus – an image that moves out of focus recedes from the 
spectator’s gaze.  
 Spectator immersion or viewer interactivity in Courchesne’s model connotes a fluid 
relation between spectator and image, a multiplicity of viewing points and ‘screens’ upon 
which the image is presented, and an open-ended text that is located only in relation to the 
organising subjective gaze (the traditional cinematic gaze is reconfigured as viewing 
presence). The ‘real’ of the spectator’s presence is literally immersed (and dissolved) within 
the total virtuality of the representation. For the immersion to be complete, narrative must 
submit to the free play of visual and aural freely associated stimuli. As Courchesne suggests, 
“it is not appropriate to speak of narrativity in relation to the construction and experience of 
an interactive work. The way I see it, the only narrative, if it materialises, will originate from 
the visitor after she or he experiences the work and not from the work itself, which is 
constructed as a context for experience.”128 This establishes a functioning continuum between 
artwork and spectator that moves towards Filser’s reading of Deleuze’s time-image “which 
forces information to think and us to think information.”129  
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 The implications of such an art and media are difficult to conceptualise. I would 
suggest that the reorganisation of the relation between spectator and artwork founded upon a 
destruction of the narrative form130 is incompatible with current mainstream cinematic 
practices. While Courchesne mentions this incompatibility in passing, for me it is crucial, and 
indeed, central to the debate. Popular culture is engaged in the construction and 
deconstruction of its sacred narratives, which I have attempted to show through a reading of 
The Matrix franchise. But immersion in Courchesne’s model is surely relegated to a fringe 
cultural aesthetic, practiced by the few trained in its traditions (that are in any case distinctly 
avant-garde and incompatible with the mainstream aesthetic). I cannot perceive this form of 
immersion at work in contemporary cinema. While Courchesne is optimistic about the impact 
of the immersion aesthetic in popular culture, I cannot fathom how such a transformation in 
the aesthetic sensibility of the mainstream would be achieved. Courchesne suggests that 
“media artists who are currently doing installation work are in the forefront of those 
inventing a medium, a medium whose impact in the future will be comparable to that of 
cinema in the not so distant past.”131 However, my conception of the spectacle aesthetic is 
vastly removed from the immersion of interactive art. I conceive of the spectacle as a 
simulation of narrative forms (hypermythology), Courchesne privileges the non-narrative art 
work and the Barthesian textual explorer that moulds the text to form and is simultaneously 
moulded by it. In this model, I can only perceive endlessly proliferating images and 
subjectivities in flux, which is of course precisely the philosophical trajectory of immersion 
art and theory. 
 The site of interaction between spectator and the mainstream cinematic image has not 
substantially changed since the rise of the studio film and the dominance of cinema as a 
social activity. The visit to the movie theatre is a form of social ritual and a site of cultural 
interaction and consumption. Spectators do not visit film galleries in the way art enthusiasts 
visit art galleries. Spectators visit consumer spaces that house multiplexes and retail stores 
that form a chain in the production-consumption process. Inside these malls, the spectator 
finds easy access to the fast food industry via a ‘food court.’ Fast food complements the 
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saturation screening of the latest blockbuster, particularly if the spectator purchases the tie-in 
drinking cup at the McDonald’s counter. The cinema is a narrative site of social interaction in 
which the social ritual is a form of storytelling that interacts with the film. An aesthetic 
response to the film product is synthetically conjoined to the ritualised practices of the visit to 
the theatre, lining up at the box office, buying popcorn and coke, viewing the advertisements 
(that are as stylistically innovative as the feature film), viewing the previews, purchasing tie-
in memorabilia. The immersion in the spectacle is an immersion in a series of ritualised 
consumptive practices. For the spectator of mainstream cinema, immersion represents an 
engagement with (rather than a departure from) a narrative text that extends from screen to an 
external reality. Mainstream cinematic practice “offers only an ‘interior,’ a pervasive meta-
cinema (or a cinematic society in which the screen intrudes on an external reality) that has 
drawn the exterior ‘reality’ into itself at its point of inception.”132  
  
3.15 24: Real-Time Narrative 
24 is perhaps the most stylistically innovative series to appear on mainstream network 
television for some time. The narrative of each series depicts the actions of a number of 
characters over the space of twenty-four hours. The twenty-four part series screens in one 
hour episodes. This serialisation of the narrative requires each episode to end in a ‘cliff-
hanger,’ a moment of great drama leaving the viewer to anticipate the events of the following 
week’s episode. The structure of the series foregrounds the passage of time. A digital display 
appears intermittently on screen to remind the viewer of the time that has passed and to 
indicate the narrative relations between the characters at any point in the story. 
Advertisements are inscribed into the real-time narrative. Thus, at the end of a commercial 
break, the digital read-out indicates that approximately four minutes have elapsed. This 
permits the forty-five minute episode to comprise an hour long segment in the viewing 
schedule while maintaining its real-time narrative structure. 
 Experiments with real-time narrative have traditionally been relegated to the art-house 
fringe (Sukorov’s Russian Ark, shot in real-time, is more remarkable for its single elaborate 
take than its simple narrative structure; Figgis’s Time Code, while a unique cinematic 
experiment, fared poorly at the box-office) or suffers a commercial and critical failure 
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(Badham’s Nick of Time). 24 offers a convoluted, multi-focused genre narrative. The generic 
characterisation and post-9/11 thematic is a major factor in the success of the series; the 
dexterity of its plotting is genuinely innovative. Its willingness to use split-screen shots, to 
reject slow motion and other time-altering strategies, and yet to emphasise fast cuts and 
‘forced framing’ (in which the framing of a shot does not conform to a realist relation of 
spectator to image) foregrounds its innovative stylistics that complement a streamlined genre 
story. It is stylistically unorthodox and yet recognisable as a genre piece. The narrative of 
each episode is structured around segments of time. Season Four, Episode 1 inserted an 
extra-narrative indication to the spectator that “everything is going to change in less than ten 
minutes.” All plot elements are constructed around time constraints. For example, a bomb 
will detonate in thirty minutes, a virus will be released within the hour (thus forming a 
temporal structure to the episode). The screening of Season Four in Australia included an 
audience promotion: solve the 24 code within the hour to win a prize. 
 Real-time, functioning as a narrative frame, constitutes a striking departure from 
traditional realism. The long take and deep focus, according to Bazin, achieves an ‘image-
structure’ “[that] is more realistic.”133 24 foregrounds the temporal and spatial presence of the 
cut, often splicing an image into multiple frames (a number of filmmakers have used this 
device (De Palma and Tarantino come to mind) but it is rare in commercial television). 
Furthermore, the cut is established as a moment in virtual real-time. The spectator is aware of 
the spatial and temporal location of the cut within the narrative. A multiple frame shot is 
accompanied by the digital read-out that co-ordinates the narrative into a sequence of 
artificially constructed time segments. Rather than achieving the perfection of the realist 
image in Bazinian terms, paradoxically, the real-time narrative structure imposes a virtuality 
on the action-image. The narrative is subjected to the process of simulated time that 
“inscribes [the viewer] into the scene, in the first instance by perspective and in the second, 
into the temporality or action by the narrative.”134 The Real recedes only to bring the real-
time generated spectacle into greater relief. 
 Traditional formal narrative structures such as the flashback and frame (Double 
Indemnity, Sunset Boulevard) are prohibited in the real-time image. In this sense, the relation 
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between ‘reality’ and the real-time narrative conforms to Baudrillard’s conception of the 
relation between the Real and hyperreal. The real-time image effaces the Bazinian 
essentiality of the visual image, foregrounding the cut, montage, and the hyper-stylised 
relations of the visual (cinematic) form. The real-time image finds form only in spatial and 
temporal segments rather than a fluid and uncontaminated realism. The genericity of the 
plotline complements the constructedness of the time-sequence. Jack Bauer (Kiefer 
Sutherland) may just as well be Jack Ryan (Tom Clancy’s intrepid patriotic hero played by 
Alec Baldwin in The Hunt for Red October and Harrison Ford in Patriot Games and Clear 
and Present Danger). CTU is merely the latest manifestation of the generic U.S. intelligence 
agency. The fact that Bauer works in the Counter-Terrorist Unit provides a post-9/11 intrigue 
in international terrorism and the U.S.-Allied insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Season 
Four focuses on a terrorist plot organised by a professional Middle-Eastern terrorist cell 
stationed in Los Angeles.  
 Time segments are organised visually through a network of imaging and audio 
devices: satellite surveillance, infra-red, subway system surveillance cameras, telescopic 
sights, night-vision goggles, phone taps, tracking devices, microscopic cameras. Apart from 
the fetish appeal, the surveillance technology employed by CTU personnel constructs a 
spatial and temporal simulation of the Real: environments are mediated through image 
reproduction. There is a tremendous vicarious thrill in the spectator’s perception of the 
hostile character through a technologically mediated form. The spectator pursues a digital 
representation of the hostile rather than the Real figure. Ridley Scott was able to achieve a 
similar effect in Alien through the ingenious contrivance of the motion detector. Baudrillard’s 
simulacrum is realised: 24 presents the thrill of the digital representation of the self (a figure 
on a screen) when the appeal of the Real form (the Platonic shape) has been aesthetically 
exhausted. 
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3.16 The Ontology of Bullet-Time 
 
One obvious problem with digital cinema is that it has no novelty value, at least not for film 
audiences. This being the case, what will drive its future development?135 
 
We’re talking about cameras that are now broken from the subject matter, that are virtual. 
That’s the next phase. That’s what computers have introduced into cinematography.136 
 
Each instalment of The Matrix franchise opens on a digitised representation of the Matrix: the 
code of the simulation seen through the eyes of the One. The spectator assumes the One’s 
point of view as the Matrix materialises into the form of the simulation: irreducible 
component into whole. The One reads the code but is simultaneously inscribed by it into the 
simulation. This motif is literally a deconstruction of the digitised image. The simulation is 
deconstructed into its component parts, digitised ones and zeros that form the simulation. The 
motif also functions as a framing device of the narrative that is installed into the simulation. 
The digital coding of the Matrix is thus a revelation of the inherent constructedness of the 
image out of its component parts. I suggest that this motif applies equally to the narrative, 
thematic content and cinematography of the franchise, exemplified in the cinematographic 
innovation of ‘bullet-time.’ 
 I recall seeing the opening action sequence of The Matrix137 in 1999 and being 
astonished at the visual incongruity of the images in terms of their relation to the sequence as 
a whole. As perhaps with viewing Citizen Kane in 1941, the spectator senses some 
transformation in the constitution of shot, sound and movement, but cannot conceptualise the 
departure from the conventional mode. Joel Silver suggests that Warner Bros. agreed to the 
film’s 100 million dollar budget only after seeing a previously shot version of this 
sequence.138 In my opinion, it is a virtuoso performance of the virtual (spectacle) aesthetic in 
contemporary popular cinema. 
 The scene begins after a brief exchange between Cypher and Trinity over a phone 
line. The uniformed policemen enter the darkened room, lit only by their flashlights. The high 
contrasts and low angled shots are a quotation of classical film noir. Repeated viewings of 
this sequence indicate a hyper-stylised aesthetic; the Wachowski Brothers are cinematic 
                                                
135 Belton, 114. 
136 John Gaeta, “Bullet-Time.” The Matrix. DVD: Special Features (Warner Bros. 2001). 
137 This is the scene in which Trinity is confronted by three uniformed police in the Heart Of The City Hotel, 
and the ensuing chase over the rooftops of the surrounding buildings. 
138 Joel Silver, “Making The Matrix.” The Matrix. DVD: Special Features (Warner Bros. 2001). 
 152 
stylists. This is perhaps not unusual when one considers a Scorsese or De Palma, but neither 
were willing to sacrifice narrative integrity to the visual hyper-stylisation of a sequence. (De 
Palma approaches this aesthetic in Carrie and Dressed to Kill but does not achieve the full 
potential of the stylised sequence as cinematic quotation.)  
 In this sequence, shots quote prior cinematic shots, lighting and set-ups quote a 
particular tradition or generic form. Characters are textual tropes: policemen inhabit a hard-
boiled world that recurs eternally within the simulation. Trinity is configured as a sado-
masochist gothic; the shot of the handcuffs over her wrists confirms this textual 
configuration. The hyper-stylisation of the scene is apparent in the visual composition. The 
first shot after the policemen enter is a close-up of the handcuffs fastened to the lead 
policeman’s belt. Trinity is in the background, out of focus. What is significant here is that 
her shadow is held in focus. The outline looks like a sketch in a graphic comic strip. The shot 
reverses (conventional shot-reverse shot) to a close-up of Trinity with her hands held behind 
her head, waiting for the policeman to fasten the handcuffs over her wrists. The first 
noticeably incongruent image appears. The camera, positioned above Trinity’s right shoulder, 
holds both Trinity’s face and the policeman in the background of the shot, perfectly in focus. 
The deep focal length is held as the policeman advances. Rather than a deliberate and heavy-
handed shot innovation, the Wachowski Brothers initiate the sequence by reverting to a 
traditional stylistic innovation in which deep focus stands in opposition to orthodox focal 
lengths. Deep focus is often used in mainstream cinema, but its appearance in this sequence 
in The Matrix is less a strategy of representation than a distinct cinematic quotation. It is less 
an innovation here than a quotation of a once innovative aesthetic impulse. 
 The policeman slaps the handcuffs onto Trinity’s wrist. The exaggerated sound (a 
sharp metallic grate) functions as a coda on the first movement of the sequence. The scene 
then devolves into a series of fast cuts and kinetic movements. Trinity spins, twists the 
policeman’s arm, breaks it, and slams her hand into his face. The scene cuts to an overhead 
shot to capture the recoil of the policeman’s head from Trinity’s hand. The scene cuts to a 
medium shot of Trinity as she leaps into the air - and freezes. The camera rotates (it appears 
to dolly) on a 180 degree arc from Trinity’s left to right. The shot is held in freeze frame as 
the camera completes this movement. Reset on the opposite side of the room, the sequence is 
set in motion and Trinity completes the kick that sends the policeman crashing spectacularly 
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into a wall. The point at which the scene freezes, allowing the camera to dolly to the opposite 
side of the room, is the first instance of bullet-time in The Matrix franchise.  
 Bullet-time is less a shot in the conventional sense than a time-segment divorced from 
the narrative. The narrative literally pauses (Trinity is held suspended in freeze-frame) to 
allow the camera to reposition itself, and resumes after the camera has been repositioned on 
the opposite side of the room. Bullet-time achieves the effect of a sequence of cuts in which 
the camera is repositioned without the cut occurring in the film. The movement of the camera 
(which is in fact only a simulated movement - the movement of the camera in bullet-time is 
captured through photographing separate visual frames and splicing the sequence together 
digitally) occurs external to the operation of the narrative, and offers an intrusion of a virtual 
space that spontaneously comes into being within the narrative. The bullet-time segment 
inserts a virtual frame into the narrative reality and achieves what Baudrillard conceptualises 
in his simulacra: “that the real is no longer real.”139 Equally, the intrusion of the virtual into 
the Real contaminates the purity of the realist image. Narrative reality is subject to the spatial 
and temporal dimensions of the virtual (computer-generated) simulation. 
 The ontology of the image in bullet-time is reconstituted within a simulated or virtual 
representative plane. In the realist mode, the image is subjected to a narrative itinerary. The 
narrative functions literally as a control on the spatial and temporal ordering of a sequence. 
This is precisely why Bazin valued Welles’s deep focus: it resisted the montage as a guiding 
cinematographic ‘voice’ and revealed the Real in its unmediated purity. The narrative 
sequence in traditional realism is subject to causal determinism: action on film should 
conform to its physical attributes and dimensions in the external reality. The dimensions of a 
shot, camera position and mise en scene in classical cinema follows deterministic patterns.  
 If cinema after Bazin has exemplified a departure from the Real, bullet-time achieves 
an advance beyond the spatial and temporal cinematographic strategies of earlier movements. 
It represents an incursion of virtual reality into an art form dominated by a realist aesthetic. 
Gaeta suggests that bullet-time is merely one manifestation of the possibilities of digitally 
produced imagery: “We’re talking about cameras that are now broken from their subject 
matter, that are virtual. That’s the next phase. That’s what computers have introduced into 
cinematography.”140 It is also what earlier cinematic traditions did not have access to: the 
                                                
139 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, 13. 
140 See note 136. 
 154 
ability to map the image on screen according to a computer generated simulation. “Today 
abstraction is no longer that of the map, the double, the mirror, or the concept…It is the 
generation by models of a real without origin or reality.”141 Digital imagery is the perfect 
realisation of the simulacrum: the reality of the image on screen functions only as a 
reproduction of the simulated form. If Godard’s work is exemplary of the departure from 
Deleuze’s action-image, digital cinema installs a simulated image completely severed from a 
self-organising deterministic reality. It is what Patricia Pisters, working through Deleuze, 
suggests is a “metacinematic universe that calls for an imminent conception of audiovisuality, 
and in which a new camera consciousness has entered our perception.”142 
 The jump-cut (Godard, Breathless), freeze frame (Truffaut, The 400 Blows), slow-
motion/fast motion montage (Peckinpah, The Wild Bunch) are each subject to the narrative 
frame. Godard claimed that he had used the jump-cut to shorten the running time of 
Breathless. Even if we were to take him at his word, the jump-cut offers a profound 
transformation of the ontology of the image. Subject to the jump-cut, the temporal and spatial 
dimensions in which the narrative coheres is essentially reorganised. Causal determinism is 
affected by the capacity to leap time segments. The jump-cut is not entirely disorienting in 
Breathless (the sequence rarely skips more than a few frames), though Godard’s 
experimentation with fractured narratives in later films (primarily through editing) revealed 
the capacity to shift the ontology of the image in modern cinema, and a willingness on the 
part of the spectator to accept this new relationship between the image and an external 
reality.143 Yet in each of these cinematographic strategies (the jump-cut is surely the most 
ambitious), the narrative is maintained as a hermetically sealed frame of representation. The 
jump-cut intrudes upon and alters the cause-effect functioning of the narrative, but cannot 
sever the image from its location within a narrative form. 
 According to Gaeta, bullet-time cinematography was “conceived specifically for The 
Matrix…as a stylistic way of showing that you’re in a constructed reality.”144 The technology 
allows the image to “go forward in motion and forward in time with the event.”145 
 
                                                
141 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, 1. 
142 Pisters, 16. 
143 For a discussion of Godard’s ‘revision’ of cinema, see Peter Wollen, Signs and Meaning in the Cinema 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 164-165. 
144 Gaeta, “Bullet-Time.”  
145 Gaeta, “Bullet-Time.”  
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I can also choose to stop the camera abruptly and start moving backwards while the action 
continues to move forward. I can shoot the move coming away from both sides at the same 
time, crisscrossing over, and ending. I can shoot in waves…cycles of film.146 
 
The Real no longer dictates the direction of the shot or the spatial and temporal dimensions of 
the image. The cinematographic eye is no longer constricted by the physical presence of the 
camera. While The Matrix is ostensibly a genre action film with an interest in speculative 
science fiction, Gaeta is correct to suggest that the technology of virtual cinematography 
offers a new potentiality of the cinematic image that is only tentatively explored in The 
Matrix. The ‘burly brawl’147 in The Matrix Reloaded offers a bullet-time shot in which Keanu 
Reeves has been replaced by a virtual figure; the action film partakes of the computer game 
(virtual) aesthetic.  
 I have argued that the synthesis of the Real and simulation in the narrative is a 
thematic that informs the visual aesthetic of the film, particularly its cinematography. With 
virtual cinema, this synthesis is realised in the visual aspect of the film. The ontology of the 
image in bullet-time (and Gaeta alludes to the fact that bullet-time is merely one innovation 
in virtual cinematography) is fundamentally altered, divorced at last from its cherished realist 
origins. For Purse, bullet-time realises the most “heightened moments of hypermediacy…[in 
which] the spectator is drawn fully into the diegetic space, disrupting the conventional spatial 
relationship between the spectator, the screen, and the filmic world.”148 In this formulation, 
Purse approaches something resembling Filser’s notion of a shared information between 
subject and text, or immersion.149 I would not want to discuss bullet-time as a form of 
‘immersion art.’ And yet, it achieves something equally radical in its acknowledgement of the 
possibilities of the digital (or virtual image) to transcend the classical montage, deep focus, or 
any manifestation of a perceived reality on film. 
  
                                                
146 Gaeta, “Bullet-Time.” 
147 This is the sequence in which Neo confronts an endlessly replicating Agent Smith. 
148 Lisa Purse, “The New Spatial Dynamics of the Bullet-Time Effect.” In The Spectacle of the Real: From 
Hollywood to Reality TV and Beyond, ed. Geoff King (Bristol: Intellect Books, 2005), 157. 
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4.1 The Spectacle Aesthetic, Or the Cinematic Real 
 
In talking about cinema, I have been talking about life as well; however, I do not want to 
make too many claims. I am not arguing that this perspective offers in some sense a better 
view of the world (there is no hierarchy). I simply want to indicate that some mutations are 
taking place, both in the image and in the world. Developments in science, art and 
philosophy all indicate changes in perception and changes in our relation to the world. It 
may be that this involves a generational shift…Ultimately, we have no choice but to 
change.1 
 
This chapter presents an analysis of recent popular cinema, focusing on filmmakers, films 
and cinematic trends that I believe represent a profound intrusion into a prior dominant realist 
aesthetic. I argue that within a complex filmic arena in which the blockbuster and the so-
called alternative aesthetic are often produced by the same studio,2 these cinematic trends not 
only reflect but increasingly express a new ontology of the cinematic image and text. 
Equally, these traditions express a transformation in the ontology of the spectator, which 
must instantiate a similar transformation in the ontology of the film theorist. 
 The chapter also functions as a conclusion to this thesis in its attempt to chart the 
phenomenon of a new film aesthetic. The spectacle aesthetic is simultaneously about what 
contemporary film is and how it is consumed. Consumption, as I have argued, is a profoundly 
aesthetic engagement with the product at the level of textuality and ideology. Mass culture 
cinema is market oriented. Its aesthetic system, which I have attempted to recuperate, is 
immersed in the market system. I am increasingly astonished at what constitutes mainstream 
cinema in what is a dynamic and increasingly discursive filmic arena. The 2006 Best Picture 
Oscar for Crash is a case in point. Reports immediately after the victory described Crash as 
the lowest money earner to win an academy award in a decade. The film seemed to come and 
go at the U.S. (and Australian) box office with hardly a whimper. Yet subsequent to the 
Oscar, Crash was re-released in the U.S. to cash in on the Oscar win, demonstrating once 
again that a small, relatively independent production is able to integrate into a discursive U.S. 
filmic environment. It matters little what Crash is in a traditional aesthetic sense; rather, what 
matters is how it performs, and is performed, for a discursive popular film culture. 
                                                
1 Pisters, 223. 
2 For an analysis of the convergence of major studio productions and smaller ‘art film’ enterprises, see Timothy 
Corrigan, “Auteurs and the New Hollywood.” In The New American Cinema, ed. Jon Lewis (Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 1998), 43-52. Mike Moore’s recent Fahrenheit 911 is an example of the 
convergence of the studio film distribution chain and the art film aesthetic (radical political documentary). In 
this case, distribution was undertaken by Miramax, a subsidiary of Disney. 
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An attempt to identify the performance of the spectacle aesthetic is necessarily 
discursive in its point of origin and summation. I have traced the formation of a classical 
realist aesthetic in the studio era, drawing on the films and theorists I consider to have 
influenced the development of filmic traditions. In this chapter, I consider a number of 
cinematic transformations manifested in recent cinema: a new status of the film image, a new 
ontology of postmodern cinematic narrative, a new notion of genre. I offer a transformation 
on classical, or ‘pure’ genre theories, drawing more concretely on Collins’s notion of 
‘genericity,’ which I will develop as intrinsic to the performance of metacinema in 
contemporary film. The staple film form – genre – is reconstituted as a new system of text, a 
discursive formality manifested in the films of Sergio Leone, Quentin Tarantino, Clint 
Eastwood, Robert Zemekis and, to a lesser degree, John Carpenter.  
The chapter will return to a more conventional approach to text in which the analysis 
is grounded in a comparative overview of several films and filmmakers. This approach is to 
reveal a film aesthetic that is anchored in the activity of film viewing, film reflection and film 
‘discussion.’ Discussion connotes an aesthetic engagement with film in a communal forum in 
which meaning is derived not in some traditional unravelling of the text, but rather something 
approaching Barthes’s ‘playing’ of the post-structuralist text. This is fundamentally a 
collective and, increasingly in film aesthetics, communal experience. The spectacle aesthetic 
is implicated in questions of a new authenticity, a new cinematic Real, and ultimately a 
‘performance cinema’ that renders the demarcation between text and spectator obsolete.3 I 
will argue also that this aesthetic is intrinsic to a cinematic subjectivity, for which everything 
is in a sense performed onscreen. 
In concluding this thesis, I return to a point at which it began: engaging the aesthetic 
impulse. I am convinced by McCann’s assessment of what needs to be done to make film 
theory meaningful for a contemporary culture that knows its films in ways far removed from 
traditional theorists: 
 
Film theory needs to think less of itself and more of the movies. It must spend less time 
seeking to ingratiate itself with academic grandees and more time trying to appeal to movie 
                                                
3 See Purse, 157, in which she offers a similar conclusion in her analysis of bullet-time in The Matrix: a 
convergence of the spatial frame occupied by cinematic text and spectator. See also Collins. However, I would 
argue that such formulations, now passé in contemporary theories of film, are indebted to the classical wave of 
post-structuralist theory. In my own experience of this movement, Barthes is a voice to which I invariably 
return. 
 159 
audiences. It has come to respect the film, but it has still to love the movie. If film theory is 
to be for something really worthwhile, it had better be for people other than theorists.4 
 
I am not aligning myself with each of McCann’s claims; my project is at least in part 
indebted to a rich legacy of film theory and analysis. Yet I share his view that film theory 
stops well short of ‘loving’ the movies, and until such a transformation in the ontology of the 
theorist takes place, film theory resides in an opposing camp to the object of its theory, and 
this will always be a profound limitation. 
 
4.2 The Metacinematic Lens 
Broadly speaking, I perceive three forms of the metacinematic aesthetic that will form a 
foundation to the argument that follows: the performance of genre (‘genericity’), various 
image strategies in recent cinema, and the inception of postmodern narrative devices. In the 
section on postmodern narrative, I trace a departure from the classical narrative frame that 
functioned as a staple of studio era cinema. Singin’ in the Rain and Double Indemnity are two 
noteworthy examples of the conventional use of the frame in which the action departs from 
and then returns to a point of origin. In Reservoir Dogs, Pulp Fiction and Fincher’s Fight 
Club, I will argue that the narrative frame is collapsed, and that the distinction between 
diegetic and non-diegetic utterance is blurred. 
The aesthetic I attempt to chart is founded upon a rejection of classical realism. But 
whereas Citizen Kane and classical noir cinema are merely retroactively ‘metacinematic,’ the 
cinema of Sergio Leone and Quentin Tarantino embraces this aesthetic as the point of artistic 
inception. In this new aesthetic sensibility, cinema is ultimately a cinema of style and an 
aestheticisation of prior cinematic representations. This is all to say that Leone and Tarantino 
(or the less well known John Carpenter and Brian De Palma) approach the aesthetics of 
cinema in a very different way to their much idealised predecessors of the Hollywood studio 
era or the European art-cinema scene of the 60s and 70s. Leone and Tarantino think 
differently about film: the way it is ‘created,’ the way in which it functions on an audience – 
essentially what it is. I contend that their audiences are required to do the same. 
 The innovation towards metacinema – and more specifically, the departure from 
classical realism – occurs earlier than Tarantino and his postmodern coterie. But whereas 
                                                
4 McCann, 33. 
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something like Michelangelo Antonioni’s masterpiece about the irresolution of the cinematic 
image – Blow-Up – clearly establishes a dialectic between meaning and a lack of meaning, 
Tarantino’s cinema embraces only a unique form of cinematic meaning in which the 
traditional dialectic is rendered obsolete. Tarantino’s cinema ‘means’ only through cinematic 
topoi (to recall Eco’s very useful term). Antonioni’s great modernist defeat of meaning – one 
recalls the photographer’s (David Hemmings) eyes as they traverse the path of an imaginary 
tennis ball in the concluding scene in Blow-Up – seems a quaint intellectualism when 
measured alongside Tarantino’s cinematic ‘caricatures,’ or the character ephemera of past 
cinema, television, pulp novels, tabloid magazines, and mainstream film iconomania. For 
Tarantino, the cinematic imaginary is indeed ‘even better than the real thing.’ As the 
photographer vanishes from a once resolute and wholly integral realism of the image in 
Antonioni’s film, so the classical modernist auteur of the 60s, viewed retrospectively from 
the 90s, becomes a thing of the past. Antonioni’s meditation on the ephemeral image is tragic 
and yet triumphant in its expression of a dialectic of truth/reality, constructed images and the 
psychological imaginary. Tarantino’s cinematic simulacra have little of this pathos or 
profundity. I should however stress that, in my argument, such a lack in Tarantino’s cinema 
(or Leone’s) is not regarded as debasement of an earlier modernist aesthetic mode. 
 
4.3 Character Acting 
In Tarantino’s Reservoir Dogs, an undercover policeman, Mr Orange (Tim Roth), must 
insinuate his way into a party of criminals who are planning to rob a bank. The film is not a 
conventional heist film; the heist is conspicuously missing from the final cut apart from a 
momentary flashback of the aftermath. Reservoir Dogs might be considered an 
unconventional character study, although this would surely not take account of the generic 
aspects of the characters and storyline. The anonymity of the characters (and their 
designation by colour) is a familiar trope of this kind of genre crime story. Paul Auster uses a 
similar device in Ghosts, a novella in New York Trilogy.5 The device in Auster’s novel 
functions as a neat realisation of the ubiquity of types in generic fiction. I want to make a 
similar claim of Tarantino’s films that Auster seems to make of the novel: that the 
representation of an object (whether cinematic or novelistic), or an ‘objective reality,’ draws 
                                                
5 Paul Auster, New York Trilogy: City of Glass, Ghosts, The Locked Room (London: Faber and Faber, 1987), 
133-196 
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that object field into its mimetic construct. This chapter is in part an attempt to conceptualise 
and ultimately come to terms with this kind of textual awareness as it is performed in 
mainstream cinema.  
The challenge posed by Reservoir Dogs seems to be a self-aware mediation between 
the serious character film (“I don’t believe in tipping” as social commentary, “you’re fuckin 
Baretta” as a pop culture (and all the more serious) take on contemporary mainstream 
masculinity) and the generic escapism of crime capers such as The Hot Rock or Topkapi. The 
viewer must negotiate these separate aesthetics modes, a verisimilitude to a traditional form 
of realism, and equally a verisimilitude to a traditional form of generic realism. Before Mr 
Orange (Tim Roth) can meet his crew, he must literally assume his character. He must 
materialise within the script in which Mr Orange plays the lead role; in a sense, the action 
involving Mr Orange in Reservoir Dogs is always already a script within a script. Tarantino 
does the same for Jules (Samuel Jackson) and Vincent (John Travolta) in Pulp Fiction. 
Arriving early to collect Marsellus Wallace’s briefcase, they “hang back” to discuss the 
incident involving Tony Rocky Horror. Here the duo assumes the mantle of new age sensitive 
(hit)men who debate a broad range of issues. When Vincent suggests a foot massage is 
inherently more than Platonic, Jules says, “It’s an interesting point.” The measured remark 
functions as a coda to one of several inventive dialogue set pieces. 
The discussion is left behind as Jules says, “let’s get into character,” and the two 
assume the mantle of generic hitmen, leaving behind the less than conventional hitmen they 
were out on the landing. The hitmen of the landing resemble their counterparts in Reservoir 
Dogs. The opening sequence of Reservoir Dogs is an elaborate introduction to the ‘band of 
outsiders’ in which they discuss the subtext of Madonna’s Like a Virgin and debate the merits 
of tipping at a coffee shop. In Pulp Fiction, Jules and Vincent, shortly before assuming the 
conventional hitmen mantle, discuss the contemporary mores of dating. The transition from 
one kind of hitman/robber into the generic role is an act of “getting into character” for the 
personas that inhabit Tarantino’s metacinematic universe. The implication of this textual 
strategy is that all characters are merely imitating prior textual roles – in Tarantino’s case, 
almost exclusively cinematic. In the shooting script of Kill Bill, Volume 1, Tarantino 
designates a fast zoom as “a quick Shaw-Brothers-style Zoom into her [the Bride’s] eyes.”6 
                                                
6 Quentin Tarantino, Kill Bill, Volumes 1 and 2 – Shooting Script. “Chapter 2.” 
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The next sequence, a flashback, is designated in the script as “Flashback – Spaghetti Western 
Style.”7 The set piece in the church that concludes with the massacre is almost a reproduction 
of two sequences in Leone’s Once Upon a Time in the West: the arrival of Jill McBain 
(Claudia Cardinale) in Sweetwater and the confrontation between Frank (Henry Fonda) and 
Harmonica (Charles Bronson). The Bride is of course the generic Woman With No Name. For 
Tarantino, even the cinematic shot (set-up, cropping, cut) is a composition of prior filmic 
references. Leone did the same thing in each of his films. While a great deal has been written 
about allusionism, pastiche, blank irony, quotation (and it has been explored at some length 
in this thesis), I am not convinced that current theories of postmodern cinema appreciate this 
aesthetic mode for what it is. 
 
“Bad acting is bullshit in this job.” 
Mr Orange receives instruction from his partner to use a “humorous anecdote” for 
authenticity. From the rooftop in which Roth is instructed to play a part as undercover cop (in 
the same sense in which all Tarantino characters are undercover players), the scene cuts to 
Mr Orange’s apartment in which he is preparing to go downstairs to meet Nice Guy Eddie 
(Chris Penn). The sequence is a Tarantinoesque ritual in which a film character must “get 
into” a generic character.8 Mr Orange wanders through the apartment to a song that 
apparently plays on a radio. The country-western tune is less evocative of a real time and 
place than of a cinematic past; Tarantino no doubt recalls the road film and its plethora of 
diner and road stop scenes in which jukeboxes are perpetually playing the same-sounding 
tunes. Mr Orange says his spiel in front of a mirror (in which he transforms into “fucking 
Baretta,” who is “super-cool”). The medium shot is held in a deeper focus to bring into relief 
a poster Mr Orange has on his bedroom wall: Silver Surfer. Silver Surfer is a comic strip 
character that identifies Jim McBride’s remake of Godard’s Breathless.9 Significant here (and 
exemplary of Tarantino’s cinema) is his acknowledgement on film (a cinematic self-
awareness) of a lineage of films that are generic performances. Both Godard’s and McBride’s 
                                                                                                                                                  
 <http://www.imsdb.com/scripts/Kill-Bill-Volume-1-&2.html> Internet Moviescript Database. Accessed 10 Oct. 
2005. 
7 Tarantino. 
8 For an excellent reading of this sequence, see Peter Travis, “The Critics Commentary.” Reservoir Dogs DVD: 
Collector’s Edition. 
9 Travis, “The Critics Commentary.” 
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Breathless are cut in this mould; perhaps Tarantino prefers McBride’s version because it is 
all the more explicit as a commentary on cinema, and specifically, genre cinema. 
Tarantino’s films make unique demands of its audiences. I have never considered 
Reservoir Dogs, Pulp Fiction or even Kill Bills, Volumes 1 and 2 as revolutionary as some 
critics in its use of unconventional plotlines, characters, dialogue, dramatic situations, settings 
or music. Mamet’s Glengarry Glen Ross has wittier dialogue; Lynch’s Mulholland Drive is 
more interesting narratively and thematically; Scorsese’s Goodfellas or Casino (or anything 
by Leone) is surely more innovative (and inventive) stylistically (and more specifically, 
photographically) than anything in Tarantino’s oeuvre. But I do contend that Tarantino’s 
cinema inaugurated a new wave as influential and potentially transforming as the Italian Neo-
Realism of the 40s or the French New Wave of the 60s. The initial transformation did not 
occur at the site of a new media culture or pop culture sensibility, but at the point of a 
transformation in the ontology of the cinematic story itself, which relies increasingly in the 
last two decades on reality’s immersion in cinematic texts, and on the ascendance of film as 
the dominant art form. I argue that Tarantino is the first real film auteur because his cinematic 
texts know no boundaries other than those that are already cinematic. In this respect, I regard 
Godard’s Breathless as a genuine precursor to the new aesthetic. But for Godard, cinema was 
always a site of contestation. It was always necessarily a political art form, if not ‘merely 
political.’ Tarantino’s brand of auteurism is a convergence of spectator/filmmaker/theorist 
that expresses a new cinematic culture divorced from prior aesthetic modes. Tarantino 
vacillates between an auteuristic self creating such diverse works as Reservoir Dogs and 
From Dusk Till Dawn, while appearing on American Idol as a guest judge. Apparently, 
Tarantino is a fan of several Reality Television shows. I cannot imagine Godard or any of the 
New Wave auteurs doing the equivalent in 1960s European popular culture forums. 
Shortly after the release of Pulp Fiction, film and literature courses found space in 
their syllabuses for Tarantino. Film scholars wanted to write about Tarantino now – as if to 
do so in retrospect would be to lose the essence of his cinema, or to shed the vitality of this 
cinematic moment that was quintessentially ‘postmodern.’ One of my formative experiences 
as a film scholar was studying postmodernism through the rubric of Tarantino and Lynch; 
Lynch was ‘serious’ postmodernism, Tarantino was ‘playful’ postmodernism. Vincent’s 
utterance in Jack Rabbit Slim’s – “That’s a fuckin good milkshake. I don’t know if it’s five 
dollars, but it’s pretty fuckin good” – seemed to offer something altogether new, yet analyses 
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of Tarantino fell back on the wholly conventional. Tarantino “did good dialogue” or 
Tarantino responded to the fascination and repulsion toward violence in contemporary 
cinema.10 Perhaps the nearest claim to what I would consider is genuinely revolutionary in 
Tarantino’s cinema is that he infuses his characters and storylines with a plethora of pop 
terminology and iconography, past and present, a functioning “wax museum with a pulse.” 
Yet even this observation does not take account of the impact of the imbrication of such an 
aesthetic sensibility. Jameson might call it pastiche, the limitations of which I discussed in 
Chapters Two and Three. Other critics have called it a form of blank irony, which is 
invariably substituted for pastiche at some point. But in what sense is this cinematic 
performance – genericity – creative, and more crucially, impacting aesthetically on a 
mainstream audience? 
Simply put, what accounts for the almost universal designation of the 90s as the 
decade of Tarantino, as perhaps the 70s was the decade of Scorsese, Coppola and Altman? 
How does one conceptualise Tarantino’s legacy and a legacy of cinema that defines an 
aesthetic of what Jim Collins calls ‘genericity’? I use the term legacy pointedly here: I am 
arguing that what is now quaintly ‘Tarantinoesque’ or ‘postmodern chic’ was manifested in 
the cinema of this period and self-consciously in the films of Tarantino. If Scorsese, Coppola 
and Altman were seriously minded filmmakers (rather than artists), Tarantino was the 
equivalent for the 90s – but without the ‘critical distance,’ to use Adorno/Jameson parlance. 
If Scorsese, Coppola and Altman wanted to ‘say something,’ Tarantino wanted to ‘make 
movies.’ I recently saw an interview with Tarantino in which he lamented the end of the 
mission/war film hybrid that gained popularity in the 60s; he mentioned Where Eagles Dare 
in this context. It was his contention that the serious war film of the 70s – Apocalypse Now, 
The Deer Hunter – rendered the action/adventure/war film hybrid obsolete. His next project, 
he claimed, was an epic scale war film that was going to be fun. 
In attempting to trace this cinematic legacy prior to Tarantino, I draw on Sergio 
Leone’s Dollars Trilogy11 and Once Upon a Time in the West, Clint Eastwood’s Unforgiven, 
and to a lesser extent, the impact of Robert Zemekis and John Carpenter on mainstream and 
                                                
10 See, for example, Grant; for an analysis of sequences in Pulp Fiction as “orchestrated violence” (and 
Tarantino’s use thereof to explore conventions of cinematic violence), see Marsha Kinder, “Violence American 
Style: the Narrative Orchestrations of Violent Attractions.” In Violence and American Cinema, ed. J. David 
Slocum (New York and London: Routledge, 2001), 81-84. 
11 Per Un Pugno di Dollari (A Fistful of Dollars); Per Qualche Dollaro in Più (For a Few Dollars More); 
Buono, Il Bruttto, Il Cattivo, Il (The Good, The Bad and The Ugly). 
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B-grade Hollywood cinema. It is more than merely noteworthy that a character in Carpenter’s 
Assault on Precinct 13 says: “I have something to do with death,” quoting a line of dialogue 
from Leone’s Once Upon a Time in the West. It is also significant that the line is quoted as a 
seminal cinematic quotation, a statement that has become synonymous with Leone’s films 
and the Spaghetti Western in general. Carpenter’s quotation is exemplary of a film aesthetic 
that is an essential part of contemporary cinema and mainstream viewing practices. It is 
fascinating to observe a cinematic ‘conversation’ between several filmmakers through a 
single cinematic sequence.12 In Kill Bill, Volume 1, Copperhead (Daryl Hannah) is set on 
finally executing The Bride (Uma Thurman). Tarantino has suggested that Hannah’s 
character is drawn loosely from a figure in an obscure Swedish action/revenge film, but the 
sequence in which Hannah walks down a corridor is a stylistic quotation of several sequences 
in Brian De Palma’s films. The use of split-screen, that seems so outmoded in contemporary 
cinema, moulds perfectly into Tarantino’s metacinematic commentary. The spectator recalls 
De Palma’s Carrie or Dressed To Kill and his almost obsessive use of the split-screen. And 
yet Tarantino’s quotation is merely a ‘reply’ to De Palma’s quotation of Hitchcock in Carrie, 
Sisters or Obsession. Thus, Tarantino’s invocation of De Palma’s split-screen quotation of 
Hitchcock is simultaneously an invocation of the stylistics of Hitchcock. Tarantino and De 
Palma are performing cinema rather than representing a non-cinematic Real. The several 
quotations function as a stream of metacinematic dialogue. 
I am not arguing that contemporary popular cinema is dominated by the 
metacinematic text.  Instead, I argue that conventional textual realism has always been and 
currently is the dominant aesthetic mode. Cinema continues to be classified as the nearest 
approximation of an external reality; a cinema that no longer engages mimetically with this 
external reality is aberrant. However, the most significant, innovative, and potentially 
impactful challenge to cinematic realism lies in ‘metacinema,’ and for this reason it is crucial 
to any theory of a new film aesthetic. 
 
                                                
12 See Gerald Peary (ed.), Quentin Tarantino Interviews (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 1998), 28: 
“When I was 18 or 19, I was going to write a book on genre filmmakers – John Flynn, Joe Dante, John Milius, 
Richard Franklin – and engage them in a conversation about movies.” Implicit in Tarantino’s comment is the 
notion that films are connected in a way that filmmakers and films recognise. 
 166 
4.4 Foregrounding Genericity: the Limitations of Classical Film Genre  
 
[There are] two aspects that define the text as an utterance: its plan (intention) and the 
realization of this plan. The dynamic interrelations of these aspects, their struggle, 
determine the nature of the text. Their divergence can reveal a great deal.13 
 
 
My discussion of genre in this section focuses less on a broad-based analysis of genre than on 
the generic film as it was produced by the major Hollywood studios. Taking Neale’s cue, I 
focus on Hollywood’s genre cinema, and particularly on the notion of genre cinema as a part 
of popular culture from the 1930s. Drawing on the concept of ‘genericity’ in recent cinema, I 
focus on the recuperation of several classical genre forms in films such as Blade Runner and 
Se7en. I consider in more detail Tarantino’s revisions of classical film noir and heist films, 
and Leone’s and Eastwood’s revisions of the Western.  
Studies of genre have been at the forefront of cinema since its inception in the late 
Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries. Porter’s The Great Train Robbery (1903) is an 
early example of the Western and a precursor to the heist film, a hybrid genre form that 
developed in subsequent decades (Rififi is noteworthy is this respect). The Wizard of Oz can 
be seen as a fantasy adventure story. Samson and Delilah is a biblical epic of the kind that 
was a Hollywood staple in the 1940s and 50s. Even Citizen Kane offers a generic plotline in 
its conventional mystery story and investigation of the meaning of Rosebud. In fact, later in 
his career, Welles conceded that the Rosebud solution was more a gimmick for audiences 
craving an answer to Kane’s inherent mystery.14 Rosebud was the narrative trope the film 
needed to transform a conventional biography into a generic entertainment. Kane might be 
the greatest film ever made, but one wonders if the accolades would have been forthcoming 
for a Hollywood product with a genuinely non-realistic thematic/narrative/character conceit. 
 Genre is a form of classification, a retrospective moulding together of qualities that 
define the genre film, or a film genre, a distinction Schatz upholds.15 The distinction forms a 
problematic in the conceptual framework of genre theory. On the one hand, a genre film 
conforms to setting, character traits and recognisable themes: Ford’s Stagecoach and The 
                                                
13 M. M. Bakhtin, “The Problem of the Text in Linguistics, Philology and the Human Sciences: An Experiment 
in Philosophical Analysis.” In M. M. Bakhtin: Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, ed. Caryl Emerson and 
Michael Holquist, trans. Vern W. McGee (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), 104. 
14 Welles and Bogdanovich, 53. 
15 Thomas Schatz, Hollywood Genres: Formulas, Filmmaking, and the Studio System (Austin: McGraw-Hill, 
1981), 16. 
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Searchers reconstruct a vision of the American West as frontier territory inhabited by 
character types. Both films engage with the uniquely American symbolism of the frontier as a 
New World, a conduit between an older form of civilisation and a new modernity. The 
Searchers is particularly interesting in this respect. Ethan Edwards (John Wayne) is a man 
returned from the Civil War in which a system of older values has been eradicated. Ford’s 
humanistic vision stands in opposition to later visions of the loss of self and a traditional 
morality. Sergio Leone, whom Baudrillard considers the first postmodern filmmaker,16 
perfects the generic typing of setting and character in his Dollars Trilogy, in which the anti-
hero is a meta-generic ‘Man With No Name.’ Leone reprised the Man With No Name type in 
the character of Harmonica (Charles Bronson) in Once Upon a Time in the West.  
The genre film is problematic insofar as it intrudes into the neatly (and 
retrospectively) formed film genre. The problem arises in the definition of genre itself, for 
which we can revert to Bakhtin. The film genre component of Schatz’s paradigm works with 
Bakhtin’s text as formal system, the “dynamic interrelations” of the text’s intention and mode 
of realisation. Thomson describes (negatively) a traditional formalist approach to genre as 
“an abstract construct that is situated at a higher level than the individual literary work. 
Missing from what is essentially a hierarchical and classificatory scheme is an account of 
how we move from specific text to generic type.”17 Bakhtin offers an advance on this rigid 
hierarchical model: “as an utterance (or part of an utterance) no one sentence, even if it has 
only one word, can ever be repeated: it is always a new utterance (even if it is a quotation).”18 
In this sense, the genre film, while conforming to type, offers a reorganisation of the contours 
of the film genre. The necessity for Schatz’s distinction – and the veracity of Bakhtin’s 
theory – is certainly played out in the Spaghetti Western of the 1960s. Leone’s films are a 
commentary on the genre form, yet they are simultaneously generic. Few spectators would 
argue that the Dollars trilogy is something other than Westerns, yet it very deliberately offers 
a departure from the classical Western of Ford (Stagecoach, My Darling Clementine, The 
Searchers) or Hawks (Red River, Rio Bravo). A film such as The Good, The Bad, and The 
Ugly bears the intent (Bakhtin) of the filmmaker to create a system of generic types while 
                                                
16 Cited in Christopher Frayling, “Commentary.” Once Upon a Time in the West DVD. Two Disc Special 
Edition. 
17 Clive Thomson, “Bakhtin’s ‘Theory’ of Genre.” Studies in Twentieth Century Literature 9, no. 1 (1984). 30. 
18 Bakhtin, 108. 
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concurrently reorganising and altering the generic form, semantically and syntactically.19 
Leone explicitly quotes Ford’s long shots of Monument Valley (Once Upon a Time in the 
West) or the inventive camera shot beneath a running locomotive20 that features in Ford’s 
Stagecoach. Yet the storyline of Once Upon a Time in the West – a generic plot in which the 
Old West makes way for the New Frontier – is handled with a sincerity and absence of irony 
that recalls The Searchers, or the stoicism of George Stevens’s Shane. The exchange between 
Harmonica and Frank (Henry Fonda) about the loss of the traditional hero is a moving 
account of what Leone’s films embody: a passing of a kind of Western, and indeed, a kind of 
cinema. The passing of the Old West in Leone is equally a passing of the Old Western, and as 
such maintains a duality as genre form and generic quotation. The elaborate civil war battle 
in The Good, The Bad and The Ugly achieves a similar effect, combining the (original) 
generic utterance and the generic utterance as quotation. Eastwood cares for a fatally 
wounded soldier in perhaps the most tender moment in Leone’s work, only to don the anti-
heroic mantle that must lead inexorably to the meta-cinematic Western shootout between the 
Good and the Bad (Leone inserts the fool, Tico (Eli Wallach), who is ultimately spared). 
Underwood’s City Slickers achieves a more recent synergy of original utterance and generic 
quotation. The protagonist (Billy Crystal) is cast as a man suffering a mid-life crisis in the 
midst of a cattle-drive weekend vacation. The vacation is a literal transposition of the 
Western setting and character into a contemporary simulation. The frontier of the New World 
is reconfigured as a theme park Wild West (Baudrillard’s reading of Disneyland is interesting 
in this respect21) but maintains the value system of 1990s middle America. The presence of 
Jack Palance functions as an explicit quotation of his character in Shane, though Palance is 
recast here as a sanguine reflection of the unremittingly evil villain. The protagonist learns to 
‘be a man’ through steering cattle through a storm and partaking of the wild Western ways of 
the traditional (and generic) American cowboy. Billy Crystal’s ‘everyman’ is a 1990s 
incarnation of Tom Dunson (John Wayne) in Hawk’s Red River. The stirring Yeehaaahhh! 
that initiates the cattle drive sequence in City Slickers is a quotation of its forebear in Red 
                                                
19 See Rick Altman, “A Semantic/Syntactic Approach to Film Genre.” Cinema Journal 23, no. 3 (1984), 10: 
“the semantic approach stresses the genre’s building blocks, while the syntactic view privileges the structures 
into which they are arranged.” Altman argues that the explanatory power of genre criticism has been weakened 
by its privileging of the semantic or syntactic approach to genre cinema.  
20 Frayling describes this shot as a reproduction of a similar shot in Stagecoach. While Leone has not 
commented on this relationship, the two shots are remarkably similar. See Frayling. 
21 Jean Baudrillard, America. Trans. Chris Turner (London and New York: Verso, 1988), 1: “Vanishing Point.” 
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River. (Slim Pickens rides an atomic bomb after the same exclamation in Kubrick’s Dr. 
Strangelove.) 
If the genre film is an intrusion into the formalism of the film genre, in what way is 
genre maintained as a classificatory and ordering system, and in what way are genre films 
able to maintain their ‘genericity’? If, as Altman suggests, early genre theory follows an 
either/or methodological approach to the semantic and syntactic components of film genre,22 
what might a fuller account of film genres and genre films constitute? And what accounts for 
the resilience of genre theory in the broader discipline of film studies? 
First, genre foregrounds and ultimately privileges the formal organisation of texts, 
and this is particularly true of popular cinema. As Eco suggests, “A popular song, a TV 
commercial, a comic strip, a detective novel, a Western movie were seen as more or less 
successful tokens of a given model or type. As such, they were judged as pleasurable but 
non-artistic.”23 The ‘organisational aesthetic’ (repetition, innovation, quotation) is thus 
connected to the value of art as entertainment.24 The genre film is easy to follow; it has a 
familiar storyline and a foreseeable outcome; it provides types and forms we recognise and 
feel comfortable with; it assures us that conflict is necessary but resolvable, that distinctions 
between good and bad exist (if they are not always distinct from each other) and that they are 
maintained by a value system external to the plot. The genre film is accessible to a mass 
culture because this culture has internalised its conventions and functionality. In this culture, 
genre is the dominant cinematic form. It was the staple of the Hollywood studio system of the 
30s, 40s and 50s, and has remained so in the era of blockbuster cinema and the film 
franchise. 
The visual structure of genre emphasises what Carroll calls the “pictorial 
representation”:  
 
These images [single shots – a close-up or long shot] are, for the most part, 
representational, but, more important, they are pictorial representations. They refer to their 
                                                
22 Altman, 10-11. As a response, Altman proposes that a study of “these two categories is complimentary, that 
they can be combined, and in fact that some of the most important questions of genre study can be asked only 
when they are combined” (11). 
23 Eco, “Innovation and Repetition,” 162. 
24 See Hollywood Blockbusters: The Top Grossing Films of All Time, introduction: “Movies are about fun, 
entertainment, sharing, and above all, sheer escapism.” Of course, the ideological theory of the Cahiers du 
Cinema group, particularly the seminal essay by Jean-Luc Comolli and Jean Narboni, 
“Cinema/Ideology/Criticism,” views the escapist/entertainment aesthetic as diversion and repression strategies 
by an industrialised Hollywood machine. 
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referents by way of picturing, by displaying or manifesting a delimited range of 
resemblances to their referents. By recognizing these similarities, the spectator comes to 
know what the picture depicts, whether a man, a horse, a house, and so on.25 
 
Carroll accounts for the popularity of mainstream cinema as “pictorial representations [that] 
differ radically from linguistic representations. The speed with which the former is mastered 
suggests that it does not require special learning…Rather, the capacity to recognize what a 
picture depicts emerges in tandem with the capacity to recognize the kind of object that 
serves as the model of the picture.”26 Carroll’s contention seems to be that popular cinema 
functions through an inherent familiarity; the pictorial offers the accessibility of a 
recognisable form. While I feel this is an oversimplification of the appeal of popular cinema, 
I agree that the popularity of mainstream cinema is related (if not proportional) to its degree 
of accessibility. The Silence of the Lambs is a rich and complex genre hybrid, yet was one of 
the box office hits of 1991 and can be credited with establishing the commercial viability of 
the serial killer genre as divorced from the staple and tested ‘crime film.’ Generic over-
simplicity perhaps accounts for recent box-office flops such as Catwoman and Daredevil, or 
the tawdry crime films Double Jeopardy (the reference to Double Indemnity is misleading; 
the film achieves nothing of Double Indemnity’s virtuosity as noir) and The Bone Collector. 
The acceptability of genre by mass culture (the crucial legitimation that is withheld 
from the art film) derives from its status as a popular form. Genre is equally ‘of the people,’ a 
popular form constructed and conventionalised for the masses, but authorised and legitimated 
by its popularity. One of the more obvious contrasts between the genre film of classical 
Hollywood cinema and the art film of the 1960s and 1970s27 produced within the Hollywood 
system is the linear structure of its narrative and the emphasis on resolution and narrative 
closure. There are remarkably few films that could be considered mainstream successes that 
depart from conventional narrative forms. Similarly, one could contrast Jim Carey’s Joel 
Barish (Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind) with his embodiment of the generic everyman 
in Truman Burbank (The Truman Show). Barish exemplifies an art film whimsy and 
dissociation from a conventional (generic) external reality, Truman is the epitome of that 
generic role; Carey’s often hyperbolic performance even lends itself to caricature. 
                                                
25 Carroll, “The Power of Movies,” 82. 
26 Carroll, “The Power of Movies,” 83. 
27 Consider Bogdanovich’s The Last Picture Show (1971), Malick’s Badlands (1973), Scorsese’s Mean Streets 
(1973) or even Polanski’s Chinatown (1974), which is clearly not classical noir in the spirit of The Maltese 
Falcon (1941) or The Big Sleep (1946). 
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Jancovich, discussing the work of James Naremore and Andrew Tudor, suggests that 
approaches to the study of genre, while dissimilar structurally,  
 
illustrate the point that genre definitions are not simply of academic interest, but have far 
greater currency and significance. Both also emphasise that genre definitions are produced 
more by the ways in which films are understood by those who produce, mediate and 
consume them, than they are by the internal properties of the films themselves.28 
 
The currency stems from the notion that generic properties are in some sense a reflection of a 
cultural reality; genre is an indicator of the kinds of stories, characters and ideas that pique 
the enthusiasm of mainstream audiences and mainstream cultures. This is no doubt the case. 
Genre cinema is connected to the structure of an external reality as formulaic, or already 
familiar. Perhaps there is also a sense of the generic role or story as partaking of a collective 
mythic store and reconfiguring that myth as textual trope. However, the shortcoming of 
Jancovich’s approach lies in the less thorough treatment of the internal properties of genre 
films, a shortcoming that is all the more apparent when one considers the stylistic and 
thematic of the work of Leone, Tarantino, Fincher, Paul Thomas Anderson and Christopher 
Nolan as genred properties. In this field of postmodern cinema, or New Punk cinema, or 
some other designation of contemporary innovative film practices, the integrity of genre 
matters. 
 
4.5 Genre and Contemporary Cinematic Forms 
It is clear that the centrality of genre films in popular culture demands a strategy for assessing 
the formal characteristics of generic forms, as well as their impact on audiences and cultures. 
“What can be said about genre? It seems universally true that escapism rules when it comes 
to blockbusters.”29 I would add that escapism functions on a textual familiarity. The recent 
increase in the number of remakes or sequels in Hollywood reflects the essential 
conservatism in the studio production ethic. Genre cinema forms are bankable. 
The pervasiveness of formal genre principles in the dominant mode of contemporary 
cinema (the franchise or blockbuster film) is a crucial aspect of any study of mainstream 
                                                
28 Mark Jancovich, “Genre and the Audience: Genre Classifications and Cultural Distinctions in the Mediation 
of The Silence of the Lambs.” In Horror: The Film Reader, ed. Mark Jancovich (London: Routledge, 2002), 
152. 
29 For an analysis of the highest grossing films, see Hollywood Blockbusters: The Top Grossing Films of All 
Time, 8-9.  
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cinema. If the dominance of cinema in popular culture is contingent on an element of 
escapism, genre is central to the development of this trend from classical Hollywood to the 
present. Braudy suggests that  
 
the typical genre situation is a contrast between form and content. With the expectations of 
stock characters, situations, or narrative rhythms, the director can choose areas of free 
aesthetic play within. In genre films the most obvious focus of interest is neither complex 
characterization nor intricate visual style, but pure story. Think about the novel we can’t put 
down. That rare experience in literature is the common experience in film.30  
 
‘Pure story,’ I would argue, relies on a sense of storied patterns, familiar narratives, stock 
character types and settings – in short, the elements of genre. Braudy is correct to suggest that 
genre offers a realm of aesthetic play, but it is a realm that is constrained by generic 
principles. The parameters of genre are an aesthetic point of impact. The boundaries of the 
genre story or characterisation, to use Braudy’s fields of inquiry, invigorate the familiar 
patterns into something immediate, vital and authentic. Citing Ian Eng, Jancovich suggests 
that “it is not the fact of differences [of tastes in popular culture] but ‘the meaning of 
differences that matter.’”31 One could equally argue that the boundaries of genre respond to a 
set of prescribed tastes that are different in specific ways and that reflect the differences in 
generic plots and characters. The internal properties of genre matter as sites of cultural 
meaning when consumed by the spectator. Thus, even familiar plotlines or characters are in 
some sense invigorating. This is not to conflate invigoration as a response to a mode of 
creativity with a more traditional sense of ‘originality’; I am not arguing that genre cinema 
aspires to a classical aesthetic of originality. 
While genre studies presents a number of shortcomings as a cinematic meta-theory,32 
cinema is increasingly reliant on generic forms to be commercially viable. But of even 
greater significance is the pervasiveness of generic tendencies in even the most self-
conscious art film. Bordwell contends that “the art film defines itself explicitly against the 
                                                
30 Leo Braudy, “Genre: The Conventions of Connection.” In Film Theory and Criticism, ed. Leo Braudy and 
Marshall Cohen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 668. 
31 Jancovich, “Genre and the Audience,” 152. 
32 See David Bordwell, “The Art Cinema as a Mode of Film Practice.” Film Criticism 4, no. 1 (1979), 56-60. 
Bordwell suggests that there are clear distinctions between the classical narrative and what he calls the “art 
film.” In this case, a theory privileging the study of genre in cinema must neglect Antonioni’s L’Avventura, 
Fellini’s La Dolce Vita and Coppola’s The Conversation. However, I am persuaded by Eco that genre is more 
pervasive than contemporary literary theory acknowledges – see Eco, “Innovation and Repetition,” 174.  
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classical narrative mode, and especially against the cause-effect linkage of events.”33 But the 
nature of the distinction between art film and commercial genre product is increasingly 
difficult to locate. I appreciate Bordwell’s detailed analysis of the distinction between genre 
films and art films, but a complication arises if we revert to Schatz’s distinction between the 
genre film and film genre, which might equally (and even more pronouncedly) apply to the 
distinction between the art film and ‘film art.’ While Bordwell draws on a hefty body of work 
from the 50s, 60s and 70s in service of the art film aesthetic (Fellini, Antonioni, Bergman, 
Godard, Truffaut), the obvious thematic and, particularly, formal disparities between, for 
example, Blow-Up (1966) and In the Heat of the Night (1967) are not as clear in 2005.34 
While art house cinemas have continued to operate in spite of the assault on cinema-going 
practices by the multiplex, art films have greatly changed. Who could fill the oversized, 
auteur-empowered shoes of an Antonioni, Fellini or Kurosawa, particularly as auteur theory 
has suffered a galvanising attack by Schatz and other genre theorists? David Thomson’s 
lament for an auteurist cinema of the past privileges the director with too much control of the 
cinematic product and conflates film with a more individualist creative art. For Thomson, 
“Robert Bresson, Bergman, Kurosawa, Antonioni” constitute the great auteurs. “But there is 
not an American filmmaker working today, or even alive, who is unmistakably of the first 
rank.”35 For Thomson, no living filmmaker is good enough simply because the material and 
aesthetic conditions for the production of the ‘art film’ no longer exist.  
The emphasis on the art film as inherently a kind of film art that is divorced from 
genre is increasingly obtuse when measured alongside the films produced each year by the 
major studios. To some extent, it may be said that Fellini, Antonioni and Bergman draw their 
formal inspiration from a mode of European modernism and the avant garde. For these 
filmmakers, cinema was an art form. The production aesthetic of this form of cinema was 
more concretely established as an auteuristic impulse or a traditional form of creativity. Film 
production – even production of a genre cinema in Hollywood’s 40s and 50s – was equally 
art if it was artful. This was particularly the case of the French New Wave revisionist 
assessment of the Hollywood auteurs, Welles, Ford and Hitchcock. In contrast to what 
                                                
33 Bordwell, “The Art Cinema as a Mode of Film Practice,” 57. 
34 Worth noting is De Palma’s fascinating remake of Blow-Up, Blow-Out (1981). De Palma, as he has done on 
several occasions, reworks the art film aesthetic as genre piece. Consider also the quotation of the Odessa Steps 
sequence in Eisenstein’s Battleship Potemkin, reconfigured in De Palma’s The Untouchables as an operatic 
shoot-out in Chicago’s own version of Grand Central Station. 
35 David Thomson, “Who Killed the Movies,” 62. 
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Thomson considers the golden age of cinematic invention in the 70s, contemporary cinematic 
practices (from production to consumption) have effectively divorced the product from the 
realm of artistic authenticity. It is increasingly difficult to talk about any form of 
contemporary cinema (art film or genre film) as film art – increasingly, and belatedly, the 
film theorist no longer feels the invocation to do so. 
Cinema is simply no longer a traditional art form that conforms to the hierarchical 
gradations of high art, mediocre art and trash. Rather, the once vital art film aesthetic finds 
dilution in major production and distribution deals, but more significantly, in self-
acknowledged generic or formulaic stories. Teaching a class recently on what I considered a 
range of ‘essential films,’ I was astonished to discover that James Cameron’s Aliens was 
effortlessly dispatched by the majority as mainstream trash, or generic junk. Even more 
interesting was the corollary notion that while a film might be ‘essential’ to a particular 
spectator (or theoretical discourse), it might also be of little artistic merit and thus unworthy 
of the kind of spectating demanded by the previous week’s essential films, Apocalypse Now 
and Taxi Driver. Aliens was exemplary of a time and place – a “cultural logic,” to use 
Jameson’s terminology – divorced from any meaningful criteria of artistic value. It became 
apparent that for the majority of this class, a sustained viewing of the film was commensurate 
with a lessening of the integrity of the spectator as theorist or critic. Aliens was thus an 
aberration on acceptable viewing practices.  
The limitation of this form of artistic evaluation is that, on the one hand, Aliens is 
increasingly considered a benchmark in contemporary film aesthetics; it thus demands 
investigation. And secondly, Cameron’s form of blockbuster cinema with a B-Grade 
Hollywood aesthetic traverses the spectrum of traditional hierarchical value usually reserved 
for high culture art forms. Jancovich suggests that a traditional notion of artistic value is 
increasingly difficult to apply to recent cinema; he refers to Alien and Aliens in support of 
this contention.36 But even more provocative is something like Almodóvar’s Bad Education, 
which is magnificent as film noir, or neo noir, while simultaneously drawing on the generic 
brand of the art film. Bad Education conforms to the aesthetic of ‘genericity,’ which is to say, 
the purest and yet most corrupt form of genre cinema. Art films in contemporary cinema 
include I Heart Huckabees, The Triplets of Belleville, 2046 and Sin City, none of which 
                                                
36 Jancovich, “Genre and Audience,” 152. 
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conform to the great auteurist/art cinema Thomson describes.  In each of these cinematic 
works, the art film is less an innovative piece than a kind of generic film art. 
The emergence of genre cinema and genre theory is connected to the emergence of 
popular culture as the dominant cultural entity. This is nowhere more apparent, and 
professionally co-ordinated, than in television and its corollary interests (news media, 
corporate advertising, Reality Television). The police procedural drama (Law and Order, 
NYPD Blue) offers hybrid generic configurations of the 80s crime stories and popular 
mysteries. Chris Carter describes The X-Files as a reworking of the television late night 
horror shows of the 1970s, including Kolchak: The Night Stalker.37 Perhaps the best series to 
appear on television since Lynch’s Twin Peaks, The Sopranos offers the most complex form 
of genericity (the series in fact foregrounds this genericity in its numerous quotations of 
gangster films and reality (Tony is compared to John Gotti on several occasions)). I discussed 
the remarkable innovation of 24 and stress here only its genre hybridity (rather than 
genericity, a distinction on which I will elaborate shortly). The phenomenon of Reality 
Television functions as generic reality for prime-time audiences. Survivor draws on Robinson 
Crusoe’s shipwrecked everyman and the communalisation of The Swiss Family Robinson 
(the hit series, Lost, ties into these generic topoi but engages with a Stephen King brand of 
the popular macabre, an intriguing metaphysical structure completely unrecognisable in 
mainstream television, and a Survivor-type challenge of the human spirit). Big Brother is 
perhaps the most interesting example of Reality Television in its generic depiction (and yet 
hyper-stylisation) of the banality of ‘real’ life. These banal existences are only palatable (and 
intriguing) when moulded to generic form through a complex editing strategy. Nondescript 
individuals gradually germinate into recognisable generic types. 
The following analysis of new genre strategies in cinema attempts to employ what 
Jim Collins and others (Rick Altman among them) have described as “genericity.” In 
Collins’s work, I take this to mean more than a conformity to genre or generic types in 
cinema. Rather, for Collins genericity is a complex cinematic aesthetic evident in such films 
as Blue Velvet, Back to the Future, Part III, and Thelma and Louise. What distinguishes 
genericity from the genre film is  
 
                                                
37 See Axel Kruse, “The X-Files: Entries on Meaning.” Sydney Studies in English 23 (1997-8), 110-111. 
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the recognition that the features of conventional genre films that are subjugated to such 
intensive rearticulation are not the mere detritus of exhausted cultures past: those icons, 
scenarios, visual conventions continue to carry with them some sort of cultural “charge” or 
resonance that must be reworked according to the exigencies of the present.38  
 
While I will address this in some detail, we can begin here by assuming that genericity only 
has meaning in relation to former generic strategies, and that it presents a qualitative 
transformation of those strategies. I argue that genericity represents a vital transformation of 
the generic text. Schatz, Neale, Altman, Braudy and others have examined the semantic and 
syntactic features of genre. Genre theory has focused on the Western, the Musical, the 
Adventure Film and the Biblical Epic as staple generic styles in the classical Hollywood era. 
Genericity offers a new approach that reconfigures genre and genre studies, and permits 
finally a means by which to approach genre cinema as aestheticised patterns and textual 
structures, an invigoration of formulaic art and a reinvention of pastiche as a profoundly 
creative aesthetic strategy. 
 The three phases of genre – the classical (or ‘pure’) genre film, the genre hybrid, and 
genericity (that is notable in the work of Leone in the 1960s) – are not chronological, and 
certainly not uniform in their appearance and development. I am not offering a historical 
account of the way in which genericity developed, except to say that it appears to have 
emerged as a textual strategy in the 1960s, but has gained credibility in the mainstream only 
in the 1990s. While it is true that film noir as a category of story is more obviously 
discernible in The Big Sleep or Double Indemnity (though the two are as interesting for their 
dissimilarities as for their generic commonality), departures from the ‘pure’ generic form 
occurred in the classical era as well as in later films.39 It should be stressed that genre is a 
theoretical tool, often servicing broad generalisations about film and culture. It is simple to 
classify a film as fitting a particular genre after the genre has been well established in film 
theory and practice. But it is also clear that genre films of the last two decades have 
undergone a profound transformation that was not clearly apparent or overtly manifested in 
the studio film of the classical era. Tarantino’s version of the heist film in Reservoir Dogs 
does not mirror Dassin’s version in Rififi. Almodóvar’s ‘femme fatale’ in Bad Education 
offers a gender reconfiguration of Barbara Stanwyck in Double Indemnity. And while Back to 
                                                
38 Collins, 256. 
39 Consider the femme fatale of Clouzot’s Les Diabolique (1954) as a variation of Stanwyck in Double 
Indemnity, though the femme fatale is maintained as generic topoi. 
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the Future, Part III is in some sense a Western, simply put, something else is going on that 
dissociates its genericness from the traditions of genre cinema. 
The ‘pure’ genre is a necessary conceptual tool in formulating a theory of genericity. 
Film genre has never been pure, even in its formative period in the classical Hollywood 
system. Generic ‘purity’ in my usage equates to a recognisable generic structure that 
informed the classical genre film, rather than a body of films that exemplify the generic form; 
this is a useful schematic for organising film history even though it is also a generalisation. 
Ryan conceives of classical genre cinema as existing only in relation to the elements of its 
generic form:  
 
A return to the individual film and its analysis enables us to find an appropriate role for the 
system-building, the taxonomic and inventory-oriented activity that characterizes genre 
criticism. Instead of asking the question, ‘To what genre does Mildred Pierce belong?’, it is 
necessary to probe the consequences of positioning the film in relation to the various genres 
to which it has a family resemblance.40  
 
In this sense, genre is also a reinvention of the generic plotline or character in which the film 
exists in relation to other films of its kind. Ryan situates genre studies within the very broad 
rubric of classical genre films, and this strategy will be useful to maintain as we proceed. 
Even a classic genre film such as Double Indemnity is not ‘pure’ or self-contained genre-fare. 
Classical genre cinema, particularly film noir, was based upon a formula, but it was rarely 
formulaic in the current pejorative sense.41 As Bakhtin suggests, the diversion from the form 
or system offers a dynamic way in which the text makes meaning. The ‘pure’ genre film is 
perhaps best thought of as a blueprint of film types that demonstrate a conformity to a single 
generic structure. The Maltese Falcon may partake of a number of film types, but it is clearly 
an early example of film noir (though noir was itself a development of earlier crime genres 
and a European aesthetic sensibility, particularly German Expressionism). Stagecoach is an 
early John Ford Western and has a very clear resemblance to his 1955 film, The Searchers, 
though The Searchers is thematically more complex and filmed in colour. Genre theory has 
rarely settled on a conceptual framework that describes the similarities and differences in 
films that form various genres. Neale suggests that “aside from film noir and 
                                                
40 See Tom Ryall, “Genre and Hollywood.” In American Cinema and Hollywood: Critical Approaches, ed. John 
Hill and Pamela Church Gibson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 110.  
41 For an analysis of the criticism of popular art as formula, see Carroll, A Philosophy of Mass Art, 49-67. 
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melodrama…genre critics and theorists have identified around a dozen major genres.”42 For 
the purposes of this conceptual paradigm – pure genre, genre hybrid, genericity – I designate 
Neale’s dozen genres ‘pure genre’ forms. 
The genre hybrid may describe a particular film or film type. Hitchcock’s To Catch a 
Thief is a combination of action-adventure, mystery and romantic comedy. Psycho is a 
mystery, suspense thriller (a genre almost synonymous with Hitchcock) and perhaps the 
earliest example of the horror/slasher film. Sunset Boulevard is a variation on film noir but it 
is also an early entry in a genre form that would develop in the sixties and seventies, ‘films 
about Hollywood.’43 One could equally discuss Sunset Boulevard as partaking of the 
aesthetic of genericity; Gloria Swanson’s casting in the role of Norma Desmond (and her 
attempt at a ‘return’ in a Cecil B. DeMille film) establishes a ‘cinematicality’ to this 
narrative.  
However, the genre hybrid can also refer to a combination of ‘pure’ genres. Scott’s 
Alien offers a hybrid form of the horror and science fiction genres while Cameron’s sequel, 
Aliens, introduces the war film and adventure film into the original hybrid form. The hybrid 
is less a rigid splicing of separate generic forms than a synthesis. Occasionally a film 
foregrounds its generic hybridity (From Dusk Till Dawn - action thriller becomes 
vampire/slasher film) but I would argue that this is a manifestation of genericity rather than a 
traditional genre hybrid. Eastwood’s Unforgiven (which I will discuss in some detail shortly) 
is a similar case in point in its awareness of its generic structure as well as the genre tradition 
of which it is a part. Neale argues that “many Hollywood films – and many Hollywood 
genres – are hybrid and multi-generic. This is as true of the feature film as it is of an obvious 
hybrid like musical comedy.”44 The hybrid then is less an innovation or commentary on pure 
genre forms than a textual structure that was concurrently employed by the major studios.45 
The genre hybrid can be regarded as a form of genre unto itself. 
 
                                                
42 Neale, 51. 
43 For an overview of the development of this genre, see Christopher Ames, Movies About the Movies 
(Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1997), 3. Notable entries in the genre include Lumet’s Network and 
Altman’s The Player (apart from Wilder’s landmark Sunset Boulevard). 
44 Neale, 51. 
45 Neale, 5. 
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4.6 Genericity: Beyond Genre 
Genericity implies a performance of genre and a stylisation of the generic form. If the pure 
genre and genre hybrid were classical narrative forms that developed under the auspices of 
the studio system,46 genericity is a textual strategy that developed within the postmodern 
aesthetic of reflexivity and textual self-awareness. The genericity film foregrounds its 
construction out of generic (and often genre-clichéd) components. But unlike the pure genre 
and hybrid, genericity is a cinematic aesthetic, a creative strategy that actively comments 
upon and reconstitutes earlier generic types and texts. The pure genre and hybrid merely 
serviced a storyline. As Braudy suggests, the classical genre form is “pure story.”47 The 
contemporary spectator did not address Double Indemnity as a generic system that manifested 
its constructedness. Recent film theory has addressed classical noir cinema as generic, but the 
classical narrative did not practice an aesthetic in which generic composition was 
instrumental. Rather, its genericness was merely a consequence of the commercial viability 
of genre forms and their acceptance by a mass audience. Genre was a form of escapism into 
broad character types and recognisable story patterns. 
The genericity film demonstrates two significant transformations on the pure genre 
and genre hybrid forms. Collins alludes to genericity as a textual strategy: “I use the term 
“genericity” here because I want to address not just specific genre films, but genre as a 
category of film production and film viewing.”48 In the studio era, genre films were crucial to 
the success of the studio. Studios invested in a number of genre films each year to guarantee 
a return on their investment. The studio genre film was considered a product for the masses 
that guaranteed the financial prosperity of the industry. “Maintaining certain formulas that 
would stabilize audience expectations and, by extension, stabilize those audiences, was 
obviously in Hollywood’s best interests.”49 The genre film compensated for the experimental 
projects, Citizen Kane and The Lost Weekend (though a studio could still bank on Billy 
Wilder to carry some weight as director). The genre film was thus associated with the cultural 
masses and the hegemony of the studio system, while dissociated from the art film and 
                                                
46 For a seminal analysis, see Bordwell, “Classical Hollywood: Narrational Principles and Procedures,” 17-34.  
47 Braudy, 668. 
48 Collins, 243. 
49 Collins, 243. 
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independently produced film (which was relatively rare). Genre cinema was commodity 
cinema, the art film was individualised, creative and authored, rather than produced.50 
In contrast to the bankable genre film that developed in a society for which cinema 
was a relatively new art form, genericity took place in the era of a cinematic society that 
Collins describes as a “media culture” manifesting a “profound ambivalence [to traditional 
film genres] that reflects the lack of any sort of unitary mass consciousness.”51 Even more 
crucially, Collins recognises the contemporary film spectator as attuned to a new “cinematic 
literacy” that recognises the “entertainment value that the ironic manipulation of the stored 
information [exemplifying the genericity aesthetic] now provides.”52 Genericity functions as 
a viable cinematic aesthetic only in a postmodern culture in which audiences are familiar 
with a plethora of recyclable cinematic narratives. There is an element of what Collins calls 
“cinematic literacy”53 in contemporary mainstream film viewing that I would argue was not a 
part of mainstream viewing practices in the classical era of cinema.  
A second facet of genericity is the self-awareness of the genre text, a knowing and 
acknowledged textual artifice. While the pure genre is a hermetically sealed frame of 
representation that encapsulates story, character and theme, the generic performance 
necessarily foregrounds its generic component structure, re-presenting what was once an 
original textual utterance. Collins offers a detailed reading of Back to the Future, Part III as 
an articulation of the Western.54 In Zemekis’s trilogy, film is itself subject to quotation; it is a 
spoken (or written) utterance that is “always already so highly mediated.”55 In Back to the 
Future, Part II, Hill Valley of 2015 is a vibrant stream of cinematic tropes. Marty is the 
cinematic flaneur who traverses a pop culture arena incorporating a Café 80s (in which 
Michael Jackson, Ronald Reagan and the Ayatollah Khomeini contest for cultural 
supremacy) and a holographic billboard of Jaws 19 (in which “the shark still looks fake”). 
Crossing a street and almost run over by a car, Marty McFly Jr. calls out, “Hey, watch it! I’m 
walking here, I’m walking here,” speaking the words of Ratso Rizzo (Dustin Hoffman) in 
Schlesinger’s Midnight Cowboy. Back to the Future is a deliberate and explicit quotation of 
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51 Collins, 262. 
52 Collins, 249. 
53 Collins, 249. 
54 Collins, 242-243 and 248-249. 
55 Collins, 247. My emphasis. 
 181 
the Americana of the 1950s that developed on film.56 In fact, the cinematic 1950s in Back to 
the Future intrudes into the reality of the 1950s as recorded history. Thus, Marty McFly 
(Michael J. Fox) is overhead singing Johnny B. Good by Marvin Berry, the cousin of Chuck 
Berry: “Chuck! It’s Marvin…Marvin Berry. You know that sound you’ve been looking for? 
Well, listen to this.” A Chuck Berry that exists in the imaginary realm of the cinematic 1950s 
inaugurates rock ‘n roll by quoting a performance of Johnny B. Good by a 1980s American 
every-teenager (!). Zemekis manages to rewrite history on film in a similar way in Forrest 
Gump.  
In each of these cases, but most explicitly in Back to the Future, Part III, the film 
demonstrates an awareness of its own immersion in ‘generic legacies.’ What makes Collins’s 
reading of Back to the Future, Part III all the more compelling and provocative is the notion 
that this self-awareness and exhibition of generic components provides a ‘cultural charge’ to 
the spectator that is indeed a new way of experiencing mass entertainment. 
 
4.7 Performing Genericity 
 
Contemporary film criticism has been utterly unable to come to terms with these very 
profound changes in the nature of entertainment because this hyperconscious eclecticism is 
measured against nineteenth-century notions of classical narrative and realist 
representation.57 
 
Drawing on Todorov’s work on the notion of verisimilitude in relation to “the fantastic,” 
Steve Neale suggests that “Negotiating the balance between different regimes of 
verisimilitude plays a key role in the relations established between spectators, genres and 
individual films. In markedly non-verisimilitudinous genres these relations can be 
particularly complex – and particularly fragile.”58 He concludes by suggesting that the 
emphasis on realism as an ideology in cinema (and more generally, art) “is to refuse to 
acknowledge the generic status of realism itself.”59 Presumably, verisimilitude forms the 
basis of aesthetic and other forms of artistic engagement. Neale’s claim regarding non-
                                                
56 For an assessment of this form of 1980s Americana as ‘Reaganite Cinema,’ see Andrew Britton. “Blissing 
Out: The Politics of Reaganite Entertainment.” Movie 31/32 (1986), 13-15. Britton considers this form of 
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Wood, “Papering the Cracks: Fantasy and Ideology in the Reagan Era.” In Movies and Mass Culture, ed. John 
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57 Collins, 250. 
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verisimilitudinous genres such as science-fiction, musicals and horror films is that, at some 
level, the generic representation must bear some relation to an object – that which it 
represents. To disavow this relation is to negate the status of the representation. Perhaps one 
might discuss abstract art as a move toward this negation of the object, though even this has 
limitations; abstract impressionism bears some relation to a prior objective point of reference, 
impressionism. Neale’s study of genre is a defence of the importance of generic forms – 
plotlines, characters and themes – to contemporary cinema and culture. For Neale, the 
verisimilitude inherent in generic representation on screen is a verisimilitude that matters.  
At this point, it is instructive to set Neale’s verisimilitude in opposition to 
Baudrillard’s notion of the reproduction without an antecedent object discussed in Chapter 
Three. I drew on the simulacrum – the Matrix – as a useful metaphor to traverse the gap 
between Baudrillard’s seemingly absurd claim regarding origins and points of reference and 
the necessity of observing the very real challenge to traditional verisimilitude, or classical 
realism. The Matrix is a reproduction of the Real that bears the “residual image” of its 
antecedent object. Rather than an image that is a literal reflection or reflective representation 
of the object, the relation between the Real and the simulacral representation lies in the status 
of the residual image. The residual image, partaking of the original but transformed by the 
performance of the simulation, operates as a discursive (rather than denotative or 
connotative) system of meaning. The cinematic image is a hermetically enclosed frame of 
meaning, drawing on its own origins that are self-reflective, forming its own cinematic 
language. Metacinema in the current usage refers to a cinema that is about cinema. In my 
usage, the connotation is nearer to a cinema that is always already of cinema. 
Tarantino’s brand of metacinema imbues the cinematic image with a life that is 
derived from an antecedent object located in a cinematic universe. The performance of 
quotation, generic utterance, and ultimately, genericity, reinscribes the original utterance (the 
veracity of which is now redundant) into a cinematic simulacrum. Tarantino’s cinematic 
images bear the verisimilitude of a cinematic simulation. In Pulp Fiction, Butch (Bruce 
Willis), fleeing the scene of the fight he has ‘fixed,’ sits in the rear seat of a cab driven by 
Esmeralda Villalobos (Angela Jones). When Esmeralda asks the meaning of his name, Butch 
replies: “This is America. Our names don’t mean shit.” This is an American pop culture and 
pop cinema is which names are inscribed as cinematic tropes. Much of the extended sequence 
(which was trimmed in the final cut from a very lengthy (and laboured dialogue) is shot from 
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the front of the taxi, with Esmeralda and Butch in focus. Tarantino uses a screen to shoot the 
exterior backdrop which displays a winding road as the cab makes its passage along a 
dimply-lit road. The use of the screen in this case is particularly significant. Tarantino 
simulates a shot that would have been used in a studio film of the 40s or 50s. The backdrop is 
noticeably contrived, deliberately artificial. The quotation of a generic car interior (the yellow 
cab synonymous with New York City (though almost all ‘New York’ exteriors of the 
classical studio films were shot on Hollywood backlots)) and the backdrop that shifts in and 
out of a deliberately contrived focus recalls scenes out of Wilder’s film noir or Hitchcock’s 
suspense thrillers. But whereas Wilder and Hitchcock were attempting the purest form of 
realism that technology provided (the most perfect verisimilitude at hand), Tarantino 
encapsulates the shot in a wholly anachronistic cinematic time and space. The result is a 
disorienting shot from the exterior of the cab of a classical studio vista in a 90s film. 
Tarantino’s characters inhabit a world bordered only by cinema itself and the yellow cab 
traverses a winding road that exists only onscreen. 
I argued in Chapter Three that The Matrix required a sophisticated awareness of its 
intertextual strategies to make sense of its storyline – specifically, to authorise Neo’s 
resurrection at the conclusion of the film. I argue something similar in the case of Tarantino. 
Tarantino’s films require an awareness of its intertextual (but more crucially, metacinematic) 
strategies to appreciate its aesthetic possibilities. Collins describes this aesthetic engagement 
as a “cultural charge.” This is no doubt the case. But there is something more than culture at 
stake. There is also the inscription of a new aesthetic value founded on the play of the 
cinematic text within the language of cinema. I am suggesting that Tarantino’s cinema 
demands a transformation in the ontology of the spectator/theorist, and this transformation 
(that is equally a transformation in the ontology of the artist-filmmaker) is something as 
profound and creative as the early challenges to classical realism posed by auteurs such as 
Antonioni and Godard. Tarantino’s films are hermetically enclosed cinematic quotations that 
proliferate into a diversely articulated popular culture as quotation themselves, generating 
new cinematic trends and a new reality of metacinematic awareness. The attempt to create a 
new form of cinema out of the detritus of a past cinema is hardly original to Tarantino, but 
Tarantino’s auteurism is new in its embrace of the corruption of the ideal, or really real, or 
authentic. Creativity here lies in an illegitimate authenticity that stems from a love of cinema 
(or better still, a love of ‘movies’) rather than a love of ‘art.’ 
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At the same time that Tarantino was being accused of a vacuousness apparently 
endemic to the MTV generation, or generation X, or the ‘Me Culture,’ he was also accused of 
a kind of cinema that is non-serious, superficial and, in its worst incarnation, irresponsible. It 
is a cinema that represents, according to Christopher Sharrett, “an inhumane vision, a 
worldview that prefers the cynicism and self-absorbed death-fantasies that have always been 
the hallmark of capitalist civilization.”60 In short, Tarantino’s films are themselves a waste 
depot, a detritus of junk parts synthesised into a product without meaning or value. In 
addition to this, as Tarantino refuses to take his screen images seriously (the argument goes), 
he divorces himself ethically from the consequences of his images on the culture that views 
his films. Tarantino is part of a contemporary culture that experiences violence, gender and 
race only as a cinematic representation, desensitised to real acts and real consequences. But 
he is more insidious than this. His films scrape away at a system of cherished and proven 
artistic values, revelling in the kind of chaotic referentiality that exemplifies a debased 
culture. How can the serious critic validate the pop culture references, particularly when 
Tarantino appears to offer little distinction between pop culture, pop capitalism (monologues 
about McDonalds, for example, or the merits of a certain kind of fast food over another), pop 
racism (“you’re my nigger”) and pop urban violence (“We gonna go to work on my homes 
here with a blowtorch and pair of pliers…we gonna get medieval on his ass?”)? Tarantino 
offers it all in a kaleidoscope of pop iconomania, lovingly depicted in the kind of detail and 
authenticity that is the hallmark of a ‘seriously-minded’ artist. 
This kind of criticism of Tarantino (which can be designated the ‘argument of non-
seriousness’) is inevitably ideologically motivated. What is perceived as non-seriousness in 
Tarantino’s films is instead the apparent lack of a distinct kind of seriousness evident in 
cinema prior to the advent of Tarantino’s “allusionism and bankruptcy of codes.”61 Thomson 
reflects on Coppola and Scorsese as America’s halcyon days, or Bergman and Fellini as the 
equivalent in Europe.62 For Sharrett, Tarantino’s brand of cinema that savours a “pop culture 
detritus” is a consequence of the ubiquitous market, late capitalistic production, conspicuous 
consumption, and the industrialisation of filmic processes.63 Crucially for Sharrett, and 
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exemplary of this form of criticism of the so-called postmodern aesthetic, is the lack of 
“worth or concern outside the realm of cheap commercial representation.”64 One assumes that 
Tarantino’s allusionism has little in common with Joyce or Eliot. Rather, this allusionism has 
nothing to sustain its performance or support its aesthetic ambitions. It is merely a dispersal 
of meanings into an overcharged, chaotic, ultimately valueless arena in which pop culture 
holds tenuously to its transparent meanings. 
My argument is that the film theorist must come to terms with the ontology of the 
cinematic text as discursive. Inherent in this discursivity is the performance of cinema as 
cinematic trope, or a sophisticated system of pop culture allusionism. The theorist cannot 
search for value in the ruins of a classical aesthetics. Such an aesthetic pursuit is futile in a 
postmodern cinema in which a traditional classical aesthetic system is meaningless. Sharrett 
might question the value of a new aesthetics in which myths of urban alienation and 
disenfranchisement are mediated by the street philosophy of Eminem and Dr Dre; these same 
street philosophers chart the abjectivity of the contemporary self through the itinerary of 
mega-corporate entities such as IPod or Limewire. I argue that such questions can only be 
meaningfully explored if the initial point of contact between theorist and object is a mutual 
experience rather than abstract criticism. Metacinema is a performance, and as such, is 
subject to an aesthetic appreciation.  
For Neo, the Matrix provided access to a “residual self image” that synthesised and 
ultimately made redundant the really real self. I argue that the self that coheres in what Lisa 
Purse calls a “hypermediate”65 culture is derived through a textual performance that 
implicates the subject in its textual itinerary. This is not the claim that audiences revel in 
allusion-spotting in The Simpsons, Seinfeld or a Tarantino film. Rather, what I perceive in 
what Sharrett implies is a culture of allusionism is a sense of collective self (and ultimately 
community) that materialises in the textual system – the allusive fabric. For those engaged in 
this culture, and this experiential process, I suspect it is a very real collusion between artist, 
text and subject. 
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4.8 The Metacinematic Aesthetic: Tarantino – Leone – Eastwood 
In one of the iconic film sequences of the last two decades, Ringo (Tim Roth) and Honey 
Bunny (Amanda Plummer) hold up a coffee shop (“Why not?”) in Pulp Fiction. Rather than 
a conventional hold-up – suspense, violence, the separation of criminal and victim – this set 
piece presents a sophisticated reworking of the generic hold-up. Amid the absurdity of the 
situation (the fact that Jules and Vincent end up in the same coffee shop as Ringo and Honey 
Bunny is an ingenious and unpredictable development), Tarantino locates the scene within a 
frame of reference that extends from cinema/television’s origins to its present. The coffee 
shop is an imaginary space that partakes of a lineage of generic themes: transformation, 
revitalisation, violence, beginnings and endings. The characters that enter this coffee shop 
inhabit its cinematic space and time; they are well versed in Green Acres, Happy Days and 
Kung Fu. This is a time and space in which popular culture is performed, and in which the 
screen and the object it seeks to represent are no longer distinct. Collins describes a similar 
synthesizing of the screen and object in relation to Back to the Future, Part III. Marty McFly 
(Michael J Fox) must travel back to 1885 to rescue Doc Brown from the Old West. In the 
sequence in which Marty time travels, he speeds the Delorean up to 88 miles per hour, 
driving directly into a drive-in movie screen displaying a marquee-type representation of 
Indians. Collins suggests that  
 
when the characters travel back in time to the Old West, their trip is actually a voyage into 
the Old Western…his avenue to the past is a film screen, a metaphor literalized by his 
driving a time machine through a drive-in movie screen in order to reach the past. The 
screen, then, is a portal to a nineteenth century that can exist only in the form of images, in 
the form of cinematic reconstructions, and their very materiality is overtly foregrounded by 
the text, a point made especially explicit by the fact that the drive-in happens to be located 
within Monument Valley.66 
 
After entering Hill Valley of 1885, Marty assumes the role of the Man With No Name 
(though in an inventive twist, he assumes the name of Clint Eastwood), the banter of Doc 
Brown and Marty recall Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid, Mad Dog Tannen is a 
caricature of the Western villain (perhaps Liberty Valance (Lee Marvin) in Ford’s The Man 
Who Shot Liberty Valance; both characters, Liberty Valance and Mad Dog Tannen 
                                                
66 Collins, 248. My emphasis. Monument Valley is significant because it is the location of several John Ford 
Western sequences, notably The Searchers; for Zemekis, Monument Valley is also the site of Leone’s homage 
to Ford and his own cinematic quotation that Zemekis is reproducing here. 
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conspicuously refer to their nemesis as “dude”), and Hill Valley itself represents the building 
of a new town in Western cinematic mythology, recalling Leone’s Once Upon a Time in the 
West. In Back to the Future, Part III, there is also an unfinished railroad that will materialise 
in the future, at which point the old railroad as new frontier (traversed by steam engines) is 
usurped by electric trains and Deloreans! The culmination of Western cinematic mythology 
in Once Upon a Time in the West (and perhaps the realisation of all that Leone had wanted to 
say on the topic) materialises at the point at which Jill McBain (Claudio Cardinale) provides 
water to the men who build the station house in Sweetwater. A train whistle is heard, the 
steam engine moves in and out of shot, and Harmonica (Charles Bronson) rides off into the 
distance, a Western hero erased by the coming of the New West and the New Western. 
 Remarkable in Tarantino’s cinema is the imbrication of this metacinematic aesthetic 
without a textual indicator. Zemekis provides the screen that functions as a metaphor of the 
transition between cinema and an external reality. Back to the Future, Part III presents a 
cinematic Western, a Western that not only finds the Old West on film but inscribes itself as 
part of cinematic legacy. Tarantino’s cinematic universe seems to materialise with the first 
sounds and images of the film. Reservoir Dogs opens with the muted discussion of Like a 
Virgin that incorporates several other pop culture references. Pulp Fiction begins in the diner 
and moves into the “royale with cheese” discussion. Tarantino does not explicitly indicate the 
parameters of this cinematic universe (as Zemekis does through Back to the Future, Part III). 
Jack Rabbit Slims, a “wax museum with a pulse,” is a microcosm of the wax museum that 
encapsulates each frame of Tarantino’s cinema. 
 Kill Bill, Volumes 1 and 2 achieve perhaps the most perfect realisation of metacinema. 
The cinematic space is explicitly constructed from the opening shot, including Tarantino’s 
novelistic chapter structure. Characters inhabit the screen ephemera of their cinematic 
precursors. The Bride (Uma Thurman) is a gender transition on Eastwood’s Man With No 
Name of Leone’s Dollars Trilogy. The opening shot on the Bride’s bloodied face functions 
on several levels as metacinematic performance. Bill’s (David Carradine) disembodied voice 
reincarnates the figure of Kane (David Carradine) in the cult T.V. show Kung Fu – in Pulp 
Fiction, Jules (Samuel Jackson) says to Vincent (John Travolta): “I’ll just walk the Earth – 
like Kane in Kung Fu.”  In Kill Bill, Volume 1, Kane rematerialises in an old Church in some 
anonymous town in the Old West. The opening in the Church (which is replayed from several 
perspectives in the film) functions as a performance of two earlier film sequences. The initial 
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performance appears in Leone’s Once Upon a Time in the West in the sequence in which Jill 
McBain (Claudia Cardinale) arrives in Sweetwater. Frayling describes a single tracking shot 
in this sequence as the most complex shot Leone had attempted up to that point in his 
career.67 The camera begins on Cardinale as she moves from the locomotive toward the 
station-house (this is the same station-house seen in the first sequence of the film, which is a 
majestic set piece that seamlessly quotes Zinneman’s High Noon). The tracking shot holds 
Cardinale as she moves onto the station house platform and enters through the door, shifting 
out of shot. Now the camera tracks upward (on a crane) and above the station-house roof to 
survey the magnificent vista of the generic Western town, Sweetwater, which moves with the 
frenzied activity of a town with a newly established railroad. The camera pause at the top of 
the pan is accompanied by Ennio Morricone’s powerful theme. 
 This sequence is reproduced with remarkable acuity in Zemekis’s Back to the Future, 
Part III. Instead of the widow entering a new town, Marty McFly (Michael J. Fox) enters Hill 
Valley of 1885. The town is a motif for Zemekis’s Americana trilogy as it is for Leone, or 
John Ford, to whom Leone is obviously indebted for several sequences in Once Upon a Time 
in the West. Zemekis’s camera replicates the complex camera track, surveying a newly built 
Hill Valley with its functioning railroad. Alan Silvestri’s score replicates the movement (if 
not the melody) of Morricone’s. In this sequence, Zemekis is offering an explicit, self-aware 
quotation of Leone’s sequence. As Marty McFly passes through the makeshift entrance to the 
new Western township of Hill Valley, the camera rises on a crane (reproducing Leone’s 
camera move) and survey’s the majesty of Hill Valley for the first time from above the town 
entrance (if not a station-house). Zemekis’s shot is in fact a repetition of several similar shots 
of Hill Valley of 1985 (Back to the Future), 1955 (Back to the Future), 2015 (Back to the 
Future, Part II) and 1885 (Back to the Future, Part III). 
 Tarantino offers a stylistic quotation of the same sequence, relocating the town 
entrance to the entrance of the Church, where the Bride is killed. Instead of the track from 
below to above the station-house in Leone and Zemekis, Tarantino uses an equally complex 
pan and tracking manoeuvre to shift from the interior to the exterior of the Church, again 
rising from the ground to a position above the Church. It is significant that this cinematic 
space (setting) in Kill Bill, Volumes 1 and 2 is visited several times, and from several 
different perspectives.  
                                                
67 Frayling. 
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 From the opening sequence in the Church, the film moves to The Bride, who lies 
comatose in a hospital bed. The interior will comprise the space of Tarantino’s ‘De Palma’ 
set piece. Her passage from the hospital to the final showdown with Bill is a re-enactment of 
Bruce Lee’s passage in Game of Death to confront his final opponent. In the miraculous set 
piece in the House of Blue Leaves, The Bride is clad in a tracksuit identical to Lee’s in Game 
of Death. Prior to the confrontation, The Bride rides a motorcycle through the streets of a 
cinematic Tokyo in which aeroplane passengers carry samurai swords on their person. The 
confrontation between the Bride and O-Ren Ishii (Lucy Liu) recalls a discursive performance 
of prior cinematic encounters, in which the sole figure must find her passage to her nemesis.  
Prior to Tarantino’s Pulp Fiction, the notion of metacinema (or metafiction, for that 
matter) referred to a cinema about cinema.68 As I have indicated, my usage of metacinema 
refers to a cinematic spectacle that is always already of cinema. In this performance of a new 
cinematic aesthetic, Sharrett’s grievances concerning a detritus of allusive fragments seems 
obtuse. The new aesthetic is not merely intrinsic to a very significant part of recent cinema, 
but it is necessary for an aesthetic engagement with a kind of cinematic text. I would argue 
that the new cinematic subjectivity is increasingly receptive to this mode of experiencing its 
art forms. 
  
Eastwood’s Unforgiven is perhaps the most elegant metacinematic representation of the 
Western since Leone’s Once Upon a Time in the West. Frayling’s authoritative commentary 
on Once Upon a Time in the West (available on the DVD) illuminates the degree to which 
Leone’s film is a simulation of prior iconic Western moments. Locations, props, even the 
choice of actor in many cases is merely a cinematic trope installing into the film a prior frame 
of reference. Unforgiven, however, attains a degree of self awareness by installing Eastwood 
as character, actor, filmmaker, and mythic figure into the universe of the film. In fact, 
Eastwood as actor forms the basis of a major strand of Western cinematic mythology since 
the early 60s. Had Leone and Eastwood not parted after The Good, The Bad and The Ugly, 
one could well imagine Eastwood reprising his persona in Once Upon a Time in the West 
(though what would that film be without Charles Bronson!).  
                                                
68 See Ames for this common usage. My notion of a cinema of cinema shares something with Pisters’s reading 
of Deleuze in which she formulates the “Universe as Metacinema” (chapter one). Pisters traces this notion 
through Hitchcock and Deleuze. 
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The Man With No Name is often described as an anti-hero despite embodying certain 
overtly heroic tendencies. At the end of A Fistful of Dollars, the Man With No Name rescues 
a boy and his mother from Escobar (Gian Maria Volonté), the villain of the piece. The child, 
named Jesus, establishes the Man With No Name as “the good,” a moral/ethical status he will 
reprise in The Good, The Bad and The Ugly. While Leone’s Man With No Name is far 
removed from the basic incorruptibility of Gary Cooper in High Noon or Alan Ladd in Shane, 
he manages to reflect the unremitting evil of Lee Van Cleef’s turns as the bad in For a Few 
Dollars More and The Good, The Bad and The Ugly, or the organised villainy of Escobar in 
A Fistful of Dollars. Zemekis’s reflection of the Man With No Name in the every-teenager 
Marty McFly is particularly inventive. Marty is a rogue with a heart of gold, but he is not 
beyond a little opportunism (which comprises the storyline of Back to the Future, Part II, in 
which Marty purchases a sports almanac in 2015 to take with him to 1985). Zemekis 
prefigures the coding of the Man With No Name in Marty’s character in Back to the Future, 
Part II. Marty confronts Biff with his knowledge of the almanac as Biff watches the ending 
to A Fistful of Dollars. In the showdown in Back to the Future, Part III, Marty places a metal 
plate beneath his poncho (that inscribes him as the Man With No Name, Eastwood) before 
facing Mad Dog Tannen. The fact that Marty pulls out of the showdown merely functions as 
a knowing transformation of an earlier Western topoi.  
Unforgiven finds the Man With No Name in his later life, widowed with two young 
children, working a small farm. The casting of Eastwood in the role (and the fact that 
Eastwood as director establishes a lineage to his The Outlaw Josey Wales (1976) and Leone’s 
Westerns of the 60s) inscribes Unforgiven as a metacinematic presentation of a Western 
cinematic mythology. The opening credits situate this story in a tradition of Westerns; 
cinematic tropes in this form of metacinema establish familiarity rather than originality of 
story, character and theme. William Munny’s (Eastwood) ‘character arc’ knowingly engages 
with the topoi of the Man With No Name, and more specifically, the incarnation of the Man 
With No Name in the physical presence of Eastwood. The topoi of the classical Western 
format find a new expression in Unforgiven that reflects on an original presentation. Munny 
must rediscover the essence of his cinematic self – literally a self inscribed on film. Rather 
than a debunking of the Western myth, Unforgiven is also a celebration of a cinematic 
mythology that has been re-presented for a cinematic audience aware of its origins. Munny 
recalls Bronson’s Harmonica, who rides off into the sunset, indelibly inscribed with a sense 
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of passing. In Cheyenne’s (Jason Robards) words, “men like that have something inside. 
Something to do with death.” Eastwood’s Munny brings new life to a cinematic myth, and a 
mythical being, but it is less a myth reflected on an American West than an American 
Western. Unforgiven is in this sense a functioning simulacrum of a cinematic form, divorced 
from origins, reflecting only on its prior cinematic performances. It is for Eastwood what 
Once Upon a Time in the West was for Leone: an expression of the form through the 
language of the Western genre. Mainstream criticism approached Unforgiven as a critique of 
the mythology of the American and Spaghetti Western.69 I do not wish to reject such 
interpretations out of hand. However, Munny’s final stand, configured as a quotation of the 
generic Western confrontation70 is equally a transformation of the original Western myth (a 
revision of a familiar topoi) in which Munny descends into a violent past; and a romanticising 
of that generic past in which the Man With No Name remains incarnate in Munny’s presence. 
Eastwood could have killed off the Man With No Name at the end of Unforgiven, but he 
chooses not to. 
 
4.9 Metacinema and Postmodern Narrative: The New Auteurism 
Kill Bill, Volumes 1 and 2 permits the discussion of Tarantino’s oeuvre in terms of genre, and 
more specifically for this discussion, the strategy of genericity that I have argued forms the 
basis of a metacinematic aesthetic. The fact that Baudrillard has written similarly about 
Sergio Leone, an obvious precursor to Tarantino, suggests that such a discussion is not 
merely a welcome addition to studies of Tarantino, but a necessary critical trajectory in 
coming to terms with his legacy as a filmmaker. While narrative has received little attention 
from critics of Tarantino’s work,71 in the following section I attempt to discuss narrative in 
Pulp Fiction in formal terms, reflecting on the characteristics of ‘postmodern narrative’ 
described by Lyotard in The Postmodern Condition. Lyotard’s contention is that the basic 
aesthetic of postmodern narrative is founded upon instability, or the process of fragmentation, 
which he attributes to the ubiquity of “language games”: 
                                                
69 See Richard Corliss, “The Last Roundup.” Time, 10 Aug. 1992; see also Michael Sragow, The New Yorker, 
10 Aug, 1992, 70. 
70 See Isaacs and Trost, “Story, Product, Franchise,” 74. 
71 Most writing on Tarantino focuses on a new aesthetic of cinema, emphasising the pop culture references or a 
blasé approach to violence. Yet I would argue that a close examination of the narrative structure of his films is 
rarely undertaken. Tarantino is thus easily reduced to a celluloid figure himself rather than sharing in the 
‘anonymity’ of Hollywood’s great auteurs, Scorsese, Lynch, or more recently, somebody like Paul Thomas 
Anderson.  
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It is useful to make the following three observations about language games. The first is that 
their rules do not carry within themselves their own legitimation, but are the object of a 
contract, explicit or not, between players…The second is that if there are no rules, there is 
no game…The third remark is suggested by what has been said: every utterance should be 
thought of as a “move” in a game.72 
 
Lyotard’s contention is that the presence of language games within narrative renders the 
narrative form subject to extraneous “moves,” and ultimately an inherent instability. 
Furthermore, the notion that an utterance constitutes a move in the game implicates external 
and internal players in the performance of the narrative. I wish to illustrate this principle by 
discussing two narrative frames in recent films. To recall the degree of Tarantino’s 
innovation on classical narrative, I want to focus on a narrative device in Pulp Fiction that, at 
least to my knowledge, has gone largely unnoticed.  
The film opens on Ringo (Tim Roth) and Honey-Bunny (Amanda Plummer) in the 
quintessential American diner scene with a twist. Deciding that restaurants are safer to hold 
up than gas stations, Amanda Plummer (on crowd control) leaps onto a table and says: “Any 
of you fucking pricks move and I’ll execute every motherfucking last one of you.” The 
camera freezes and we move to credits. In the film’s final set piece, we discover (from a 
different point of view) that Ringo’s and Honey-Bunny’s hold-up forms a frame to this 
unwieldy narrative. Linear narrative has been dispensed with: Vincent (John Travolta) sits on 
a toilet though he was shot by Butch (Bruce Willis) in an earlier scene. Vincent’s brief 
confrontation with Butch in a dimly lit bar takes place shortly after the “Bonnie Situation.” In 
the final sequence of the film, returned once again to the diner, we shift from Vincent and 
Jules for the moment it takes Ringo and Honey-Bunny to announce the hold-up. We watch 
again as Plummer leaps to the table for her (now) anticipated line: ‘Any of you fucking pricks 
move and I’ll execute every one of you motherfuckers!’ 
 On a first viewing, or perhaps even on several cursory viewings, the line functions as 
a neat installation of a traditional narrative frame. However, rather than maintaining the linear 
sequence in which cause must eventuate in effect, Tarantino fractures the frame, the one 
coherent and wholly conventional narrative device. The narrative frame recalls an entire 
cinematic tradition, encompassing Billy Wilder’s Double Indemnity [1944] and Sunset 
Boulevard [1950], seminal American noir films made within the studio system and 
                                                
72 Lyotard, 10. 
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emblematic of its great achievement. The narrative frame extends to the realist novel of the 
nineteenth century, particularly Mary Shelly’s Frankenstein, and is predicated on a 
conventional causality. Cause and effect must operate to return the beginning of the narrative 
to its natural end.  
In this sequence, the frame is fractured by Honey Bunny when ‘revising’ her earlier 
exclamation. “Any of you fucking pricks move and I’ll execute every motherfucking last one 
of you” becomes “Any of you fucking pricks move and I’ll execute every one of you 
motherfuckers.” Though not overtly a narrative self-awareness, it is a narrative reflexivity that 
reflects the growing acceptance of non-realist narrative devices, and more specifically, the 
intrusion of alterior narrative frames into a master narrative. Plummer’s revised line makes 
literal what was only metaphorical in classical Hollywood, and notably, Citizen Kane: that 
story is ultimately and resoundingly the contrivance of its narrative framing, subject to 
revision, reversion or, in the case of David Lynch’s best work, dissolution. Tarantino’s 
cinema is ultimately a language game in which a conventional narrative structure and a realist 
aesthetic metamorphoses into the metacinematic ‘frame.’ 
David Fincher’s Fight Club offers a similar intrusion of the non-diegetic space into 
the diegetic, which I would argue is a profound transformation of realist cinematic practices. 
The film charts a presentation of a postmodern odyssey into destruction, oblivion and, 
ultimately, the recuperation of the self – in this it diverts from Palahniuk’s novel which, in its 
conclusion, is unremittingly bleak: the protagonist ends up in a mental institution when his 
explosive charge malfunctions and history is relegated to a perpetual present.73 The film’s 
narrative appears to function conventionally, again with the use of the traditional framing 
device. In the opening scene, the nameless narrator (Edward Norton) and Tyler Durden (Brad 
Pitt) share a conversation, which digresses into a depiction of the events that culminate in that 
conversation. When the viewer returns to the scene, Tyler is unveiled as a destructive (and, 
paradoxically, regenerative) split personality, a degree of sensationalism that weighs upon the 
film’s magnificently rendered (and very fashionable) anti-sensationalism. 
 One of the film’s motifs involves depicting a scene in reversion. The title sequence 
inverts the conventional cinematic gaze: we begin inside the narrator’s mind and exit through 
a point between his eyes to view the barrel of a gun held by Tyler. Fincher’s preponderance 
of experimental cinematic devices – jump cuts, fades, a reduced colour ratio – convey the 
                                                
73 Palahniuk, 206-207. 
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constructedness of the narrative. Tyler’s splicing of porn images into family entertainment 
parallels Fincher’s control of the film narrative, de-framed by Norton’s fractured self. The 
Tyler persona intrudes initially in Norton’s narration in fleeting still shots, mirroring Tyler’s 
splicing of frames of film into a master narrative; it is worth watching the first twenty 
minutes of the film very closely to observe this bold and yet remarkably subtle intrusion into 
the linear, cause-effect narrative. The nearer we come to Tyler’s entrance into the film, the 
more frequent the spliced frames of Tyler’s figure. 
 Unlike Tarantino’s frame that collapses without the impetus of a character, Fincher 
places the narrative in the control of the characters framed within it. The narrative is written 
and rewritten at the whim of the characters that are traditionally its components. An example 
of the reflexive narrative frame (Plummer’s line in Pulp Fiction) expanding to the self-aware, 
ironic placement of characters as creative agents occurs when we return to the frame in the 
final scene of Fight Club. The shot materialises on Norton sitting on a stool with a gun in his 
mouth. The opening credit sequence – a shot reverting from a central point (Norton’s 
psychosis) to the exterior reality – recurs with Norton’s voiceover: “I think this is about 
where we came in.” The two alternate versions of the conversation (the narrative frame) are 
reproduced below. 
 
The Opening 
Tyler: Three minutes. This is it. Ground Zero. Would you like to say a few words to mark 
the occasion? 
Narrator: I can’t think of anything. 
 
The Closing 
Tyler: Three minutes. This is it. The beginning. Ground Zero. [The narrator’s voiceover: 
This is about where we came in.] Would you like to say a few words to mark the occasion? 
Narrator: I still can’t think of anything. 
Tyler: Hmm…flashback humor. 
 
A Tarantino-like alteration occurs with Tyler’s insert “The beginning,” which does not 
appear in the original conversation. However, Tyler’s acknowledgement of the narrator’s 
“flashback humor” reflects a radical narrative self-awareness. And beneath that is Fincher’s 
ironic appreciation of the essential constructedness and contrivance of the traditional 
narrative form. On one level, the “flashback humor” is presented as functioning within the 
narrator’s psychosis – that is, it makes sense because it is only to be expected of an irrational 
mind fumbling over an otherwise accepted sequential narrative. On another level, a narrative 
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origin (cause) is unrecoverable because it is reflected upon by an internal presence. The 
narrator is also a narrative trickster insofar as he is able to alter a narrative sequence 
(conversation 1) required to perform its repetition (conversation 2). Tyler’s and the narrator’s 
simultaneous awareness of the narrative revision fractures what began as whole and must 
thereafter regress to a point of entropy. This is not to say that the narrative fractures into non-
sense, but merely a radically indeterminate kind of sense. 
Linearity and causality, Fincher seems to declare, are merely select ways of telling a 
story subject to the intrusion of an indeterminate narrative voice that is aware of its presence 
within a hermetic structure. It is a textual conceit that ultimately has very little to do with an 
external reality. Various narrative realities converge, each an indeterminate construct of the 
other, each compromised in its integrity by the existence and performance of the other. 
 
I would argue that narrative self-awareness is merely one element of a broader ironic 
relationship that exists between the mainstream cinematic text and a contemporary audience. 
The implications of this shift in aesthetic sensibilities are difficult to evaluate and, indeed, 
conceptualise. If cinematic narrative reflects an increasing uncertainty in narrative truth, 
ideological right and existential purpose, these contemporary auteurs, rather than shying 
away from the disturbing implications, seem to have embraced the aesthetic possibilities. 
Aesthetic innovation, insofar as it is able to establish a ‘wave,’ requires a sensibility and 
mindset willing to receive it. Contemporary mainstream audiences are aware of cinematic 
traditions less as incarnations of an inherent and external Real than as a cinematic mythology. 
The hermetically sealed frame of representation, in contemporary cinema, has been inverted: 
accessing this cinema requires a profound and complex knowledge of cinematic traditions, to 
varying degrees of esotericism. To what extent does an aesthetic appreciation of Tarantino’s 
Kill Bill rely on a prior knowledge of Leone’s Once Upon a Time in the West? To what 
extent is contemporary cinema merely a cinematic performance of prior texts and past 
traditions?  
One characteristic of the films of the so-called postmodern generation is the hyper-
revisionism of its content, aesthetically and thematically. The cinematic image is a 
commentary on film, and by extension, a running commentary on itself. The film-savvy 
culture of the milieu permits and embraces a radical new kind of mainstream cinematic 
appreciation that seems to explore (if not embrace) an alternative aesthetics – narrative 
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experimentation, self-awareness, and the artistic frame as simulation or metacinema – 
marketed by major studio subsidiaries for mass audiences. The implication of this hyper-
revisionism is the loss of an essential and literal realism that was once so pervasive in the 
Hollywood studio film. Tarantino and Fincher reflect obsessively on a cinematic past, a 
cinematic mythology that informs the narrative frame of their films. Their protagonists are 
not only able to stand outside of the mimetic construct, they are able to locate themselves 
within a prior cinematic tradition. 
The new auteurism of Tarantino and Fincher (that is a profound transformation on the 
auteurism of the French New Wave or the Hollywood auteurs of the 70s) lays bare the 
inherent cinematicality of the image. Narrative takes its place alongside other textual tropes 
in a performance space. Bazin’s ‘reality myth,’ in this context, has been reconfigured for a 
cinematic culture practicing a new film aesthetics. Perhaps we might adopt a position similar 
to the residual self-image of the simulacral Matrix, in which a screened reality offers itself 
merely as a vestige of the Real.  
 
4.10 Conclusion 
 
I am first and foremost a film fanatic. I’ve always wanted to make movies, to be part of that 
world. My most important experiences as a viewer are amazingly varied: they go from 
Nicholas Ray to Brian De Palma, from Terry Gilliam to Sergio Leone, from Mario Brava to 
Jean-Luc Godard and Jean-Pierre Melville, and even include Eric Rohmer.74 
 
Auteurism in an age in which the classical auteur has been well and truly killed off (if 
Barthes, Foucault and other post-structuralists were not entirely successful in the realm of 
film, writers like Schatz very effectively described a cinematic text that had little use of a 
single genius75) finds a new form in the era of metacinema. I agree with Thomson that 
Godard, Antonioni and Fellini are no longer reproducible. The cinematic culture has lost the 
material conditions required to produce ‘film art.’ Auteur filmmakers are no longer aesthetes 
but pop culture flaneurs traversing the boundaries of a new cinema inscribed by a very real 
cultural agency. And perhaps even more crucially, the new auteur’s expression of 
authenticity resides in an awareness of film, film references and the cultural detritus of so 
many scenes, set pieces and throw away lines of dialogue. This is the cultural screen in which 
                                                
74 Peary, 7. 
75 See Schatz, “The Whole Equation of Pictures,” 93-94. 
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film means. To ask what ‘allusionism’ means is to impose an aesthetic sensibility wholly 
incompatible with the process of cinematic meaning in the contemporary mainstream scene. 
Rather, the spectator (and the theorist) should ask how it is performed.  
This is a kind of cinema that has drawn the Real into itself, making it cinematic, 
offering a series of tropes and topoi (that Eco discusses in relation to Casablanca or Raiders 
of the Lost Ark) that bounce off of the spectator immersed in the cinematic spectacle. This 
kind of cinema is necessarily hyper-stylistic. It is fundamentally experiential. It is exhibited 
in all of Tarantino’s films, but perhaps most elegantly in Pulp Fiction in which a yellow taxi-
cab, superimposed on an artificial background, maintains its position in movie stasis while 
the backdrop recedes into the distance of a cinematic simulacrum.  
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